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C hairm an: G regory R. Cam pbe
The allo tm ent policy is a t the roo t of contem porary  hun ting  conflicts on 
the F lathead  Reservation. In  particu lar, the m anagem ent of fish and  gam e 
an d  ju risd ic tion  over those w ho use tribal resources have resu lted  in  an 
extrem ely long-standing controversy. The conflict has been  betw een  the state 
of M ontana and the Salish-Kootenai Tribes since the A ct of 1904 opened  u p  
the reserva tion  to non-Indian  settlem ent. O pening u p  the reservation  to 
w hite  settlem ent w as an illegal act, and  therefore the tribes are strongly 
o pposed  to the state asserting jurisdiction over tribal people, land  and  
resources. The evolution of gam e laws on  the reservation  is a d irect 
reflection  of U.S. land policies concerning N ative A m ericans. Because federal 
pohcies w ere am biguous an d  poorly p lanned, they set u p  potential conflicts 
over au thority . These conflicts w ere then  left to be b a ttled  ou t betw een  the 
tribes an d  the state.
W ith  the force of law  beh ind  them , the state easily asserted  jurisdiction 
over Ind ians, their land, and  their resources. The Salish-K ootenai how ever, 
never gave u p  opposition. They strongly opposed the allo tm ent policy, and  
the in tergovernm enta l confusion it caused. They sp en t m any years defining 
their righ ts to control reservation  m atters based  on their treaty  and  various 
federal acts and statutes. The tribes have gained g ro u n d  in asserting their 
jurisd iction , and they have recently en tered  into a com pact w ith  the state for 
jo int au tho rity  over som e fish and  gam e m atters. N ow , how ever, they face 
serious opposition  for exerting control over their resources as w ell as 
au th o rity  over non-Indians. Today non-Ind ian  residen ts  on  the reservation  
are d em and ing  to be pro tected  from  w hat they see as unnecessary tribal 
con tro l.
To p rom ote understand ing  of hun ting  conflicts on  the F lathead 
R eservation, this study  will exam ine the U.S. policies im plem ented  betw een  
the signing of the Treaty in  1855, and  the 1994 Tribal Self-G ovem ance Act. In  
add ition , it w ill look at over eighty years of various justifications devised  by 
the Salish-K ootenai and  sta te au thorities to keep the  evo lu tion  of gam e law s 
in  m otion . W ith a be tter un d erstan d in g  of tribal h isto ry  and  their 
in te rgovernm en ta l relationships, today 's conflicts can be seen outside of the 
realm  of racism. This study  w ill dem onstrate  tha t m any  of today 's conflicts 
over fish and  gam e m atters exist because of am biguity , poo r p lanning, and  the 
p aternalism  found in federal an d  state Ind ian  policies.
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CHAPTER I;
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to show  the relationship betw een the U nited 
States policy of land allotm ent and the developm ent of contem porary 
hun ting  conflicts on the F lathead Reservation in M ontana. Due to the 
allotm ent policies im plem ented in the early tw entieth  century and opening 
the reservation to w hite settlem ent, jurisdiction over land has become a 
serious political and em otional issue for bo th  Indians and  non-Indians living 
on the reservation. This conflict over the jurisdiction of land directly applies 
to the regulatory control of gam e laws. H unting conflicts arise betw een 
Indians and their non-Indian neighbors because each group falls under 
separate federal, state, and  tribal laws. Currently, the Confederated Salish- 
Kootenai Tribes are being challenged by m any non-Indians who oppose gam e 
laws im plem ented by the tribes. Those opposed to tribal regulations are often 
non-Indians living w ith in  reservation  boundaries w ho contest tribal 
jurisdiction over the acts of non-tribal m em bers as well as over their 
property, w hich they believe to be no longer a part of the reservation.
Since the reservation w as opened to w hite settlem ent, approxim ately one-
half of the land base has been appropriated  by non-Indians. This private
ow nership  of land by non-Indians has created problem s of jurisdiction over
the entire land base. Because private property  is not legally ow ned by the
tribe, jurisdiction over bo th  indiv iduals and p roperty  has generally fallen
u n d er M ontana state law. Jurisdiction over fish and  gam e have been
separated  from the land, how ever, and  therefore fall u n d er the m anagem ent
of the tribe, w ho currently  have joint control w ith  the state of M ontana. The
Salish-Kootenai have tu rn ed  the m anagem ent of w ildlife in to  revenue for
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the tribes. This revenue depends upon  attracting non-m em bers and  tourists 
w ho fish, hunt, and  recreate on the reservation. Consequently, any non-tribal 
resident m ust purchase a joint s ta te / tribal perm it to h u n t w ith in  the 
reservation, even if they h u n t on their ow n property .
The required purchase of the perm it by non-Indians has recently set off 
conflicts betw een Indians and  non-Indians. A lthough objection to paying for 
the perm it may seem petty, m uch m ore is at the root of this problem . A t its 
root lies the issue of sovereignty and  freedom  for the Salish-Kootenai. 
Sovereignty and freedom  m ean having control over issues pertain ing  to land 
and resources that ultim ately concern the well-being of the tribe. It is, after 
all, a land base the tribes reserved for them selves since 1855. On the other 
hand , non-Indians believe they should  have the right to use the resources on 
their p rivate property  w ithou t facing additional fees or restrictions. If 
restrictions or taxation are to be im plem ented, they believe that bo th  should 
fall exclusively under state law. Ultim ately, m any non-tribal residents 
believe tha t Indians should not have the pow er to regulate how  non-Indians 
exercise their private p roperty  rights. They have com plained for years that 
state and federal laws are contradictory, and  are often im plem ented illegally 
w ithout considering the consent or w elfare of non-Indians. In effect, the 
conflicts today create problem s for bo th  sides.
The U.S allotm ent policy continues to affect all contem porary issues over 
jurisdiction on the reservation. If lands had  no t been allotted, joint control by 
Indian  and  state authorities w ould  have been  avoided, leaving the State of 
M ontana w ith  little or no jurisdiction w ith in  the reservation  and leaving the 
Salish-Kootenai to m anage their people and  resources as they see fit. As 
m atters currently  stand, no one w ants to fully relinquish  au thority  over fish
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and  game, because that authority  includes the pow er to use and m anage 
resources as well as generate income. In  addition, it w ould be hard  to 
relinquish  jurisdiction over m igrating gam e because it does not stay w ithin  
reservation  or state boundaries, m aking joint m anagem ent betw een the tribes 
and the state an appealing idea to bo th  sides.
Joint control allows for sharing of the inform ation and  expenses of 
regulatory  gam e control; how ever, joint control does no t solve the follow ing 
questions tha t need  to be answ ered. W ho should  ultim ately have control 
over fish and  gam e w ith in  the reservation, and  w hat jurisdiction should  
non-Indians fall u n d er if they com m it a gam e violation? In a land base 
checkerboarded by the ow nership of both  Indians and non-Indians, can each 
area afford to have separate laws? W ould tha t be a feasible solution, 
considering the problem s of patrolling each area w ith in  the reservation? As 
anim als m igrate across the reservation they cross p roperty  boundaries.
Should a person in  possession of w ild gam e be held accountable based on 
laws tha t pertain  inside tha t particu lar boundary, or should they fall under 
hunting  regulations based on a theoretical tribal or state "ownership" of the 
game? All of these questions have becom e troublesom e. The problem s 
include w ho should issue perm its, w ho should  regulate and  enforce hun ting  
laws, and  w hose court should hun ting  offenders face charges in. Councilm an 
H ank Baylor acknow ledged these problem s w hen running  for his four-year 
term  in 1993. H ank stated that the "checkerboard ow nership  of land 
challenges us aU the time." C ouncilw om an R honda Swaney stated in  the 
sam e election that the tribes are in a position w here if they don 't exercise 
their jurisdiction, they will certainly lose it. She suggested tha t the tribes
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continue purchasing as m uch land as possible on the reservation to elim inate 
m any of the jurisdictional and  legal problem s occurring today. ̂
These issues connecting private ow nership of land and hunting rights 
w ith in  reservations have been discussed am ong law m akers for years. Some 
of the m ore recent discussions aim ing to w ork out long term  solutions to this 
problem  began in  1965 w hen the tribes and the state began w orking tow ard 
joint jurisdiction over particu lar m atters on the reservation, and in  1968 
w hen  the Senate held hearings on the m anagem ent of w ildhfe on federal 
l a n d s . 2 Several m ore recent conflicts have been  filed in court, setting 
precedence for fu ture decisions over fish and  gam e authority  on reservations. 
For instance, in the 1983 court case of New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 
the court held that "New Mexico could not regulate non-m em ber hunting  
and  fishing on the M escalero Apache reservation. This decision was based 
upon  a balancing of the com peting federal, tribal, and state interests at stake in 
state regulation. The facts in the case w eighed strongly in favor of 
invalida tion  of state r e g u l a t i o n . T h e  ruling favors tribal jurisdiction over 
the issues pertaining to wildlife w ith in  the reservation, indirectly allowing 
som e tribal au thority  over non-Indian gam e violators. A nother case know n 
as U.S. V.  Montana ru led  in favor of the state. In this case the ruling decreed 
w ho should  m aintain  jurisdiction over hun ting  rights on tribal lands w ith in  
the C row  reservation. N ot only was the state of M ontana allowed to continue 
issuing state licenses to non-m em bers, b u t the state w as also perm itted  to 
im pose restrictive bag limits and  hun ting  s e a s o n s .^  Ultim ately this case 
determ ined that the state possessed a "great interest" in the preservation  of 
gam e w hich m igrate across the reservation boundary, leaving the Crow  
nation w ith  little if any authority  to control their ow n resources and  generate
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income. M ore im portantly, this decision blatantly  d isregarded  the C row s’ 
right to self-governm ent. The C row  lost their recourses w hile the state of 
M ontana m ade m oney from  issuing hun ting  perm its.
The inconsistencies of these various rulings are perhaps the reason that 
b la tan t hunting  violations by non-m em bers of the Flathead reservation  have 
becom e a com m on occurrence. The fact that court rulings are often 
inconsistent is one reason the Salish-Kootenai like to avoid any litigation 
over gam e issues. Historically, a case ruling has been a test of one's rights. As 
it stands, the tribes need to keep w hat control they have over resource 
m anagem ent and hunting , and  if any m ajor litigation occurs w ith in  this 
realm , they risk losing the jurisdiction they have been asserting. O n the other 
hand, if they do not actively press charges against those individuals that break 
tribal laws, there is a chance that the gap in jurisdiction will be subsum ed by 
the state and they m ay face disrespect of their justice system  from non- 
Indians. The evolution of tribal law  has p roven  that if Indians do not exert 
their jurisdiction and pow er over their land base, they lose their rights to do 
so.
Methods and Materials
Before we can offer possible solutions to contem porary problem s, we have 
to stop and look at w here we stand on a particular issue and how  we got 
there. Today, m any anthropologists w ho study  contem porary issues are 
pu tting  an even greater em phasis on studying  the history behind the issues. 
They, like myself, are convinced that history has charted  the course for m any 
of today’s social, political, and  economic views, as well as for the decisions we 
m ake concerning these issues. In this particu lar study  of the Salish-Kootenai,
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I have found tha t historical circum stances have not only influenced, bu t have 
virtually  created the present form  of relations betw een  Indians and non- 
Indians on the Flathead Reservation. For this reason I have chosen to use an 
ethnohistorical approach  to this study. E thnohistory is the study of prim ary 
docum ents from  an anthropological perspective.^ This m ethod exploits 
various historical resources including  journals from  governm ent officials, 
correspondence betw een tribal m em bers and federal and  state governm ents, 
new spaper articles, transcripts of tribal m eetings, and  docum ents and 
correspondence of local w hite settlers. The docum ents are used in 
conjunction w ith  ethnographies and  o ther m aterials, and  w hen all m aterials 
are critically analyzed, and  p u t into context w ith  other docum ents, they can 
give the reader a perspective on issues at a very personal level, reproducing a 
particu lar m om ent in time. This study will focus on  the personal experiences 
and views of the C onfederated Salish-Kootenai people.
E thnohistory is different from  history because of the approach one uses to 
look at historical inform ation. The objective is to gain insight into how  a 
culture perceives their ow n actions, beliefs, and  behavior, over time. 
Ethnohistory adds the insight of anthropology, allow ing you to critically 
analyze oral history or w ritten  docum ents, in  o rder to elim inate m uch of the 
fictitious or legendary perceptions tha t we see in  w estern  histories. Flistory 
has often been in terpreted  to give credence only to the testim ony of Euro- 
Am ericans. This being the case, ethnohistory  is a different approach, in tha t it 
is typically a cultural b iography about people w ho have traditionally been 
d isregarded  or ignored in history.
W ithout an understanding  of the Salish-Kootenai perspective and  their 
cultural phenom ena, the conflicts created by culture contact on the F lathead
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reservation  are im possible to solve. By em ploying an  ethnohistorical 
m ethod, I will study  tw o aspects of the C onfederated Sahsh-Kootenai people. 
The first will prim arily deal w ith  culture contact and  how  it has affected 
contem porary  relationships betw een  Indians and  non-Indians. The second 
aspect of this study will look at the evolution of legal jurisdiction on the 
reservation 's fragm ented landscape. In doing so, w e will begin to see how  the 
tribes legitimize their cultural and political decisions that also affect m any of 
their non-Indian neighbors. The history presen ted  in this thesis is largely 
chronological. It will include the in terp retation  of culture contact betw een 
the Salish-Kootenai and  the non-Indian  people w ho settled and in tegrated  on 
the reservation. It will look at how  the policy of allotm ent initiated and 
consum ed people in em otional and  legal battles concerning the value, use, 
and  rights over the land.
Exam ining the evolution of legal jurisdiction on the reservation is 
im portant because law  affects and is affected by behavior, attitudes, and the 
w ay people interact w ith  each other. O n the F lathead Reservation the 
im plem entation and  violation of laws have p roduced  a very em otional 
history for Indian-w hite relations. Laws reflect and  shape in tergroup 
attitudes th rough  time. Ultim ately, this thesis will show  how  the policy of 
allotm ent has influenced or affected legal decisions pertain ing  to gam e rights 
on the reservation. E thnohistory will take us back in tim e to see w here 
conflicts began and how  attitudes w ere justified over time. A study of this 
kind cannot be successful w ithout acquiring adequate data  on the various 
groups w ho participate in the larger social system. The archives often reveal 
personal a ttitudes and em otions tha t are som etim es lacking in personal 
interview s, or inform ation that can not be atta ined  due  to its controversial
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political nature. A critical review  of past events and  historical docum ents is 
absolutely necessary in o rder to attem pt to reveal accurate, tru thfu l accounts 
of events on the Sahsh-Kootenai reservation. Bruce Trigger w ho w rites on 
the ethnohistorical m ethod  adds that;
The m ain checks on the quahty of ethnohistorical research are 
m ethodological. The m ost im portan t of these are the techniques 
shared by all historians and ^vhich ehtnohistorians have borrow ed 
from  them. These relate to the evaluation of sources and under­
standing their biases. They also ensure that interpretations are 
tested against a sufficiently com prehensive corpus of data and that 
evidence that does not support an  in terpretation  is taken into 
account no less than  that w hich does.^
Trigger and o ther great anthropologists have given excellent advice as to 
how  one insures a scholarly approach" to historical in terpretation, and  I do 
agree w ith  their m ethodology. M any scholars have spent years, how ever, 
trying to ensure tha t the in terp reta tion  of historical docum ents is "scientific." 
A lthough I agree tha t one can reveal patterns of behavior and interaction by 
using a consistent m ethod of in terpretation, I do not believe that this 
in terpretation  can be a totally scientific adventure. One's ow n experience, 
m ethods of com parison, fairness to each argum ent, and  personal insights into 
a situation perm it w ell-grounded in terpretations. These are the qualities I 
have applied  to this study  along w ith  my historical know ledge of the 
F lathead Reservation and  m y im partial observation of the historical data.
I was aw are that problem s could arise in my research; for instance, m ost 
w ritten  sources for my study identify only the attitudes of influential people, 
ra ther than  the view of the average person  w ho lives on the reservation.
This has not posed a problem , how ever, because 1 resolved to stick to the 
sentim ents and actions of the influential leaders and  political organizations 
w ho have been forced to w ork together since the signing of the 1855 Treaty.
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These political organizations are the representative voice of a good portion  of 
the people. In  addition, it w ould  be extrem ely difficult to portray the 
sentim ents of all of the Salish-Kootenai because of the diverse backgrounds 
and  attitudes w ithin  the nation. I am  also aw are that this ethnohistory has a 
few gaps in the chronological study. N on-Indian testim ony has naturally  
been m uch easier to come by than  Indian  testim ony because w estern history 
has often overshadow ed the history of the Indian nation  w ith  w hich it 
interacts. A lthough there is archival inform ation w ritten  by or for the Salish- 
Kootenai people tha t contains em otional pleas, responses to certain events, 
and  letters addressing cultural conflicts, there are m any events and time 
periods that contain few clues as to the sentim ents or actions taken on  the 
part of the tribal people.
Ethnohistory as a m ethod is certainly a bridge betw een anthropology and 
history. It allows the researcher to use historical data  to gain insight into the 
present. The interaction betw een  Indians and  non-Indians on the reservation 
cannot be understood  today w ithout taking into consideration the continuity 
of policies and attitudes that have existed over time. Bruce Trigger refers to 
this m ethod w hen he tells us that ethnohistory  can give us some insight into 
how  attitudes of the previous generations affect the historical record they 
produce.^ U ltim ately, the goal is to bring together the history of bo th  sides of 
today's conflict. In this study, I am  attem pting  a brief historical reconstruction 
from  the Salish-Kootenai perspective. By attem pting  to take w hat w e have 
always thought of as culture contact from  the perspective of Euro-A m ericans 
and look at it from the o ther side, I hope to give the reader a better 
understand ing  of w hy problem s and  attitudes exist w ith  such intensity. It is
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hoped  that this study will yield some explanations of the cause and effect of 
today 's conflicts over gam e rights on the reservation.
Thesis Format
The form at of this thesis will begin w ith  an  in troduction  to the Salish- 
Kootenai people. C hapter 11 will in troduce the history and social organization 
of the people. A lthough this history does not go into any great depth, it will 
give the reader a general understand ing  of the Salish-Kootenai social 
structure and the values associated w ith  land use. C hapter H will then go on 
to look at the process of change and how  it began to heavily im pact the Sahsh- 
K ootenai shortly after they m oved onto the reservation in the 1850's. This 
history is brief, in that it does not address all of the cultural differences am ong 
the m any bands and tribes that are hving on the reservation. Instead, it often 
addresses traits and  characteristics as well as the history held in com m on by 
the C onfederated Tribes. The end of C hapter II wiU briefly contrast the land 
use and perceived rights of land ow nership  betw een the C onfederated Salish- 
Kootenai and  Euro-A m ericans. This contrast should  help illum inate one of 
the very roots of today 's conflicts. It will address historical conflicts stem m ing 
from different cultural attitudes tow ard  the ow nership and use of land. Land 
has sym bolized private boundaries and  a productive investm ent for w hites, 
w hile land  has often sym bolized au tonom y and  a com m unal, non-profit 
existence for N ative Americans.
C hapter HI will be an in -dep th  historical study of the policy of allotm ent. 
This is no t necessarily a study  sim ilar to previous allotm ent studies done on 
this reservation. Ronald Trosper's study  of the allotm ent policy is an in 
depth-study , bu t does not specifically deal w ith  the problem s of jurisdiction
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over land  betw een tribal and  state governm ents. T rosper deals w ith the 
econom ic prospects the reservation w ould  have had  if the allotm ent policy 
h ad  never been p u t into effect.^ C hapter III will look at w hat the Sahsh- 
Kootenai thought of the allotm ent policy, how  it changed their social 
structure and  economy, and  how  the pohcy allow ed the U nited States 
governm ent to m anage and m anipulate every aspect of the Indians personal 
affairs.
The fourth  chapter of this thesis will establish a connection betw een the 
policy of allotm ent, the problem s and conflicting attitudes over jurisdiction of 
land, and contem porary hun ting  conflicts. This chapter will deal w ith  the 
evolution of law  perta in ing  to the Salish-Kootenai reservation  and m ore 
specifically, how  the policy of allotm ent affected the evolution of gam e laws. 
The following chapter will specifically deal w ith  contem porary  hunting  
conflicts, the em otions involved, and  how  the Salish-Kootenai legally justify 
their political and em otional stand  on  the issues.
Implications of This Research
As I talked w ith  w estern  M ontanans during  the last five years, it becam e 
apparen t to me that there is a need for non-Indian com m unities to becom e 
m ore fam iliar w ith  the desires and goals of their Ind ian  neighbors. S tudying 
contem porary  problem s betw een  Indians and non-Indians, I found that 
history is indeed the force beh ind  today's confUct. It is history that estabhshed 
how  decisions w ere reached and  how  they are carried out on the reservation 
today. I hope that this research will give the reader a better understand ing  of 
how  the history of U.S. and  N ative A m erican relations still greatly affects the 
people living on the F lathead Reservation.
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Early policies often w ere not thought out thoroughly and could not have 
foreseen m any of the contem porary problem s they have created. A lthough 
the Salish-Kootenai have had  to deal in  the econom ic and  political realm  
w ith  m any individuals w ho create negative stereotypes of Indians, they have 
also found fault w ith  the com m only held, over-sim plified explanation that 
"racial differences" are the cause of today's problem s. Confhct betw een tribal 
and  non-tribal m em bers often stem s from  a lack of understand ing  of N ative 
A m erican culture, creating views that d istort the reality of tribal history, 
culture, and political goals. This study is especially im portant as an  exam ple 
of how  conflict can becom e a continuous cycle for generations, if a realization 
of its causes is no t effectively understood  by those involved. Often, as is the 
case on  the F lathead Reservation, anger and alienation are the results. 1 hope 
that w ith  a better understand ing  of Salish-Kootenai history and how  law  has 
developed on the reservation, non-Indians will tu rn  to understand ing  and  
com prom ise as opposed to acts that attem pt to deny the tribes of their 
au thority .
CHAPTER H:
THE CENTRALHY OF LAND: A CONTRAST BETWEEN CULTURES 
The C onfederated Salish and Kootenai tribes have generally been 
characterized by their ability to adap t to changing circumstances, because 
th rough  the years they have experienced m any changes in  their land base, 
economy, technology, and  subsistence. Some of these changes were of course 
inevitable, as their way of life dem anded  that they adap t to the natural forces 
around  them. A daptation  w as also a necessity in their long history of 
interaction w ith other cultures. They often interm arried, traded, and w arred  
w ith  neighboring tribes; how ever, no change was as all-encom passing or 
came w ith  such intensity as their in teraction w ith  Euro-Am ericans. This 
change w as m ost devastating to the tribes because the resulting loss of their 
land affected alm ost every aspect of the tribe's well-being. In addition  to 
m ajor land  cessions to w hite America, m any of the relatively small parcels of 
land tha t the tribes reserved for them selves w ere d iv ided and taken as well. 
W hen the tribal enrollm ent lists w ere com pleted by 1909, the total allotm ents 
held by Sahsh-Kootenai m em bers w ere approxim ately one-fifth of the entire 
acreage w ith in  the reservation. 1 By the m id 1980’s, the reservation w as hom e 
to over 20,000 people and only about n ineteen percent w ere of Indian 
a n c e s t r y .2 The Salish-Kootenai and their reservation  are larger than  life 
sym bols of change, adaptation  and  tolerance am ong the cultures and  various 
w ays of life that have su rrounded  them.
A lthough hunting confhct is the topic of this thesis, it is not the ultim ate 
focus of this study. Jurisdiction over hun ting  on the reservation is just one of 
m any topics that illustrate the confusion and conflict caused by the Sahsh- 
K ootenai s loss of land due to the allotm ent pohcy. W e will see tha t
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jurisdiction over land and private property  is at the root of alm ost all 
contem porary  conflicts betw een  Indians and non-Indians. Therefore, we 
cannot sim ply take a superficial look at today's conflicts, b u t m ust travel back 
in  tim e to find their underly ing  causes.
To understand  contem porary problem s pertaining to land and its 
jurisdiction, it is best to first try to understand  the symbolism of land to tribal 
people as it w as in the recent past. We are all p roducts of our history, and 
sym bohc and m ythical beliefs pertain ing  to land are still prevalent in all of us 
today. It is therefore beneficial for us to have an  understanding  of the recent 
social, political, and economic structures tha t w ere directly tied to land use by 
the Sahsh-Kootenai. After looking at these aspects of tribal history, w e will 
then  take a brief historical look at Euro-A m ericans in the N ew  W orld to see 
how  their view  of social structure and  land use contrasts w ith  the Salish- 
Kootenai. We will also look at how  both  perceptions are im plem ented in 
today's society. It is hoped that this will set up  some basic underlying reasons 
for the m isunderstanding  and tension tha t exist betw een the two cultures.
W hat do the land  and  its use m ean to today's tribal people? We can find 
out by looking at w hat it has m eant to them  in the past. There is a perceived 
notion on the p art of m any non-Indians that the previous history or m eaning 
of land to Indian cultures is not relevant to today 's issues. Indians of N orth  
Am erica do not live as their ancestors did; consequently, the argum ent that 
Indian  heritage m ust be preserved and exem plified th rough  tribal law  is 
rarely understood  by non-Indians. O u tw ard  changes in the Salish-Kootenai 
people how ever, do not necessarily m ean tha t the sym bolic im portance of 
their land  has changed. Today few tribal people seem very different from 
their w hite neighbors. M any Indians do  not relate as m uch to the
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characteristics of their ow n heritage as they do to the characteristics of w hite 
A m erican culture. O n the o ther hand , som e Sahsh-Kootenai m em bers relate 
to their heritage on various levels, ranging from  the superficial to the very 
traditional. W hat-ever their views, tribal m em bers have one thing tha t b inds 
them  at som e point and  allows them  to w ork  tow ard  com m on goals—their 
history of being N ative Americans.
The im portance of their cultural ties comes from  rem em bering their recent 
past. That past is reflected in the daily political and  economic decisions m ade 
by the Tribal Council and the various tribal bureaus, as weU as the Council's 
tru st in a com m ittee of elders that advise them . The elders have seen m any 
changes in their lifetimes and can reflect on the changes certain processes 
initiated. They can poin t ou t preventive m easures to help insure the long 
range protection of tribal i n t e r e s t s .3 Decisions to preserve w ater, air, wildlife, 
and o ther aspects of their cultural heritage show  the im portance of preserving 
everything associated w ith  their land  base for the fu ture well-being of their 
people. It is im portan t for non-Indians to realize that today's cultural behefs 
and the ability to integrate those beliefs into Salish-Kootenai politics and the 
economy is im perative. Controlling their reservation in a w ay that benefits 
their ow n people is som ething they have been  outright denied and have 
struggled to obtain since the allotm ent policy w as im posed on them  around  
the tu rn  of the century. Bringing together historical traits w ith  today 's beliefs 
creates a delicate balance because today's tribal beliefs are tied to two very 
different histories. The first and  forem ost history for m any recalls their 
cultural beliefs and  practices of land use before forced integration w ith  
A m erican settlers. These beliefs are bo th  prevalent and  persistent, regardless 
of how  assim ilated individuals m ay appear to others. O n the o ther hand.
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m any Salish-Kootenai have a strong history of assim ilation w ith  the w hite 
m an. Being a m em ber of the tribe does not necessarily m ean denouncing the 
influence of another culture; it sim ply m eans tha t first and  foremost, they are 
Indian. A review  of Salish-Kootenai history will help  us understand  the 
im portance of this first and forem ost aspect...their tribal culture.
Land as Cultural Mandate Among the Salish-Kootenai
Traditional land tenure by the Salish-Kootenai was not based on 
ind iv idual ow nership of land as w e perceive it today. Instead, the land  was 
occupied by tribal entities that controlled tracts of land held in common.
Land use p rio r to the reservation is im portan t because m any historical ties to 
land are symbolically carried out today by the tribal people and their 
governm ent. Carling M alouf lies ou t som e of the historical land use by the 
tribes in his book called Economy and Land Use by the Indians of Western 
Montana.  M alouf explains that the Sahsh and  Kootenai people occupied the 
w estern  region of M ontana for quite som e time, and  this region included a 
m ountainous area stretching from  above the C anadian  border sou th  to the 
M ontana-Idaho border. The region w as also encom passed by the Idaho border 
on the West, and the Rockies to the East. Essentially there w ere several bands 
and tribes that Lived in the large area that was later ceded to the U nited States. 
These various people w ere later designated by the U.S. as one nation under 
the nam e of the C onfederated Sahsh-Kootenai Tribes. The Kootenai 
generally occupied the no rthern  region stretching from  the tip of Flathead 
Lake in  M ontana up  into Canada. The U pper Pend d ’Orielle occupied the 
m id-section of this long stretch of w estern  M ontana. This area ran  from  the 
tip of Flathead Lake south to w hat is now  Arlee, M ontana. This section
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spread east and w est for quite some distance. The Flathead w ere located 
farther sou th  from the C anadian border. They held the land that generally 
ran  from  the tow n of Arlee south  th rough  the B itterroot Valley.4
A lthough the traditional land base of the Salish-Kootenai is systematically 
m apped  ou t today, Indians w ere not confined to such areas. The Flathead, 
w ho often hved in the B itterroot valley, traveled as far east as w hat is today 
know n as Yellowstone and w estw ard  into Idaho. Their subsistence econom y 
div ided  the Kootenai people into tw o tribes. M any hun ted  on the plains of 
M ontana, and  others fished the Colum bia River in W ashington. The 
Indians' economy depended  on the land, and  different times of the year 
required  m oving to a new  geographical area to seek necessary resources for 
food, trade, and m edicine. The seasons, w arfare, and tribal m obihty 
determ ined  the Sahsh-Kootenai econom y and land  use. The reverse w as also 
true, because the Salish-Kootenai w ere tied to the land  in such a way that 
their econom y and  use of the land determ ined w hen  and  w here they w ould 
m ove next. Religion and cerem ony w ere also tied to land use, as bo th  w ere 
believed to alleviate natu ra l disasters affecting tribal subsistence. Religion 
and m ythology also determ ined w hat foods could and could not be eaten. For 
instance, the m eat of wolves, coyotes and foxes w ere avoided because each of 
them  w ere characters in Salish-Kootenai m ythology.^
The Salish-Kootenai People had  obtained the horse by the early 1700's, and 
it becam e im portan t to hunting , trade  and  com m unication. The horse 
allow ed m uch of the tribe to join together to h u n t and process buffalo in the 
w in ter m onths. Entire tribes w ould  m ove onto the eastern  plains in the late 
fall and w ould  rem ain there for u p  to six m onths. Before acquiring the horse, 
they d id  no t usually w inter on the plains as an entire tribe, and hunting
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excursions generally consisted of several indiv idual hunters. The buffalo was 
of g reat im portance un til the m id to late n ineteenth  century  w hen it began to 
d isappear, and  tribal people becam e confined to the reservation. A lthough an 
im portan t resource w as lost w ith  the passing of the buffalo, m any staples of 
life rem ained in the valleys the tribes lived in. The flora in the valleys 
contained various trees, berries, w ild onions, and  edible roots, some of w hich 
w ere m ain items in the diet. Cam as and b itterroot w ere a part of the diet for 
some tribes and  w ere found in abundance th roughout w estern  M ontana.
Deer, elk, ra b b it , moose, fowl, and  fish w ere all im portant food sources and 
w ere num erous as well.
The im portance of the land as a p rov ider of food and  healing becomes 
quite clear w ith  the continued tradition  of the bitterroot-digging ceremony. 
The cerem ony has been changed and  m odified today, b u t the significance of 
the bitterroot as food and m edicine, the season in w hich it grows, and  the 
creator and land from  w hich it comes are still acknow ledged today. The 
bitterroot is dug each spring by those ^vho trek to the Bitterroot Valley. They 
believe the root is the first p lan t food the C reator m akes available to the 
people each spring, and  tha t the grow th of the bitterroot m eans tha t the tribal 
people have been blessed by another year.^
The food produced in the different seasons w as the basis of the tribal 
economy, and determ ined  w here the tribes w ould  reside on the land. Both 
the Salish and  Kootenai calendar kept track of the events in the natural 
w orld. Each m onth  w as nam ed after an im portan t event taking place in  the 
com m unity  or its su rround ing  environm ent.^  According to anthropologist 
H arry  H olbert Tum ey-H igh, the Salish calendar w as d iv ided  prim arily by
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econom ic pursuits, and the twelve m onths of the year roughly  corresponded 
to the following:
1. First m onth: The W andering
2. Second m onth: Three Bands Spread All O ver (?)
3. Third m onth: The Goose Flight
4. Fourth  m onth: The Lovem aking
5. Fifth m onth: Bitter Root M onth
6. Sixth m onth: Cam as M onth
7. Seventh m onth: Service Berry M onth
8. E ighth m onth: O nion M onth
9. N in th  m onth: The H arvest of Ripe Things
10. Tenth m onth: H alf-autum n, or H alf-sum m er
11. Eleventh m onth: A utum n
12. Twelfth m onth: C ontinuous Snow (?)^
One can see the great im portance land itself has played in the Hfe of tribal 
people by looking at one of the few  w ritten  histories of the Kootenai in the 
n ineteenth  century. A t this time, history w as passed dow n oraUy, w ith  the 
exception of those historians w ho recorded it th rough  the use of symbols 
notched onto sticks or pieces of hide. Sometimes they added  knots and beads 
to signify im portan t events in the life of the tribal people. W hen we read  the 
historical accounts of Kootenai m em ber H ollow  H ead, w e find that m any of 
his symbols indicate w here the people w ere located on the land, and  why. 
Wars, treaties and the b irth  of H ollow  H eads' chiefs w ere naturally recorded 
events, b u t the m ore com m only recorded  inform ation included tribal 
campsites, places to "winter," and the resources located t h e r e .9
The condition and the am ount of land available, as well as how  the land 
was utilized, always determ ined the quality of life for the tribal people. The 
entire economy was tied to w hat the land produced  and how  it w as used; and 
w hat the people could not produce they could trade for. The tribal people 
used  trees, barks, w ild grasses, stones, and various parts of anim als for the
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very creation of their economy and livelihood. Crafting m aterial goods like 
baskets, ropes, and clothing allowed them  to live comfortably, and trade for 
necessities and  luxuries like ornam ental and  m etal goods. The tribes cam ped 
in  various locations and each cam psite had  one or tw o im portan t 
characteristics. There w ere places specifically suited to fatten u p  their horses, 
areas tha t offered protection by separating the enem y across a swift river, and 
hunting  grounds w here natural salt hcks attracted  black tailed deer. O ther 
cam psites w ere chosen specifically to give thanks to, or to seek help from  the 
superna tu ra l. 10 All of these types of land and the offerings they produced, 
attached a deep  spiritual value to the land. This spirituality w as directly tied 
to the pro tection  of their people and their hom eland, a "homeland" once 
encom passing thousands of miles of natu ra l boundaries.
The Politics and Economy of Leadership
A m ong the Salish-Kootenai people, political and economic ventures w ere 
generally led by those w ith  special skills and  know ledge. Decisions often w ere 
m ade by the head chief, sub chiefs, or councils in charge of everything from 
defense to subsistence and trade. For the m ost part, the chiefs had no absolute 
pow er, b u t w ere generally respected for their ability to m ake decisions that 
benefited no one individual, b u t ra ther the people as a whole. The chief acted 
as a group 's conscience and could help direct poHtical decisions, bu t the m ain 
economic units of the tribal people w ere their fam ilies.H  As John Fahey 
notes in his book on the Flathead Indians, "The core un it w ith in  the tribe 
was, of course, the family, in w hich cousins to the fourth  degree w ere 
addressed  as brothers and sister. Beyond the seventh, cousins m ight m arry. 
The family constituted an economic as well as a k inship  unit. No distinct
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pattern  appeared  other than  a patriarchal society exploiting a geographic
a r e a /^ 2
A lthough no absolute pow er existed, the position of the principal chief of 
the tribes was very influential, and  heredity  m ost often determ ined his 
position. Major Peter Ronan w rote in the late 1800’s, how ever, that other 
chiefs w ere elected: "The greatest portions of w isdom , strength  and bravery 
w ere combined" to elect [the] w ar chief. "The elections took place every year 
and it som etim es occurred tha t the general in  one cam paign becam e a private 
in jthe  next."^^ This w ar chief had  no authority  over his people at hom e, bu t 
Avhen on the h u n t or at w ar, he exercised his au thority  w ith  great precision 
and pow er. He even expressed his jurisdiction With a long w hip tha t he 
applied to anyone w ho fell out of rank. For m any years, w hipping w as a jv ay  
in w hich tribal laws and m oral codes w ere enforced. Several of the Flathead 
chiefs enforced obedience and harm ony by m eans of w hipping and public 
hum iliation. The people d id  not resent punishm ents adm inistered by the 
chiefs, as children w ere brought u p  to respect him  and  his position of 
au th o rity .^4 Perhaps one of the key characteristics of this form of tribal 
governm ent w as the fact that decisions w ere typically ruled by consensus, 
rather than  by a m ajority ruling or a bu reau  of som e kind. This prom oted  
constant interaction betw een all people, and kept everyone aw are of their 
com m unities needs. The m orals and  values of the com m unity w ere form ed 
partially through the interaction needed to reach a consensus.
A lthough each tribe had  its ow n definition of m oral codes, there w ere 
alw ays some "common sense " law s for each tribe to follow. One exam ple is a 
couple of basic principles taught to Kootenai boys by their fathers and uncles.
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Try to get up  before anyone else. Take your bow  and hunt.
True, the girls will not see your face because you  are out 
hunting  every day, b u t they will know  your fame and will 
w an t to m arry you. That is surer and  better than stru tting 
around before them  all the time...One cannot keep a lie, and 
w hen  the tru th  is know n the cam p will be told and its 
laughter will make you asham ed.
H onesty, generosity, and  personal honor w ere highly esteem ed characteristics
in m any tribes. The chiefs w ere very devoted  to their tribal members, and
they w ere generally respected for all of these traits and  their w isdom  as well.
Olga Johnson's' research of the Salish-Kootenai revealed that the Kootenai
listened and followed their chiefs ou t of great respect for their personal
achievem ents. The chiefs sym bolized the group as a whole, in a way that
Johnson likens to today 's m onarchs of Britain. The chiefs w ere father figures
looking ou t for the welfare of their com m unities. By the tu rn  of the
tw entieth  century, Johnson found, the chief acted as adm inistrator and
persuader to help sort ou t disagreem ents or differences of opinion in critical
tribal m atters.^^
We will see that w ays in w hich tribal chiefs and  their legal system instilled 
values, w ere replaced by federal policies and agents w ho essentially destroyed 
the chief's pow er, and  w ith  it the sense of tribal unity. In doing so, the U.S. 
placed itself in a position to become the new  protector and provider for these 
people. W hen they asserted  their political and  economic authority, how ever, 
the Salish-Kootenai w ere com pletely let dow n by the U nited States. The U.S. 
never seem ed to fulfill the prom ises to either pro tect or assim ilate tribal 
societies. It is certainly no w onder that the pre-reservation days are 
rem em bered so favorably today. A lthough they w ere a tim e of change, they 
w ere also a time of less w ant, greater security in tribal autonom y, and p ride  in 
the people 's heritage.
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From the perspective of the Indian, it is hard  to understand  w hy the w hite 
m an invading the land  undercu t the im portance of the tribal leaders and 
tried so desperately to m old the Indian to a new  w ay of hfe. Unfortunately, 
for years the popular assum ption  am ong w hites has been  that Indians are less 
com plex in  their ability to m anage their people or m ake decisions concerning 
their ow n well being. In reality, the Salish-Kootenai w ere incredibly complex 
in their socialization, spiritual hfe, defense systems, and economics, and they 
have m aintained these qualities in the m idst of forced change. As we begin to 
look at the interaction betw een the Sahsh-Kootenai and  w hite societies, keep 
in m ind  tha t th roughout their relationship, the tribes p u t a very strong 
em phasis on keeping verbal agreem ents and respecting one’s sincerity and 
honesty. Keeping one's w ord  w as expected, and this is how  the Salish- 
Kootenai chiefs and  those of influence approached their agreem ents w ith  
Indians and non-Indians alike. These tribal characteristics often determ ined 
how  they interacted w ith  non-Indians, and  the same characteristics allowed 
for failed dealings w ith  the U nited States governm ent. Their ability to keep 
peace even w hile the agreem ents m ade w ith  the federal governm ent w ere 
failing, show  the tribes' determ ination  to fulfill their original peace 
agreem ent of 1855.
Erosion of the Cultural Landscape
M uch of the rapid  change felt by the Salish-Kootenai culture came around 
the m id 1800's, w hen  w hite expansion w as pushing  its w ay into w estern  
M ontana. Tribal land holdings shrank fast, as settlers pushed  Indians ou t of 
their traditional hunting  territories and  cam psites. As the land becam e m ore 
and  m ore crow ded and the settler's vulnerability increased, the U nited States
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approached the tribes and asked them  to treaty w ith  them. In addition to 
financial rew ards, the treaty w as to reserve for the tribes a tract of land  in 
w hat is now  w estern  M ontana. The reservation seem ed necessary for the 
developm ent of the W est by w hite settlers, as reservations w ould allow 
M anifest D estiny to continue ivithout aggressive interference from  tribal 
nations. A policy separating Indians from w hites was expected to reduce any 
conflict betw een the tw o cultures. As the need for land grew, whites 
justified their desire to purchase Indian  lands. Settlers could not com prehend 
the need for so few Indians to occupy so m uch valuable space. A lthough it 
appeared  to ivhites that Indians "wasted" land by having few people utiUze 
large areas, in reality the tribes needed the large portions of land for survival. 
N evertheless, the Salish-Kootenai agreed to cede m uch of their hunting  
grounds and reserve for them selves a sanctuary large enough for the tribes to 
live on part of the year.
Agreeing w hether or not to live on a reservation was a tough decision, 
because m any Indians opposed the idea, and believed that the settlers should 
be forced to leave. N ative Am ericans w ere already in  com petition w ith  other 
tribes for resources, and  w hites w ere extremely com petitive in using those 
sam e resources. In addition, w hites found Indian  cam psites the m ost 
com fortable and beneficial sites on w hich to locate their com m unities in 
M ontana, as they w ere usually near w ater, trees, subsistence, and grazing 
fields for horses or cattle. O ther tribal m em bers believed that perhaps 
Indians and  w hites could live peacefully together. Their lifestyles w ere very 
different and Indians may have reasoned tha t the settlers w ouldn 't take up  
too m uch space. After all, m ost lived sedentary  lifestyles by Indian  standards. 
But although settlers took u p  a small am ount of actual Hving space, they did
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com pete w ith  the Salish-Kootenai for huge tracts of grazing land. This pu t 
them  in direct com petition w ith  the tribal horse economy and raising cattle. 
The large num bers of settlers' cattle also encroached on w ildhfe grazing areas, 
pushing the gam e farther aw ay and directly reducing the subsistence of the 
tribal people.
A lthough reluctant, the Salish-Kootenai agreed to the arrangem ents in the 
Treaty of 1855 after m any days of discussion and consultation. They agreed to 
cede m uch of their territory to the U nited States, and reserve 1,243,969 acres 
for themselves. The idea of a reservation w as opposed by the tribes for m any 
obvious reasons, bu t w as finally agreed upon  for the m ain reason of 
protecting them selves and their land from  the Blackfeet w ho frequently 
w arred  w ith  them.^0 The Treaty agreed that any conflict betw een Indian 
nations w ould be handled  by the U.S for the tribes' protection.^1 In addition, 
the treaty w as som ew hat of a peace offering to the U nited States on behalf of 
the tribes. As far as the tribes w ere concerned, it was an  agreem ent to stay out 
of each other's way, bu t to cooperate w hen necessary. It is clear, how ever, that 
bo th  Indians and non-Indians w ho negotiated the Treaty had  a h ard  time 
understanding  each other, and  it is noted by Father Hoecken, w ho kept a diary 
of the negotiations, that the translator Ben Kiser w as extrem ely poor at his
skill.22
Once the tribes m oved onto  the reservation, they continued their com m on 
use of the land. M uch land off of the reservation w as still equally im portant, 
and  they continued to preserve their traditional econom y by traveling to their 
accustom ed areas. They continued their beliefs in religion and the spirit 
w orld  and  their linguistic characteristics that culturally  defined each of the 
tribes. Their lifestyle w as quickly inundated , how ever, by the surrounding
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settlers th a t had  developed large com m unities on their traditional hunting 
g rounds and  soon began encroaching on the reservation as well. The new  
land  base and their tribal cultures w ere greatly affected, and rapid  change took 
its toll on  the social unity  of m any tribes. The deterioration the tribal people 
experienced was not due to inflexibility or inability to adap t to new  situations, 
b u t ra ther to the pace and intensity w ith  w hich these new  situations arose.
Besides the devastating effect of the settlers' illegal use of resources on the 
reservation, other events w ere eroding the landscape. M issionaries' 
educational activities and  federal agents' control on the reservation had a 
long term  negative im pact on the Salish-Kootenai. A lthough missionaries 
and agents w ere often respected by Indians for particular qualities, their 
attem pts to transform  Ind ian  society played a prom inent role in severing the 
Indians from  their cultural ties. A uthority  figures exerted m ost of their 
control by illegally confining the tribal people to particular areas w ithin  their 
ow n reservation. A lthough Catholicism  w as w elcom ed by m any tribal 
people, it often overstepped its bounds. For instance, the Indian children 
w ere confined to m issionary schools in w hich they lived aw ay from their 
families. They w ere required  to dress, act, and even speak like w hite people. 
Their parents w ere often confined by the agent to the area w ithin  the 
reservation boundaries. This lim itation destroyed bo th  their success in 
hunting, and their efforts to successfully raise horses and cattle because they 
com peted w ith  non-Indians and governm ent officials for grazing land. This 
fact gave political and  religious figures an open door to controlling the 
economic aspects of Indian life, and in  tu rn  directly affecting tribal law  and 
politics. Chiefs had  been respected for their w isdom  or generosity in 
provid ing  for the well being of their people, and their ability to do  so quickly
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deterio ra ted  after m oving onto  the reservation. The im pact of education and 
law s im posed upon  the Indians by governm ent agents came so quickly that it 
left the tribal people extrem ely vulnerable. This erosion of the tribal 
economic and  political base created a dependency on the various m eans of 
relief the U.S. felt com pelled to offer, bu t this dependency by no m eans 
resulted  in a total cultural breakdow n. Tribal people had  several m eans to 
resist w hite culture, and to slow  the process and im pact of assimilation.
In o rder to understand  the Salish-Kootenai today, we m ust first break 
th rough  som e typical stereotypes. One m isconception is that tribal people 
w ere som ehow  not sm art enough or flexible enough to adap t to changes in 
their economy. They w ere seen as childlike and even foolish at times, 
w ithout the ability to unite and  m ake decisions. Tribal entities w ere certainly 
not static cultures, how ever, and  w ere quite adaptable to change. Travel and 
trade had  previously changed the m aterial culture affecting their economy. 
They w ere generally a people open to new  technology and anxious to leam  
about it, so technology w as not a threatening change to their culture either. 
They only adap ted  the technology that could be easily utiUzed in their 
particu lar economy, how ever, and  this fact kep t them  from  em phasizing the 
m aterial benefits. As D onald Fixico points out in his paper Indian and White 
Interpretation of the Frontier Experience, "Indian groups stressed different 
areas of culture for developm ent such as philosophy and art, rather than 
business enterprise and t e c h n o l o g y . "23  W hether they w ere adapting to new  
technology, or to new  landscapes and  food sources for the year, the ability to 
rem ain  flexible w as indeed a necessary characteristic of the Salish-Kootnei.
A nother com m on m yth about Indians in the past as well as today, is that 
they are too lazy to farm  or enter into an econom y based on full tim e labor.
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Farm ing w as opposed for several good reasons, how ever, and  mostly because 
it d id  no t fit into their cultural economy. A lthough some d id  indeed farm  or 
cultivate gardens, others refused to farm  except out of necessity. Farm ing d id  
not fit into their Hfestyle, and  m any knew  that extensive agriculture w as not 
feasible in w estern  M ontana, considering its frosty w eather, potential 
problem s w ith  insects, and  a soil that consisted of large layers of glacial rock.
It w as a fuU time job to farm  w ith  little money or security in it. In addition, 
E.O. Fuller states that w ars w ith  o ther tribes prevented  them  from cultivating 
crops and advancing in m aterial w ealth. The Sahsh-Kootenai, Fuller says, 
w ere often exposed to enemies, thereby losing m aterial w ealth  in raids, and 
the defensive stance they had  to take created an  unsetthng feehng am ong the 
tribes.24 Until they w ere absolutely forced to farm  due to dim inishing 
resources, m any seriously opposed farm ing as a m eans of subsistence. The 
tribal people knew  well, as settlers like Father M engarini soon came to find 
out, that;
The soil is naturally dry  and filled w ith  large rocks...and we 
cannot find arable spots except along the creeks w hich are often 
located at great distances from  each other. To cultivate one 
h u n d red  acres of land the Flatheads are forced to m ake five 
different cam ps w ith in  a sixteen-mile area. In addition  the large 
rocks h idden  beneath  the surface of the g round frequently break
the plows.25
In spite of the Indians' conviction that their land  w as unsuitable for a life of 
agriculture, Euro-A m ericans pressed on w ith  their attem pts to transform  the 
Ind ian  into a yeom an farm er. The Salish-Kootenai confrontation w ith  this 
overw helm ing and typically condescending and paternalistic culture w as the 
greatest challenge they had to face.
The Indians of w estern  M ontana w ere som ew hat fam iliar w ith  the w hite 
m an as a missionary, trader, and  pioneer. They had  historical encounters
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w ith  w hite people, b u t w ere not forced to live side by side w ith  them. Thus 
no specific event had  th reatened  their cultural autonom y. The situation 
betw een Indians and settlers w as different. Their separate economic pursuits 
forced the two cultures to com pete for the use of the land and the resources it 
p rovided. Personal characteristics em phasized by the tribes as w orthy were 
no t necessarily valued  in all situations by non-Indians. Tribal nations 
expected the qualities of honesty, personal integrity, and  above all, keeping 
one's w ord  to be dem onstrated  by all those entering into agreements. Unlike 
their w hite counterparts, the Salish-Kootenai p u t no m ore value on a w ritten  
agreem ent than  a verbal one. The tribes' sense of com m unity dem anded that 
one's trust and  honor always be m aintained.26 The U.S. and  its people, 
how ever, appeared  to em phasize honesty and the im portance of verbal 
agreem ents only w hen it w as to their ow n advantage to do so. Many 
prom ises w ere not kept, and  the personal integrity of agents and other 
governm ent officials often proved  to be corrupt. The event that first p u t the 
different character traits into perspective and lost the trust of the Salish- 
Kootenai w as none other than  the signing of the 1855 treaty. A lthough we 
have already briefly discussed how  and w hen the treaty came about, it is 
im portan t to take a look at the event in greater detail to see why the Salish- 
Kootenai have em phasized the im portance of this docum ent over the years.
It w as G overnor Stevens w ho represented  the U nited States in the land 
exchange w ith  the Indians of w estern  M ontana. The purpose of this 
agreem ent from  the tribal standpoin t appeared  to be a contract in w hich each 
culture w ould  be ensured safety, and  w ould  control its ow n defined territory 
w ith  little interference from  each other. After all, separation  of Indians and 
w hites w as the U.S. policy at that time. The Flathead reservation was
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officially established in 1859, by the ratification of the Hellgate Treaty. This 
treaty officially condensed Kootenai, Salish (sometimes referred to as the 
Flathead), and  the Pen d'O reille w hich also held small groups of Nez Perce, 
Spokan, C oeur d'A lene, Kettle Falls and Blackfoot Indians, and  a few French 
h a l f - b r e e d s . 27 The C onfederated Salish-Kootenai tribes agreed to cede their 
aboriginal territories tha t ranged  from  M ontana and the Idaho panhandle, to 
parts of British Colum bia and Alberta, C anada ceding approxim ately 25,000 
square miles of Indian  land in exchange for a perm anent reserve of 
approxim ately 2000 square miles. The M ission M ountains are the east wall of 
the reservation, w ith  Evaro Canyon and the Squaw Range m arking the 
southern  border. The Cabinet Range is the w estern  border, and the northern  
bo rder is an im aginary line th rough  the center of the Flathead L a k e . 28 
A lthough the various tribes that w ere united  under the treaty w ere not 
always friendly tow ard  each other, the general a ttitude am ong the Indians 
w as that there w ould be enough land to com fortably separate the bands or 
tribes. They agreed to consolidate for the benefit of peace w ith  the large 
Blackfeet nation, o ther neighboring tribes, and  the w hite m an as well. The 
reservation was essentially large enough for all of the tribes to live on, 
a lthough certainly not large enough for them  to carry out their traditional 
m eans of subsistence or o ther econom ic ventures. The tribal leaders w ho 
signed the treaty d id  not really expect to be confined to the territory w ith in  the 
reservation...it w as sim ply a place to call " h o m e . "29 in  fact, the U nited States 
also m ade it clear that the Indians w ere no t confined to the reservation either, 
as Article III of the treaty gave the tribal people exclusive rights to hun t and 
fish in all accustom ed p l a c e s . 80
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The treaty w as essentially the first encounter the tribes had w ith the "legal 
arm ” of A m erican expansion, and  they soon found ou t that jurisdiction over 
the tribal people had  been am biguously set up  in  the treaty. Only a few years 
after the signing, the U.S. restricted w hen  and w here the tribes could hunt. 
Restrictions on hun ting  ranged from  designating only certain areas to hun t 
buffalo, to agents w ithhold ing guns and  am m unition from tribal m em bers.31 
Restricting the Salish-Kootenai to hunting  buffalo only on specific tracts of 
land on the plains w as particularly devastating. The fact that buffalo m igrate 
som ew hat sporadically, and  rarely use the sam e m igration routes m eans that 
a successful hun t w ould depend  on pure chance if any restrictions were 
placed on the hunter. These and o ther acts on the p art of the governm ent 
created such instabihty, the tribal economy w as no longer dependable.
O ther prom ises of the 1855 treaty w ere not kept, a fact w hich causes m uch 
of today's tension betw een  Indians and  non-Indians living on the Flathead 
reservation. One unkep t prom ise w as the federal governm ent's agreem ent to 
p ro tect the Salish-Kootenai from  w hite settlers' illegally m oving onto the 
reservation and utilizing the available resources. By 1860 there w as already 
great unrest by the tribes, as they com plained that em ployees of the federal 
governm ent w ere no t only avoiding the issue of protecting Indians, b u t w ere 
actually granting perm ission to traders and  settlers to "winter" on the 
reservation. Some of the Salish-Kootenai m em bers w ere greatly offended 
and  rebelled, doing everything from stealing the settlers' horses to destroying 
their perm anen t structures.32 As it tu rned  out, agents becam e m uch m ore 
concerned w ith  the w rongs done by Indians than  w ith  m aking right their 
prom ises to the tribal people.
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The story of Chief Victor and  Chief Charlo is another example of how
casually the articles in the treaty w ere disregarded. After signing the Treat}^ of
1855 the Flathead Chief Victor and his people believed that they w ould have a
perm anen t reserve in  the B itterroot Valley. A lthough he signed the treaty
w ith  the other C onfederated Tribal Chiefs, Victor d id  not w ant to be confined
to the same reservation. Instead, he and his people w ere to be given a
separate location in one of their trad itional hom elands just south of the
Flathead reserve. The Flathead w ere able to live peaceably in the Bitterroot
Valley for only a short while, before w hite intrusion becam e a serious
problem  for them  as it had  been  for neighboring tribes. A gent McCormick
w rote in his agency report of 1868 that the Bitterroot Valley w ith its vast
grazing lands and extrem ely adaptable land for agriculture had brought
several hun d red  w hite people into the valley. In addition  to being attracted
by the land, m any of the new  settlers w ere those w ho w ere following the
fortunes of the m ining prospectors. M cCormick closes by saying that:
The conflicting interests of the opposite races are becoming 
every day m ore and m ore apparent, until w hat now  seems 
bu t a m atter of trivial m om ent, in a few short years, perhaps 
m onths, wiU develop into a question of m agnitude, as these 
lands becom e valuable by im provem ents, cultivation, and 
their close proxim ity to centers of t r a d e .33
The agent of the F lathead reservation at this time m ade the suggestion that
the governm ent take action either to buy out the w hite people and uphold
the agreem ents of the treaty  or to buy out Victor, paying him  for his land and
the im provem ents his people had  built, and  m ove them  to the Flathead
reserva tion .
By the 1870's, the governm ent pushed  for V ictor’s people to disband and 
either take u p  residence in the B itterroot Valley by applying for individual
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allotm ents, or m ove no rth  to the F lathead Reservation. A lthough several of 
the Flatheads w ere farm ing at the time, the idea of allotm ents and paten ted  
farm s repelled them. They w ere determ ined to avoid patents, and to stay in 
the valley prom ised to their forefathers in the Treaty of 1855. In 1871, Chief 
Victor d ied and w as replaced by his son Charlo. It was this same year that the 
Flatheads received an executive o rder to leave their land and join the others 
on the F lathead Reservation. Charlo and several m em bers of his tribe 
absolutely refused to leave based on their treaty rights, and lived in the valley 
for another tw enty years before finally being forced out. The significance of 
this story is that like so m any agreem ents m ade in the treaty, the prom ise to 
Charlo s people w as broken quite easily by the U nited States. Charlo had  been 
prom ised the Bitterroot Valley as a reserve for his people. The President w as 
to survey the land  and if finding it sufficient, the reserve w as to rem ain there 
for the tribe's exclusive use. It w ould not be open to whites until the entire 
m atter w as decided. N ot only d id  the U.S. fail to survey the land as prom ised, 
b u t failed to protect Charlo from  the w hite settlers w hich crow ded in. It was 
of course unreahstic for the governm ent to m ake such prom ises in  their 
treaties because they had  httle if any ability to enforce federal laws over the 
vast m ajority of w estern  inhabitants. If w estern  settlers claim ed that local 
Indians w ere a nuisance, it w as easier for the federal governm ent to bargain 
w ith  the Indians, ignoring agreem ents already m ade to the tribal nations, 
than  to deny the w ishes of their ow n people.
In add ition  to ceding the land  to the U.S., the Salish-Kootenai had agreed 
tha t they w ould also receive m oney and  services following the ratification of 
the treaty. The following w ere to be supplied; $120,000 w hich w ould be paid  
in installm ents of $36,000 for the first four years, and then decrease to
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paym ents ranging from 3 to 6 thousand dollars a year. This money w as to be 
paid  to the tribal people, and the chief w ould receive an additional $500 per 
year for tw enty years, for his services of "public character." In addition, the 
chiefs w ere to have a house built and  furnished for them  w ith  10 acres of 
p low ed and  fenced land. The U.S. also agreed to provide services on the 
reservation that included a hospital, school, carpenter, w agon and plow  
m aker, gunsm ith, and  a saA\' and  flouring-mill. All of these w ere to be 
supphed  and m aintained efficiently by the U nited States governm ent.^b
It was truly unfortunate that the U.S. failed to keep m ost of these prom ises 
w ith  the exception of provid ing  a school im m ediately following the 
agreem ent. The school, w as perhaps the least beneficial innovation the 
governm ent could have devised. The school w as estabhshed to civiUze the 
Indian  and  consequently, it w as built and  m aintained quite weU. It w as run  
by the Jesuit Fathers and the Sisters of Charity at Scdnt Ignatius Mission w ho 
w orked desperately to civiUze and  Christianize the Salish-Kootenai. They 
believed tha t to civihze the children m eant teaching them  the way of the 
w hite m an. They taught the boys reading, w riting, spelling, gram m ar and 
history. The girls on  the o ther hand  learned em broidery, housewifery, and 
sew ing.36 These skills w ere not in them selves w rong, bu t they taught the 
children nothing about w orking and succeeding w ith in  their ow n culture. 
Rather, they learned that their social behavior w as not appropriate, and  as a 
result they lost respect for the w ay their ow n relatives lived. The teaching 
created great difficulties for family m em bers. A gent Joseph T. Carter w rote in 
1894 tha t "It is som etim es pitiful to see an  Indian  father or m other unable to 
speak English conversing w ith  their little one th rough  an interpreter.
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E ducation had a great im pact on transform ing the lifestyle of the Sahsh- 
Kootenai. Education created tension w ithin  the tribes, as people w ere torn 
betw een the way of life they desired, and  the way of life being forced upon  
them . Because their culture had  so quickly been transform ed, the w hite 
m an's education soon becam e a necessity for Indian  survival on the 
reservation. The Indians applied  learned traits to their ow n culture, bu t tried 
to avoid full assim ilation in to  the w hite m an ’s w orld. This apparen t 
w illingness of persons to acculturate, p rom pted  w hites to create new  
stereotypes. Indians tha t farm ed on any level w ere said to be "moral, high 
toned, and  Christianized," and  those Indians like the Kootenai w ho early on 
had  little interest in a so called "civilized" hfe w ere deem ed to be "idle, 
thriftless, im provident, and  dishonest. Both settlers and their 
represen tative governm ent failed to understand  w hy some Indians 
continued to em brace m any of their cultural practices. Because of this 
ignorance, transform ing the Indian  becam e incredibly intense effort on every 
level.
Eventually there w ere other w ays tha t the governm ent and its people took 
control over the Indian, fu rther deteriorating  tribal culture. W hen the w hite 
m an m oved onto the reservation, he created and applied  laws to Indians 
w ithou t any real jurisdiction to do so. Early on, this jurisdiction w as often 
im posed by the Flathead agent. O ne of the earliest exam ples in the archives 
has to do w ith  the A gent Chas S. M edary being instructed to keep aU of the 
Salish-Kootenai w ith in  the reservation  boundary  except w hen hunting  
buffalo. W hen hunting, they w ere to inform  the agent and obtain an  escort 
by a detachm ent of the U nited States troops. This was obviously a problem  
for the Salish-Kootenai as M edary w rites in his agency report of 1876 that the
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orders could not be enforced until a m ilitary post w as established in the local 
v ic in ity  .39 Regardless of reasons for keeping Indians w ithin the reservation 
boundaries, the escort w as a clear violation of their treaty rights.
O verstepping  jurisdictional boundaries m eant the destruction  of Sahsh- 
Kootenai econom y and  culture.
Up until the tim e the reservation had  become their home, it appears that 
the Sahsh-Kootenai had  rarely encountered long periods of starvation or 
need. The illegal jurisdiction asserted  over the Indians in the latter 1800’s 
b rough t w ith  it a host of other troubles. Indian w ars had  already caused 
restrictions on travel, the buffalo w ere alm ost gone, and  m other natu re had  
taken a tu rn  for the worse. Cold w inters and  dry sum m ers caused crops on 
the reservation to fail, cattle and  horses died, and  food of all kinds were 
scarce. In 1871, crickets devoured  all crops belonging to the Pend d'OreiUes 
and that sam e year the F latheads in their attem pt to range farther for food 
encountered  the heavily arm ed Sioux tribe and  lost approxim ately one-fifth 
of their fighting m en, w hich w ere all heads of f a m i l i e s . 4 0  ju st a few years 
later, the tribes had another year in w hich they faced an extremely cold w inter 
that killed large num bers of their cattle, followed by a dry  sum m er in w hich 
they lost m any of their c r o p s . ^ l
Coincidentally, the N orthern  Pacific Railroad approached the tribes during  
this tim e of natural disasters to ask for a cession of land from  their 
reservation  that w as over fifty miles long and encom passed approxim ately 
2,500 acres, on w hich they hoped to build  their railroad. The railroad w anted  
a lot of the good land, including m uch of the land runn ing  along rivers on 
the reservation. A lthough the tribes had  faced great losses and w ere quite 
vulnerable, m any w ere opposed to giving u p  any m ore land. Chief Eneas of
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the K ootenai opposed the session, and  told the representative of N orthern
Pacific in 1882, that;
This reservation is a small country, and yet you w ant five 
depots upon  it. These are the best spots on the reservation.
W hat is the reason I should  be encouraged w hen you take 
the best part of my country? My country w as hke a flower 
and  I gave you its best part. W hat I gave 1 don 't look for back, 
and  I never have asked for it back. The G reat Father gave it to 
us for three tribes, Flathead, U pper Fend d'OreiUes, and Kootenais. 
W hat are w e going to do w hen  you build  the road? We have no 
place to go. That is w hy it is my w ish that you should go dow n the 
M issoula River. I am  not telling you tha t you are m ean, bu t this is 
a small country, and we are hanging on to it like a child on to a 
piece of candy.42
A lthough very reluctantly, the tribes d id  eventually sell their land. They may 
have sold it out of great necessity, bu t it is also apparen t in the letters of Agent 
Ronan that the tribes believed tha t if they d idn 't sell the land, the 
governm ent w ould sim ply take it. The tribes dem anded  from  N orthern  
Pacific h ard  cash in  quarterly  settlem ents, to be p u t directly in the hands of the 
tribes and not the Secretary of the Interior.43 U nfortunately, they never saw 
the money, and  it was deposited  in the treasury of the U nited States to be 
expended for the benefit of the tribes as the Secretary of the Interior saw  fit.44 
These hard  times and the transition into a cash econom y w ithout any access 
to cash, quickly forced m any of the Salish-Kootenai into dependency on the 
federal governm ent for their m aterial and subsistence resources.
In add ition  to destroying their economy, the im posed jurisdiction on the 
tribal people by the federal governm ent undercu t the political strength  and 
leadership  of the chiefs. It allow ed the U.S. to easily interfere in tribal politics 
by refusing to recognize a chosen tribal chief w hen it w as advantageous to do 
so. The A gent could then proceed to appo in t w hatever leaders he believed 
w ould  lead the C onfederated Tribes tow ards the w hite m an's idea of
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civilization. This had  first happened  in 1855 w hen the U nited States 
designated Victor as H ead Chief of the Confederated Tribes. As author John 
Fahey notes, the idea of selecting a suprem e Chief to represent all of the 
various bands, tribes and  nations w as absurd. N ot only was com bining the 
three nations into the C onfederated Tribes an  accident, bu t Indians had 
always chosen their chiefs for particular characteristics valued by the people as 
a whole. There w as no chance that Chief Victor could rem ain any kind of 
real negotiator for the m any tribes. In addition, by 1855 Victor had already 
lost some of the respect of his ow n people for the Christian act of allowing a 
rival to strike him  w ithou t retribution.45 The choice of Salish-Kootenai 
leaders by governm ent agents continued right u p  to the Indian 
Reorganization Act in 1935.
Even in the 1920’s, w hen  the tribes w ere trying to organize them selves as 
one federally recognized political unit, the A gent was always there to help 
initiate factions. In 1922 the Tribal Council w as greatly opposed to having 
federal and local officials on the reservation; how ever, their objections w ent 
unrecognized by the agent and  the U.S. governm ent because they 
disapproved of the tribal m em bers w ho m ade up  the council. Further 
problem s resulted  because the agent w ould  only officially recognize the 
reservation 's "Business Com m ittee" as representatives of the tribes.
M em bers of this com m ittee w ere generally m ixed-bloods w ho were m ore 
assim ilated into m ainstream  America, or m em bers tha t w ere hand picked by 
the agent.46 By the late 1920's d irect opposition to the agent grew. The 
traditional Tribal Council accused the agent of backing "progressive" Indians 
and taking bribes from  M ontana Pow er C om pany and o ther non-Indians w ho 
needed  tribal cooperation for the use of tribal land or resources. M ontana
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Senator B.K. W heeler w rote to the Bureau of Indian  Affairs in 1929 stating 
tha t he had  received letters from  M ose Michell, Camille Lantow, and  several 
o ther Indians w ho had  com plained of the agent and  o ther Business 
C om m ittee representatives being "bought off."47
By 1934, the tribes w ere faced w ith  a decision of w hether or not to adop t a 
C onstitu tion  and By-laws u n d er the Indian  Reorganization Act. A lthough it 
is unclear exactly w hich tribal m em bers w ere in favor of the successful 
adoption, it is clear from  the council m inutes that the three chiefs d id  not 
sign in favor of the new  bill w hen it w as first presented.48 A lthough tribal 
factions already existed, the agent usually intensified the conflict, because he 
Avas really the only voice or m ediator betw een the U.S. governm ent and the 
tribes. He therefore becam e a sym bol of pow er over the tribal people. The 
tribes realized tha t the agent w as their only political recourse for persuading 
the governm ent to carry out their prom ises and goals effectively. The Salish- 
Kootneai people w ere often obliged to tem porarily adhere to the agent's 
desires, even though his requests som etim es had  a negative impact.
One exam ple of how  agents com m itted seriously destructive acts on the 
F lathead Reservation w as their p art in  establishing an  Indian police force and 
judges for the tribal court. This of course ran  counter to the way Indians had 
handled  jurisdiction over their ow n people, w hich as w e have seen was 
traditionally  handled  by the chief and by hum iliations im posed by the tribal 
people. Tribal jurisdiction w as seriously violated w hen A gent Ronan 
appoin ted  a Fend d ’Oreille by the nam e of A ndre as the head  chief of police in 
1877. A n unpaid  police force im posed w hite social norm s on all tribal 
families. The system  forced Indians to adhere to new  m orals and condem n 
o ther Indians as a m eans of social control. Police and tribal courts w ere all
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p art of a system  that pushed  aside various aspects of tribal culture and 
trad itional m eans of enforcing laws.49 By 1894, the tribal police force and 
judges for the court w ere well established. At the time, there w ere 15 police, 
consisting of 1 captain  and 14 privates. The agency jail, built around 1894, 
allow ed the police to enforce laws w ith  the penalty of a jail sentence. Joseph 
Carter, the agent at that time, w rote in his governm ent report that the chiefs 
w ere no t happy  w ith  the new  jurisdiction and w ould try to prevent the 
execution of the policem an's duties w henever possible. This police force w as 
indeed  a serious sign that the chiefs authority  w as being debilitated by the U.S. 
g o v ern m en t.
Even though  the agent exerted his jurisdiction over Indians, the Salish- 
Kootenai noticed that he possessed little if any jurisdiction over his w hite 
neighbors on the reservation. A lthough som e agents truly tried to protect the 
Salish-Kootenai and  uphold  the agreem ents m ade betw een the tribes and the 
U.S., they rarely had  the pow er to do so. One exam ple comes from the 
Flathead Agency report of 1876. The report reveals that disputes betw een 
w hites and Indians on the reservation  w ere running  ram pant due to 
disagreem ent over the reservation boundaries. A gent M edary reported  that 
settlers had  encroached on a large m eadow , only a small portion of w hich 
extended outside of the reservation boundary . They w ere not only living on 
it b u t using the resources as well. They had  driven bands of horses on it to 
feed and the agent w as concerned that they had  com pletely destroyed the 
m eadow  and the large quantity  of hay it provided  for the Indians. M edary 
had  approached the w hite settlers bu t said they refused to m ove because he 
couldn 't prove w here the reservation boundaries were. The agent states in 
his le tter that:
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I have consulted a law yer in regard to such and other trespasses, 
b u t the law  seems to be so indefinite that no decisive action can 
be taken in the prem ises. As there is also a m eadow  on the 
northern  boundary  similarly situated and under like difficulties,
I shall make the m atter subject of a special com m unication 
hereafter, suggesting now  that bo th  of these d ispu ted  tracts be 
either included w ith in  the reservation or else that the treaty-line 
be surveyed and definitely e s ta b l i s h e d .
In add ition  to all of the existing conflict and  confusion for the tribal people, 
they found out that w ithout "legal proof" in the form  of a w ritten  docum ent 
(which in itself w as a foreign concept) they w ould never be able to defend 
their land and resources from settlers. By 1910, w hen the reservation was 
opened to w hite settlem ent, there w ere still boundary  disputes that were not 
settled, and  the inability of the D epartm ent of the Interior to prove those 
boundaries left the ow nership of 11,000 acres of valuable tim bered land in 
q u e s t i o n . ^ 2  M any hom esteaders developed ranches on the disputed  land and 
one rancher by the nam e of H arrison Robinson had  cut over six hundred  
thousand  feet of tim ber in less than  a year. Even though an  investigation of 
the p roperty  by Superin tendent Fred M organ found that the land belonged to 
the tribes, the federal governm ent ignored his findings. Salish-Kootenai 
m em bers Joseph Seepay, A ntoine Moiese, Louie V anderburg, Big Sam,
Lassaw Kaltomee and  o thers w ho had  built hom es along the river in this 
d ispu ted  location, w ere forced by the governm ent to abandon their properties 
to h o m e s t e a d e r s . tribes had  discovered that the Treaty of 1855 left even 
the governm ent com pletely confused about w here the boundaries were, and 
they w ere therefore unable to pro tect the land  for the Salish-Kootenai people. 
The Indians, on the o ther hand, had  always know n exactly w hat land they 
had  reserved for them selves in the Treaty. These d isputes not only infuriated 
the tribes, bu t created m any financial hardsh ips as well.
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Perceived Rights and Liberties of Euro-Americans
As the Salish-Kootenai observed this total disregard for N ative Am erican 
rights, m any thought the w hite m an's only m otivation was pure and simple 
greed. A lthough m any individuals certainly exemplified greed, there w ere 
also at fault som e basic ideologies prevalent in the m inds of the settlers that 
came west. These ideas played a big part in shaping settlers' attitudes tow ard 
themselves, as well as tow ard  the tribal people. Regardless of w hat each 
w hite new com er's in tentions w ere tow ard  N ative Am ericans, the outcom e 
seem ed to be the same. The supposed superiority and strength of the w hite 
society w as ingrained in the A m erican people in various ways, and they 
believed tha t their culture w ould  and should  prevail over the Indians. Even 
those citizens w ho sym pathized  w ith  the Indian 's loss of culture and land 
had  no better solution than  to tu rn  the Ind ian  into a com petitor w ith  the 
w hite m an. The Salish-Kootenai, a lthough  strongly assim ilated in some 
ways, find that these a ttitudes still persist today in some of their w hite 
neighbors. To give us an  idea of the strength  of these predom inant w hite 
attitudes, and w hy they have persisted through time, w e can take a brief look 
at some of the history tha t helped  shape and m old these attitudes.
Reflecting on the Euro-A m ericans' perception of land rights and their use 
of land, w e find that a lthough Euro-A m ericans strongly believed that 
particular rights and  liberties Avere em bedded in private land ow nership, they 
failed to apply  them  to every landow ner. After the Salish-Kootenai w ere 
forced to adhere to the responsibilities tied to indiv idual ow nership of land 
and  to U.S. citizenship, they w ere still denied  the rights associated w ith  those 
responsibilities. Looking at the history behind the im portance of land and the
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rights associated w ith  it, we discover that ethnicity played a role in the 
perception  of the rights of U.S. citizens, b u t the pow er exerted over the Indian 
cannot sim ply be seen as a racial issue or as nothing m ore than greed. 
A lthough the goal of assim ilating the Indian by m eans of the allotm ent policy 
w as indeed  contradictory, it should be realized that the justification of the 
policy w as directly tied to the m yths of private land ownership.
Euro-A m erican ancestors lived and preached for centuries the m orals and 
ethics tha t pertained  to the m yth  of land. Land was, in past and present times 
regarded  as a sound investm ent for the financial and m oral stability of any 
American. They believed a parcel of land could be shaped and m olded by 
hard  w ork  and sw eat into a dependable source of income. Private land 
ow nership  m eant freedom , privacy, and w ealth  gave ow ners a sense of pow er 
over their ow n destinies. By underlying this sense of security and 
independence, land has been the symbol of Am erican democracy.
Historically, p rivate ow nership  w as an  opportunity  given to the com m on 
people by the com m on people and  represented their new  way of life and  their 
new  governm ent. It should be understood  that the very sam e issues 
pertain ing  to land today on the Flathead reservation have been instilled in 
bo th  Euro-A m ericans and N ative A m ericans for quite some time. It is just as 
ridiculous to say tha t the Indian no longer has a cultural attachm ent to the 
land, as it is to say that Euro-A m ericans no longer have preconceived notions 
of land use and rights that are theoretically centuries old. If w e contrast the 
tw o parties' historical and  cultural use of land, we m ay be able to better 
u n d erstan d  w hy jurisdiction over land is such an  em otional issue, and  w hy 
there are so m any m isunderstandings w hen dealing w ith  land  issues today.
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In the brief history of the m eaning and im portance of land to the Salish- 
Kootenai, it was obvious that their use of land  had  less to do w ith private 
ow nership  and  investm ent, and  m ore to do w ith  m aintaining a certain 
quality  of life and  a spiritual connection w ith  their surroundings. This view 
of the land was essentially a non-profit ven ture for quite some time. They 
did , how ever, have a g reat interest in protecting their economic recourses, bu t 
protection w as for the benefit of the tribe, and pu t less em phasis on the 
individual. N ow  let us contrast this approach to land use by taking a look 
into the recent h istory  of the Euro-Am erican.
For the w hite m an, private ow nership of land was and still is a firm 
institu tion  in A m erican society. Yet the history of this institu tion reaches far 
beyond Am ericans in  the N ew  W orld. W e can get a sense of the issues that 
w ere im portan t to m any of the N orth  Am erican new com ers by looking a t the 
early British Freem en in the N ew  W orld. Briefly put, the Freem en’s cause 
arose w hen  King George Ill's Royal Proclam ation of 1763 restricted settlem ent 
beyond the crest of the Alleghenies in the N ew  W o r l d . ^ 4  The Freem en 
becam e part of the A m erican Revolutionary era that began the expansion of 
the w est by extinguishing the pow er of the C row n over the virgin lands of the 
N ew  W orld. The people of the N ew  W orld fought to oppose the Crow n's 
taxation of property , control of trad ing  licensing, and  "prohibitions on 
purchasing  Indian  l a n d s . T h e  N ew  W orld w as seen as a frontier of virgin 
soil, w aiting for its people to shape and m old it, and the Crow n's dem and that 
the W est be closed to settlem ent w as a serious constraint on the fu ture of 
Furo-A m erica. Robert W illiams in his book The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought  describes how  som e groups of people w ere fighting 
for the N ew  W orld to be subordinate to a pow er overseas, thus creating a
45
fierce resistance am ong m any Am ericans. This resistance m otivated them  to 
absolutely deny any feudal restraints on land, and  to create their ow n social 
institutions. D enying the C row n's restraints on the new  land led in tu rn  to 
denial of tribal sovereignty and tribal ow nership of the land already occupied 
by N ative Am ericans.
In the case of the Freemen, land m eant pow er, as it was essential to gaining
freedom  from  the Crown. Defying the Crow n's control often entailed
defining law  as well. As law  developed, it incorporated m any com mon
sensibilities, resulting in so-called "natural law." N atural law  was to become
the constitution of the people of the N ew  W orld and encom passed all of the
perceived rights and  liberties based on the British c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^ ^  Por
instance, under their constitution, the English people w ere protected from
taxation w ithou t representation, and  from  seizure of p roperty  w ithout the
ow ner's consent. The repeal of the Stam p Act, (taxation w ithout
representation) took place w ith  the help of Freem en like Samuel A dam s w ho
drafted  resolutions. Even w ith  the new  laws, how ever, colonists were still at
a d isadvantage w ith  a governm ent that held so m uch pow er in the N ew
W orld. The colonists still had  to overcom e an  obstacle that was in  the way of
their am bitions, w hich w as the Proclam ation of 1764. This obstacle was the
agreem ent betw een the C row n and the Indians of the w estern  frontier.
W illiams explains it well w hen  he states that;
The English had  come to the N ew  W orld in search of plentiful 
and  cheap lands free of the feudal burdens that m ade land dear 
and  unavailable in  England. To radical colonists in ten t on 
underm in ing  Crow n prerogative rights in their country, the 
proclam ation 's assertion that the king, not the colonists, ought 
to control the pace, the direction, and  ultim ately the price of the " 
disposition of lands on the A m erican frontier seem ed contradicted 
by their sense of history as well as by their "common sense.
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The boundaries set u p  in the Proclam ation w ere to keep Indians from
getting in the way of settlem ent, and they allowed the British to m ake a pretty
penny from  the Ind ian  trade tha t w ould  continue if the Indians w ere left
their w ilderness. The colonial rebels w anted  to expand w estw ard, how ever,
and  decided that it w as time to take control and initiate self-government.
This w ould  in  tu rn  allow  them  to control the m anner and  pace w ith  w hich
they w ould  open the frontier. A m ong the theories of the enlightenm ent
period  tha t could justify this revolution over the Crow n, perhaps the m ost
im portan t w ere the ideas of free land and independence, w hich w ent hand in
hand. S tew art U dall explains in his book The Quiet Crisis that;
In the face of wolves, savages and blizzards, skill and  courage 
m easured m en, and  nature w as the final arbiter of nobility. The 
hand  of London or C harleston or W illiamsburg could not reach 
into the back country; and if a m an took up  land in  the m ountains, 
w ho was there to stop him  or to tell him  how  to live? The ideas 
of independence and free land w ere always inseparable.
As part of asserting pow er over the Crown, John Locke pu t forth a theory on
w hy the frontier should be opened. He asserted that the frontier was little
m ore than  an  "Indian w asteland" that could be tu rned  into "valuable
property" by hard  w ork  and tiring labor—an idea quite appealing to colonists.
The bottom  line of his theoretical argum ent was that the w ork of converting
useless land into som ething productive, m ade that land  private p r o p e r t y .^0
In o ther w ords, land  tha t lies do rm an t and unproductive is not ow ned.
There are m any books w ritten  addressing the particular issues of w estw ard  
expansion, b u t perhaps none better than  Virgin Land by H enry N ash  Smith. 
H e exam ines how  a particu lar people's history and literature had  a profound 
influence on  the w ay A m ericans looked at land. For quite som e tim e there 
w as a prom inent feeling that the undeveloped  W est w as there for the taking.
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and  w ould  be developed into a profitable em pire. These prevailing attitudes 
tow ard  land  involved the people of the time and their history as well. The 
new ly-arrived inhabitants of N orth  America often w ere distressed Europeans 
w ho had  come to the N ew  W orld in search of land amd a better w ay of life. 
They w ere hoping to be free from  the im poverishing restraints of the Crown. 
They em brace the concept tha t land w ould  m ake im poverished people 
w ealthy and  independent, and  m ost im portantly, w ould offer security.
These hopes and  dream s of a new  way of life could be seen in m any of the 
w ritings of the day. For instance, some of the better know n prom oters of the 
agrarian  philosophy w ere Benjamin Franklin and Thom as Jefferson. H enry 
N ash Sm ith called this agrarian philosophy the "myth of the garden," and 
stated tha t the fertile W est w as just w aiting to be transform ed through 
agriculture. The im age of a vast agricultural society tha t w ould grow  and 
p rosper w ithin  the nation 's interior w as extrem ely popu lar at the time, 
although this im age ran  counter to the industry  and commerce actually 
taking place on the eastern seaboards of America. Even though the reality of 
becom ing a yeom an farm er w as dying out by the 19th century, the m yth 
persisted that agrarian simplicity offered a better quality of life. This m yth  of 
"the good life" w as exem plified by the agrarian  frontiersm an, who w as a 
heroic figure in everything from  literature to politics.
A lthough there w as a dual expansion going on  th roughout the eighteenth  
and n ineteen th  centuries, agrarian  societies encom passed m uch of 
m ainstream  America. There w as the busy, boom ing eastern  side of Am erica 
that w as a region of industry  and grow ing social stratification, bu t m any 
A m ericans believed in the sim plicity and happiness of the agrarian  farm ers 
tha t w ere filling in the regions to the west. Thom as Jefferson him self view ed
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agrarianism  as a political stand. H e believed that the small land holders
tilling the soil w ere w hat m ade up  the backbone of America. They w ere the
fu tu re  stronghold for the nation, as the eastern U nited States had already
becom e over crow ded. Jefferson pushed  h ard  to open up  the vacant lands of
the W est and  eventually he established a system  allowing for w estw ard
expansion. His goal w as to p reven t the Am erican population  from crow ding
them selves into the "depravity" they had  experienced in Europe. W estw ard
expansion and  land  for all w as the answ er to m aintaining a higher quality of
life than  their E uropean ancestors. Robert N ash Smith sum s it up  best for us
w ith  his sta tem ent that:
The W estern yeom an had  becom e a symbol w hich could be 
m ade to bear an  alm ost unlim ited charge of meaning. It had 
strong overtones of patriotism , and  it im plied a far-reaching 
social theory. The career of this symbol deserves careful 
atten tion  because it is one of the m ost tangible things we m ean 
w hen we speak of the developm ent of dem ocratic ideas in the 
U nited States.^l
Perhaps the greatest appeal of the yeom an farm er symbol w as the perception 
tha t farm  life allow ed the control of one's ow n destiny. Farming allowed one 
to p lan ahead, and  to control the future and well-being of the family. This 
idea seriously contrasted, how ever, w ith  the American belief that Indians had 
little or no control over their destiny. Indians, Euro-Am ericans believed, 
could only plan from "Moon to m oon, season to season, and accepted the 
w orld  the w ay they found it..."^2
As w e now  take a jum p in tim e to the tu rn  of the tw entieth  century w hen 
w hites and  Indians w ere living as neighbors, we can see that the early 
attitudes and  m yths about land use persisted  into m odern  times. Typical 
correspondence am ong non-Indians on the Flathead reservation reflects the 
im portance of land  and the belief in an  inheren t righ t to progress m aterially
49
th rough  the im provem ent of their land. W hen Indian land was coveted by
w hites, settlers used the argum ent that developm ent by whites p u t the land
to better use in m aking a better country. A letter from  a non-Indian club
located on  the F lathead Reservation exemplifies the com m on beliefs
perta in ing  to non-Indian land  use. The Ronan Com mercial Club w rote to the
Office of Indian Affairs in A pril of 1912 asking that the departm ent allow
some of the lands held by the tribal people to be sold.
A nd that w hile the purchaser of this land th rough  his industry  
m ay m ake this land m uch m ore valuable. We subm it that the 
exam ple w hich he wiU set to his Indian neighbor and the 
im m ediate relief w hich the Indian  wiU get will m ore than offset 
the enhancem ent Avhich w ould take place five or six years hence 
w hen  the irrigation project will be com pleted.
Furtherm ore the m aking available of one-fourth of this land 
to a thrifty w hite people will cause a production  of diversified 
farm ing p roducts w hich w ould bring to our valley creameries, 
canneries, flouring mills, factories, etc., w hich will form  a m arket 
for not only the w hite settler bu t the Indian as well.^^
In this letter the non-Indians coveting Indian land have identified 
them selves as "thrifty" people w ith  capabilities to p lan  extensively for the 
fu ture and  develop the area’s businesses and industries. M eanwhile, the 
Indians are indirectly portrayed  as a dorm ant society that should be taken 
u n d er the paternal w ing of those w ho know  how  to progress.
Ronald Trosper notes in his study of the effects of the allotm ent policy on
the Flathead reservation, tha t some non-Indians w ere aw are of the cultural
differences in  land use and yet still felt that the functioning property  system
of the Indians should  be abolished. Senator Dawes revealed his attitudes
to Weird Indian property in 1885 when he stated that:
The head chief told us tha t there w as not a family in that 
w hole nation (one of the Five Civilized Tribes) that had  not 
a hom e of its own. There w as not a p au p er in that Nation, 
and  the N ation  d id  not owe a dollar. It bu ilt its ow n
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capitol...and it built its schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect 
of the system  w as apparent. They have got as far as they can go, 
because they ow n their land in common. It is H enry George's 
system, and u n d er tha t there is no enterprise to make your hom e 
any better than  tha t of your neighbors. There is no selfishness, 
w hich is at the bottom  of civilization. Till this people will consent 
to give up  their lands, and  divide them  am ong their citizens so 
tha t each one can ow n the land  he cultivates, they will not m ake
m uch m ore p r o g r e s s . ^ 4
Even though  Senator Daw es understood  that Indians w ere not concerned 
w ith  m aterial progress as m uch as their quality of life, his statem ent reflects 
the sheer strength  of cultural m yths. A ttitudes of superiority through 
m aterial prosperity  w ere and are still directly tied to private property.
These behefs continue to detract from the N ative Americans' right to 
participate in their ow n natural law  and tribal sovereignty. If we are to take 
these early beliefs and  m yths tow ard land and carry them  over into the late 
n ineteenth  centuries dealings w ith  the Salish-Kootenai Indians, w e can gain a 
clearer picture of w hy em otions over land use ran  so deep. In addition, we 
will see that because Euro-A m erican attitudes contrasted so deeply w ith those 
of the Salish-Kootenai, the tw o cultures inevitably clashed w hen dealing w ith  
laws and regulations over people and property  on the Elathead reservation.
CHAPTER IE:
THE POLICY OF ALLOTMENT 
The m yths pertaining to land and the belief in the superiority of the Luro- 
A m erican culture w ere often the m otivating force behind governm ent 
policies tow ard  N ative Americans. The m ost devastating of these 
governm ent enactm ents for the Salish-Kootenai w as the allotm ent policy. 
A llotm ent forced private land  ow nership on the Indians by allotting 
m em bers ind iv idual parcels of land and eventually opening up the 
rem aining land w ith in  the reservation to non-Indians. The history of 
allotm ent and its effects on the Confederated Tribes lay the very foundation 
for today 's jurisdictional problem s on the reservation. A llotm ent was m uch 
m ore than  an act that fragm ented the landscape, it was an act that tried 
desperately  to im pose upon  Indians a belief in the superior quality of non- 
Ind ian  life. All in  all, the goal of the policy was to "civilize" the Indian, 
th rough  assim ilation ra ther than  in tegration.
Paternalistic by nature, the policy of allotm ent sanctioned absolute control 
over every political and economic aspect of tribal life. This control forced the 
Indian to adhere to state and federal laws regarding m arriage, religion, 
education, land and even personal finances. N ot only w as it destructive to 
tribal life, b u t there was an inherent contradiction in the policy. The policy 
forced U nited  States citizenship on N ative Americans, yet refused to render 
the pro tection  and rights valued  in citizenship. C itizenship d id  not insure 
basic ind iv idual rights like religious freedom  or control over one's personal 
p roperty  and  finances, because this was not the governm ent's concern w hen 
they bestow ed the pow ers of A m erican citizenship on N ative Americans. 
W hat they d id  have in m ind was to create a m otivating force that w ould
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com pel Indians to abandon their strongest cultural glue... com m unal land. 
Ind iv idual ow nership, they hoped, w ould  in troduce Indians to civilized 
p u rsu its  and  eventually  assim ilate them .l A lthough the policy did 
successfully fragm ent the land, the goal of individualization fell short of 
realization. The allotm ent poHcy failed in its attem pt to tear tribal people 
from  their cultural ties; yet for over 100 years, the policy continues to be at the 
root of m any complex problem s on the Flathead reservation.
A Fragmented Landscape
A lthough the treaty w ith  the Salish-Kootenai was signed in 1855, it w asn't 
ratified until 1859 and  it was in this year that the tribal people were expected 
to m ove into the Jocko Valley of the F lathead Reservation. Taking three 
culturally different tribes and various bands that resided in  different localities 
and restricting them  to one small land base was a new  kind of stress on all of 
the tribal people involved. N ot only w ere they com petitive am ong 
them selves for particu lar areas of land and resources on the reservation, bu t 
they had  m oved onto their reservation only a short tim e before whites 
illegally m oved onto the reservation. In only a few years, the Salish-Kootenai 
began feeling crow ded on their new ly negotiated land base. In addition, their 
trad itional hunting  g rounds had been filled w ith  settlers for some time, and 
these areas w ere quickly being depleted of resources. In 1868, Agent W.J. 
M cCormick w rote to the Office of Indian  Affairs, stating that encroachm ent of 
the w hite m an w as "converting vast hunting  g round  into theaters of busy, 
active industry." We also know  that by 1872 the valleys surrounding the 
reservation w ere packed heavily w ith  settlers, and tha t w as the m ain reason 
for creating the executive o rder for Charlo and his band  to leave the Bitterroot
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Valley. Even before Charlo was forced to leave, m any m em bers of the tribes 
had  com plained of w hite encroachm ent. The Pend d Oreille and Salish w ere 
very concerned that the big gam e they had always believed to be an 
inexhaustible source of food and clothing, w ould soon be gone due to the 
over-crow ding.^
The new  w hite com m unities pushed m uch of the game into different 
areas and higher elevations, forcing hunters to exert m ore energy. D angerous 
encounters w ith the Blackfeet , Sioux or Cheyenne Indians became a greater 
possibility. The annual buffalo hun t in 1868 resulted in the Flathead and 
Fend d  Oreille tribes losing several w arriors in skirm ishes w ith  the Blackfeet, 
and  they re tu rned  w ith  very little subsistence and few robes for their efforts.^ 
By the early 1870's, the Flathead agent reported  trespassers on the reservation 
w ere using the northern  m eadow s and creeks of the Indian lands because of 
their rich soil and large quantities of h a y .4 There w ere also whites who 
settled on the south  end of the reservation and used tim ber and grazing lands 
belonging to the Salish-Kootenai. Of course the tribes dem anded that the 
settlers take their cattle and graze elsewhere, bu t the Indians had no political 
recourse, and  the settlers continued to m ove in.^
By 1883 trespassing had  becom e such a problem  that Flathead agent Peter 
Ronan attem pted  to scare non-Indians off of the reservation by threatening 
them  w ith  a one thousand dollar fine for trespassing.^ This threat was 
supported  by Section 2118 U.S. Revised Statute w hich gave him  the pow er to 
issue such fines. That sam e year another incident w as equally frustrating for 
the tribes. That sum m er, Ronan had  tried desperately to rem ove from  the 
reservation four large herds of cattle that w ere ow ned by a non-Indian cattle 
com pany. Ronan threatened the ow ners of the cattle w ith  fines, and ordered
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their rem oval. The ow ner of the cattle, Mr. Cum mings, protested and 
explained to Ronan that he and his com pany had grazed their cattle for over 
three years on a particular area of the reservation w ith  consent from  the 
Indians. The chiefs and  headm en w ho gave the consent w ere leasing ou t the 
land for three hund red  dollars a year, w hich was profitable to them, seeing 
that they had  little use for the particular area being grazed upon. A lthough 
Ronan m eant well in trying to protect the Indians from  w hites encroaching 
on their property , he negatively affected the tribe in  not allowing them  to 
m ake their ow n decisions politically and economically. The Federal 
G overnm ent did no t allow Indians to m ake economic decisions like leasing 
land  w ithout the consent of Congress, and  any money m ade from such 
transactions was to be m anaged by the federal governm ent, not by the Indians 
them selves.
The encroachm ent of settlers and big businesses on Indian lands, as well as 
their ow n need for grazing and agricultural land, helped fuel the enactm ent 
of the allotm ent policy. A nother reason behind the act w as the desire for the 
federal governm ent to protect the Indians from total poverty, as well as to 
drastically reduce financial expenditure on N ative Americans. Some 
believed tha t the best way to achieve these goals was to ehm inate the 
separation policy that had  been enacted through treaties, and force the Indians 
to live w ith, and im itate their w hite neighbors. It was hoped  that once 
assim ilated culturally, the Indian w ould be on equal footing w ith  every w hite 
Am erican, and  N ative A m erican culture w ould fade away. In theory, this 
assim ilation w ould dissolve the reservation boundaries, and  the huge federal 
bureaucracy  dealing w ith  N ative A m ericans could then  be elim inated.
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Interestingly enough, those w ho pushed the hardest in W ashington to 
allot land  to Indians w ere no t those settlers in direct com petition for the use 
of Ind ian  resources. They w ere the hum anitarians of the eastern U nited 
States, w hose policies concerning Native Americans w ere w ell-accepted by 
leading politicians. M any of these hum anitarians had never m et an Indian 
and knew  little of their lifestyle or true needs, yet they sym pathized w ith  
those m any N ative Americans w ho w ere being taken advantage of by the 
unchecked advances of the w hite man. They strongly believed that 
assim ilation into the dom inant culture w ould be the only real way to save 
them . M any of these people took the future and safety of the Indian very 
seriously, and  although they had  good intentions, they, like m any U.S. policy 
m akers, gave N ative Americans little if any credit for know ing w hat w ould  
be best for their ow n people. M any had little faith in the Indian's ability to 
adapt, and this lack of faith created a paternalism  that ran  ram pant in 
hum anitarians and Congress alike. Both groups, in alm ost com plete 
ignorance, m arched on w ith  policies to transform  the Indian.
G overnm ent attitudes tow ard N ative Americans always conflicted, and the 
C onfederated Salish-Kootenai tribes saw the same conflicting attitudes in 
settlers w ho came onto the reservation to live. A lthough there w ere always 
w hites w ith good will tow ard them, there were just as m any w ho had  a 
negative stereotype of the Indian and treated them  accordingly. N othing 
fostered the negative stereotype m ore than the very m eans by w hich Indians 
sustained  them selves. The w hite m an thought of him self as hard  working, 
fu ture oriented, and  a v irtuous tiller of the soil. In addition, he could support 
his family on a fairly small parcel of land. A griculture, as we have noted 
before, w as the w hite m an’s security. The Indian, on the o ther hand, was
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believed to be one w ho "roam ed around," used up  a lot of space and took 
food w herever he could find it.
In reahty, the Salish-Kootenai culture em bodied m any of the same 
characteristics im portan t to the w hite m an. They too thought of them selves 
as h ard  w orking people w ith  great foresight, b u t these characteristics w ere 
exem plified in  culturally different ways. W hat w as considered to be a "good 
quality of life" for these two cultures differed greatly. The key conflict of 
course w as m obility...a necessity and enjoym ent to the Salish-Kootenai, b u t a 
d irect th reat to the w hite settler's w ay of hfe. Settling in  one area and fencing 
them selves off from  the com m unity tha t helped and pro tected  them , or 
fencing off the land that provided for them, w ould be regarded  as extremely 
detrim ental to the tribal people.
The civilization of A m erican Indians w as one of the prim ary goals of 
allotm ent. Even though  Indian nations w ere losing their pow er to negotiate, 
they w ould  not let go of their com m unal life w ithout being separated  from  
their bands or tribes. The first congressional act that called for the allotm ent 
of reservation lands w as the Dawes Act of 1887, also know n as the General 
A llotm ent Act. This was a federal act allotting land to Indians on each 
reservation  and reserving the right to open the rem aining land to non- 
Indians in the future. The size of grants depended  on the individual's family 
status and  age. For instance, the head  of a particular Salish-Kootenai family 
w ould receive 160 acres, individuals over the age of 18 and  orphans w ould 
receive 80 acres, and  those under 18 w ere to receive 40 acres. Those w ho 
opted  to raise livestock ra ther than  farm  w ould receive additional acreage.^ 
The allo tm ent policy aim ed to transform  the Salish-Kootenai in every way; 
from  creating a new  kinship organization, to an adherence to new  political
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organizations and economies. The policy took precedence over any fu ture 
legislation dealing w ith  N ative A m ericans until the policy w as transform ed 
u n d er the Indian Reorganization Act of 1936.
For an  exam ple of how  in tent the US. w as on transform ing the Indian, we 
can look at six of the eight points of Indian policy p u t forth by Indian 
Com m issioner Thom as J. M organ in 1889. The following six points sum m ed 
u p  the com m on theoretical approach  by w hite Am erica tow ard  N ative
A m erican policy and  the support for the allotm ent policy.
(1) The Reservation system  belongs to the past, (2) Indians m ust 
be absorbed in to  our national life, not as Indians, b u t as Am erican 
citizens, (3) The Ind ian  m ust be "individualized" and treated  as 
an  ind iv idual by the G overnm ent, (4) The Ind ian  m ust "conform 
to the W hite m an's ways, peaceably if they will, forcible if they must," 
(5) The Indian m ust be p repared  for the new  order through a system  
of com pulsory education, and  (6) The traditional society of Indian 
groups m ust be broken up.^
The 1887 Dawes Act essentially em bodied and tried to im plem ent the 
previous points, denying the Indians inheren t right to govern them selves, as 
well as those rights stated  in  their treaty. In fact, w hatever the Indians 
thought they agreed to in the Treaty of 1855, the policy of allotm ent w as to 
enact the opposite. A lthough it w as indeed  forced assimilation, the allotm ent 
policy d id  in tend to prom ote g radual transform ation. The allotm ents to 
ind iv iduals w ere m ade so tha t the allottee w as p reven ted  from selling the 
land for 25 years. This stipulation w as designed to protect the allottees from  
having their p roperty  transferred to settlers, as m any Indians w ould  have 
been w ilhng to sell at an  extrem ely low  price and  w ould  then  likely rem ain 
landless. The allottee w as also pro tected  from  state or territorial governm ent 
taxes for the first twenty-five years, and  the President had  the pow er to extend 
the tru st status on the p roperty  indefinitely if it w as in the Indian 's best
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interest.lO  This w as of course a necessary protection, as Indians w ere not 
capitalists at heart, and  had  few if any m eans to m ake m oney and fully 
in tegrate in to  a cash economy. A lthough stipulations like the 25 year trust 
period  w ere m eant to protect the Indian, w hat they often d id  was keep 
Indians like the Salish-Kootenai from  deciding how  best to ru n  their hfe and 
p rovide for their families. In times of extrem e need, and newly su rrounded  
by a cash economy, som e Indians needed to sell their land as an economic 
resource. In addition  to the other provisions, the final d raft of the Dawes Act 
g ran ted  U nited States citizenship to N ative Americans. C itizenship w as little 
m ore than  a statem ent of intent, b u t needed to be a part of the allotm ent 
pohcy. It w ould have been  em barrassing to dem and of the Indians their 
transfo rm ation  in to  A m erican landow ners w hile denying them  A m erican 
citizenship .
A lthough Thom as M organ and  o ther opponents of the reservation policy
appeared  cruel to some, they w ere actually interested in protecting the N ative
Am erican. M organ w as aw are tha t the reservation d id  not m eet Indian
needs. M any had  lost their hun ting  grounds and w ere starving as a result. In
various o ther ways they had  been pauperized  by the U.S. governm ent and
non-Indian  settlers. M organ stated in 1890 that:
The entire system  of dealing w ith  them  (the Indians) is vicious, 
involving, as it does, the installing of agents, w ith  semi-despotic 
pow er over ignorant, superstitious, and helpless subjects; the 
keeping of thousands of them  on reservations practically as 
prisoners, isolated from  civililized life and  dom inated by fear and  
force; the issue of rations and annuities, w hich inevitably tends to 
b reed  pauperism ; the d isbursem ent of millions of dollars w orth  of 
supplies by contract, w hich invites fraud; the m aintenance of a 
system  of licensed trade, w hich stim ulates cupidity and  extortion, 
etc ..H
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In spite of M organ's obvious negative stereotypes of Indian culture, he had  
certainly pegged the disgraceful situations occurring on Americas Indian 
reservations, and felt they could be im proved  th rough  ind iv idual land 
ow nership. It was tim e for a change; how ever, a policy that d id  not seek any 
inpu t from  the Indians them selves, simply created a greater paternalism  and 
even greater poverty. Because of the great im portance of com m unal lands, 
the Salish-Kootenai always p ro tested  heavily against the policy that 
fragm ented their landscape. The protests against splitting up  the land  on the 
Flathead reservation w ere initially seen in the late 1880’s, bu t becam e a 
serious cam paign for the tribes by the tu rn  of the century. The Salish- 
Kootenai had  been denied  alm ost every prom ise m ade in  their treaty, and 
w ere therefore not convinced of the governm ent's goodw ill in  creating the 
allotm ent policy. They spent m any years and a lot of money, and  used every 
m eans possible to oppose it. Because the Dawes Act w as im plem ented 
w ithou t tribal consent, the Salish-Kootenai realized that they had  becom e 
extrem ely vulnerable. Their lack of partic ipation  in the political process, left 
them  little control over the protection  of their people or over the decision 
m aking concerning their welfare.
A lthough the land  w ith in  the Flathead reservation had  been allotted to 
indiv idual Indians th rough a federal act, it took an additional act by each state 
to "officially" open u p  the surp lus lands to w hite settlers. The Dawes act 
greatly affected the SaUsh-Kootenai by allotting land, b u t the m ost serious 
effects came from  the Act of 1904. The act is know n as the Dixon bill or the 
F lathead A llotm ent Act and w as designed to sell the excess land left over after 
all Indians w ere allotted property . Burton Smith's article on "The Politics of 
A llo tm ent " specifically deals w ith  allo tm ent on  the F lathead  reservation.
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Sm ith tells us that a lthough the G eneral A llotm ent Act w as a Congressional 
Act, it w as necessary for each state or territory to draft a bill pertaining to each 
reservation. He states tha t "This second legislation, d rafted  and passed in 
Congress by m en representing state and territorial dem ands, determ ined 
A m erican Ind ian  p o l i c y . "12
The Act of 1904 split up  the left over acreage into five types of surplus land 
for w hite settlers to purchase. There w ere first and second class agricultural 
and  grazing lands, as well as tim bered and m ineral lands for sale. The 
U niversity of M ontana biological station received 160 acres, and later, over 
12,000 acres w ere reserved for a bison range. In addition, there were 
thousands of acres for tow nships reserved for the state of M ontana and sold 
to the state for $1.25 per a c r e . 13 This w as a cheap price considering that 
N orthern  Pacific Rail had  paid  the tribes $11.18 per acre alm ost thirty years 
b e f o r e .  14 The m oney m ade from the sale of surplus land w as to be paid to the 
Flathead Indians for their benefit. To the w hite m an's m ind  they w ere not 
only pu tting  w asted land  to good use, b u t helping the Indian  to becom e 
civilized by earning him  profits. To the Salish-Kootenai, how ever, the 
m oney m ade w as not considered a profit. The tribes had paid  dearly in being 
forced to sell their land. In addition, they had  no access or control over the 
m oney m ade. It w as held in  trust by the Secretary of the Interior. They w ere 
no t allow ed to m anage their ow n tribe's m oney, invest it, or use it for their 
ow n benefit.
There w ere o ther financial restrictions on the tribal people as well. The 
federal governm ent stated  tha t one-half of the m oney m ade for the benefit of 
the tribes w as to be used  for the purchase of farm  equipm ent, cattle, and  seed 
to force the Indian into a new  economy. In 1912, the superin tenden t
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suggested tha t the elderly Indians sell the tim ber off of their land to purchase 
necessary farm ing im plem ents. The tim ber, how ever, w as of m uch m ore use 
to the elderly for a heat and cooking source.^^ The tribal m oney w as also to 
be used for building irrigation canals for Salish-Kootenai use and benefit. 
Those Indians farm ing at this time, how ever, already had  dug their ow n 
irrigation ditches and  w ere angry that they w ould have to pay for som ething 
they already had.^^ The tribes w ould  also have to su rrender some of their 
m oney to pay for the surveying and allotm ent fees for the w hite settlers, to be 
paid  back to the tribes at a later date. The m oney left over was to be dispersed 
in equal paym ents to the I n d ia n s .U n f o r tu n a te ly ,  few of the Salish- 
Kootenai used  the irrigation they paid  for, and the farm ing im plem ents w ere 
of less use to them  than  the actual m oney w ould have been. In the early 
1900’s, annuities w ere not paid  for the year, causing m any elders to com plain 
of no t having the m eans to purchase needed clothing and food for their 
f a m i l i e s . E v e n  into the year of 1918, the tribes had not been reim bursed for 
the lands taken. By 1918 the Salish-Kootenai becam e agitated that large areas 
of tribal lands had been taken for reservoirs, cam psites, and pow er sites 
w ithou t reim bursem ent to the tribes.!^
Total paternalism  and control over the tribal people was w hat the Salish- 
Kootenai experienced w ith  the im plem entation  of the allotm ent policy.
There w ere agencies to control w here the Indians w ould  live, and exactly how  
m uch m oney they w ould  have. Their spending w as com pletely m onitored  to 
insure their transform ation as well as to insure enough m oney to pay for the 
costs of opening u p  the reservation. The requirem ent tha t Indians w ould 
have to pay for non-Indian land  surveys, allotm ents and  irrigation, w ere 
im m ediately  surfaced as a problem  after the im plem entation  of the F lathead
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A llotm ent Act of 1904. By taking a look at some other problem s the 1904 act 
initiated  aroim d the tu rn  of the century, w e will be able to see w hy the 
allotm ent policy rem ains so problem atic for the Salish-Kootenai today.
Political Issues
It is certain that the Salish-Kootenai ow ned the land  w ith in  their
reservation boundary  before the Act of 1904 opened it u p  to setttlers. The
Daw es Act, a lthough it forced private land ow nership  on the Salish-Kootenai,
d id  no t specifically open and  sell the rem aining land. The Act of 1904 (a.k.a.
the Dixon Bill) was, how ever, m uch m ore devastating in that it b latantly
broke the prom ise m ade in Article II of the H ellgate Treaty of 1855. That
treaty declares tha t the land w as set aside for the Salish-Kootenai people, and
the first parag raph  recognizes that the Salish-Kootenai are indeed a sovereign
nation  w ith  Victor as the nation ’s chief. The U nited States agreed to certain
stipulations on the reservation as sta ted  in Article II:
All w hich tract shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and 
m arked ou t for the exclusive use and benefit of said confederated tribes 
as an  Indian reservation. N or shall any w hite m an, excepting those in 
the em ploym ent of the Indian departm ent, be perm itted  to reside 
upon  the said reservation w ithou t perm ission of the confederated 
tribes, and  superin tenden t and  agent.^0
W ithout the Indians ever consenting to it, the Salish-Kootenai land 
reserve allow ed non-Indians to w ork, live and use recourses w ith in  the 
reservation. The governm ent abandoned  its prom ises and  agreem ents, and  
even betrayed its ow n federal em ployees by not supporting  them  as they tried 
to carry out the du ties of their job description. Federal agents on Indian  
reservations w ere originally h ired  to serve and pro tect the Indian from the 
encroaching w hite m an. The agent w as also the m iddle m an w ho
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com m unicated problem s and needs betw een the tribal people and U nited
States governm ent. C orrespondence beginning w ith  the late 1800's th rough
the tu rn  of the century show s that the federal agents on the reservation w ere
pow erless to pro tect the Salish-Kootenai from  the intrusions of cattle
ranchers, settlers, and  big businesses like N orthern  Pacific Rail, w ho used
tribal resources to build  their railroad .^ l
In 1882 the tribes had  pro tested  N orthern  Pacific's infractions by harassing
the survey crews to the poin t that they w ere forced to shut dow n their w ork
until agreem ents could be r e a c h e d . 22 Chief Eneas w as not afraid to voice his
d istrust of the A m erican governm ent or of A m erican businesses. D uring the
negotiations betw een the railroad com pany and the tribes, Eneas questioned
the A ttorney G eneral w ho negotiated for N orthern  Pacific:
W ho established the lines of this reservation? It w as the G reat 
Eather that got these lines established. Why does he w ant to break 
the lines? If w e had  no lines I w ould say no w ord. Lines are just 
like a fence. H e told us so. N o w hite m an is allowed to live and 
w ork on the reservation. You know  it is so in the treaty. That is 
the reason I say you had  better go the other way. W hy do you w ish 
us to go away? It is a small country; it is valuable to us; w e support 
ourselves by it; there is no end to these lands supporting us; they 
wiU do  it for generations. If you say you will give us m oney for our 
lands, I doubt if we get it, because we d id n ’t get it b e f o r e . 2 3
Eneas believed tha t the land they had  reserved for them selves was quite
capable of supporting  all of his people, if they w ere left alone. He was
frustra ted  in his attem pts to protect tribal resources by governm ent failure to
upho ld  the article in  the treaty provid ing  for Indian  consent to allow w hites
on  the reservation. Eneas w an ted  to know  w hy the A m erican governm ent
felt no  need to follow the policy of cultural separation that they had created.
Ironically enough, w hen the Salish-Kootenai w anted  businessm en and
settlers off their land, m ost w ere allow ed to stay and carry ou t their business.
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But w hen  Indians leased land to non-Indians to generate income for the tribe, 
those non-Indians w ere usually forced to leave.
The allotm ent Act of 1904 dem anded  that the Salish-Kootenai adhere to 
the accom panying changes. They w ere im pacted in m ore w ays than  just the 
actual loss of land, as the policy tossed the Indian under new  system s of 
jurisdiction. Often, as is still the case today, various jurisdictions w ere 
asserted over the Ind ian  because Indians and non-Indians had  become 
neighbors. V ulnerability could not be tolerated by non-Indians, and so 
"civilized" la^v ivas im posed upon  those thought to have few  if any social 
norm s or a m oral consciousness. Full jurisdiction over the Indian  could be 
im plem ented  and easily justified. The governm ent's policy of assim ilation 
th rough  allotm ent w as so am biguous that the stipulations could be 
in terp reted  in any w ay one saw  fit. Jurisdiction on the reservation had  not 
been p lanned  out in any detail w hen the A llotm ent Act passed, and  now  that 
the governm ent had  checkerboarded the reservation, Indians, whites, 
federal, state and county bureaus all contended for jurisdiction over people, 
land, and  resources w ith in  the reservation boundaries. If Indians traveled 
anyw here w ith in  the reservation, they often found them selves subject to 
non-Indian  jurisdiction. Being forced to adhere to non-Indian  rules and 
regulations was no th ing  new , how ever, as the Salish-Kootenai had  had  
several encounters w ith  state and county officials w ho illegally assum ed 
jurisdiction over the tribal people long before the tu rn  of the century. State 
gam e w ardens h ad  refused to let the Indians continue hun ting  for food 
w ithou t state restrictions being im posed on w here and  w hen they could hunt. 
G enerally these restrictions w ere applied  to hun ting  bo th  on and off the
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reservation; how ever, after the reservation w as opened u p  to settlem ent, 
jurisdictional d isputes becam e extrem ely prevalent.
A fter the opening of the reservation to whites, letters came pouring  into 
W ashington  from  m em bers of the Salish-Kootenai tribes. A letter from  Sam 
Resurrection in 1910, explained to President Taft that there could not be two 
d ifferent sets of law s existing on the reservation. Sam identified the fact that 
as tw o nations, they w ere div ided  culturally. H e believed that because their 
laws w ere different, they could not live together, and  that forcing w hite laws 
u p o n  the tribes had  created a racism  against all non-Indians. Sam further 
stated  tha t it was not only non-Indian law  he w as opposed to, bu t those 
m ixed-bloods w ho carried ou t w hite laws. By 1910, Sams' people w ere being 
controlled by Indian  police officers and judges that w ere not tribal m em bers. 
They had  been appoin ted  by the superin tendent because of their progressive 
attitudes.24
H ow  d id  jurisdictional problem s develop, and  how  did the Salish- 
Kootenai lose m uch of their ability to m aintain their political and legal 
au thority  w ith in  the boundaries of their ow n reservation? There w ere of 
course several factors playing a part, as new  laws, bo th  civil and crim inal w ere 
applied  to the Indian w hen-ever it w as to the w hite 's advantage. Some of the 
rationale for forcing the Indian to fall u n d er w hite jurisdiction had to do  w ith  
their new  A m erican citizenship. It w as clear to some officials that m any of 
the Indians w ere US. citizens th rough  the allotm ent policy, and  tha t laws 
should  be applied  equally to all citizens. Indians w ere considered M ontana 
residen ts as well, because it w as rationalized tha t the reservation boundary  no 
longer existed after the 1904 Act. Therefore, the Salish-Kootenai w ere to obey 
M ontana state laws. In addition, fee paten ts offered to "competent " Indians
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m eant they w ould pay taxes on property , opening u p  the jurisdiction over 
Indian  property  by the county and state.
By taking a look at how  the land w as split u p  and  distributed, w e will see 
how  today 's jurisdiction problem s on the Flathead reservation  have come 
about. The details are disturbing to tribal people. They know  that their land 
w as taken w ithout their consent and  w ithout rem orse. But to find out that 
Indians w ere relocated several tim es after w hites choose the finest land 
available, and  how  governm ent acts allow ed land to be taken for purposes 
benefiting w hite interests, is beyond the understand ing  of m any tribal people 
even today.
It is im portant to rem em ber that it w as approxim ately thirty years after the
signing of the treaty w ith  the Salish-Kootenai that their land base w as split
up, and  less that fifty years before their reservation w as entirely invaded and
their culture suppressed  by an  overw helm ing and determ ined people. The
redistribution  of land  came swift and  hard  in 1910 and w ithin  a few years,
Indians ow ned only a sm all portion  of their entire reservation.
A nthropologist and  econom ist Ronald T rosper tells us tha t the allotm ent
policy transferred thousands of acres into non-Indian hands. Fie also states
that in 1954 the land-lease clerk for the tribes estim ated that fewer than  one
percent of the allotm ents on the reservation w ere still held by an Indian
ow ner. T rosper goes on to note that;
Based on the 1904 Act w hich started  the process, a total of 485,171 
acres were disposed of . These dispositions w ere of three types.
Land patented  to settlers totaled 404,047 acres; these lands were 
"normal" and "cash" hom esteads. School lands gran ted  to the 
state of M ontana totaled 60,843 acres. The other dispositions w ere 
miscellaneous; of this group, the creation of the N ational Bison 
Range was the largest, consisting of 18,524 acres. The total 
miscellaneous dispositions w ere 20,281 a c r e s . 25
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The school lands w ere sold to the state of M ontana for $1.25 per acre, and 
any Ind ian  w ho already had  a perm anent hom e on this land  was forced to 
relocate. These 60,000 acres of school lands took approxim ately 92 square 
miles of reservation  land  from  the Salish-Kootenai. Section 12 of the bill also 
reserved alm ost 1000 acres for the Catholic m ission schools, church and 
hospital, as well as any o ther institu tion they saw fit to establish. The 
President reserved the righ t to offer the sam e am ount of property  to any o ther 
m issionary or religious society that applied  w ith in  a year after the bill was 
passed. In addition, the P resident had  the right to reserve any areas needed 
for governm ent agencies, mills, institutions, and the like. Actual Indian  
allotm ents totaled 245,00 acres, only about one-fifth of the total reservation.^^
In the m idst of the confusion on the reservation came an  overw helm ing 
desire to get back the land that the Salish-Kootenai had  so quickly lost. 
W ithout doing so, they had  little hope of ever m anaging their personal lives 
or property . They had  in  a short time lost hundreds of thousands of acres to 
non-Indians. The tribes pro tested  the allotm ent policy th rough  several 
means, and  the fuU bloods especially initiated m any protests over the years. 
The following correspondence in the archives gives us a look at their 
concerns, their m ethods of opposition  and, the intensity in w hich opening up  
the reservation  devasta ted  the lives of ind iv idual Salish-Kootenai m em bers.
The Salish-Kootenai w ere un fortunate  in having W.H. Sm ead as agent 
around  the time the Dixon Bill w as passed. Smead had  quite a repu ta tion  for 
doing business on  the reservation, and  m ost of his business came at the 
expense of the Indians. Smead w as agent from  1898-1904...a critical tim e in 
trying to get tribal voices heard  in the governm ent. Sm ead w as all for the 
opening of the reservation, and his illegal practices on the reservation  m ade
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his political views very apparent. By the early 1900's he w as involved in 
several business dealings w ith  w hite business ow ners, m any of them  from  
nearby M issoula. M uch of his business had to do w ith  leasing Indian lands 
and  the resources on it w hile he pocketed the money. H e not only let his 
ow n cattle graze illegally on tribal land, b u t he advertised to outsiders that he 
w ould  lease the entire no rthern  part of the reservation for grazing. G razing 
fees w ere pocketed by Smead, although m any of his close cronies w ere 
allow ed to ru n  cattle on the reservation  w ithou t paying anything. Smead 
denied  all accusations of allowing non-Indians to run  cattle, bu t bo th  the 
H ubbard  Cattle C om pany and M issoula M ercantile held grazing perm its.^^ 
A lthough Sm ead denied  having done anything illegal, his com m ents 
reflected the actions he was accused of. He argued  in 1903 that the Indians 
w ere being selfish w ith  their land, and that they should be required to pay for 
the lands on w hich they ran  their cattle, and  that any land in excess should 
then be leased to w hites.^^ A round the tu rn  of the century, the businessm en 
of M issoula w ere especially ben t on opening up  the reservation to help 
stim ulate their ow n businesses. They w ere ow ners of everything from  
new spapers and banks to real estate agencies and m ercantiles, and w ere just 
the political force needed  to help pass the Dixon Bill. Shortly after the biU 
passed. A gent Smead published a book to prom ote the opportunities available 
on the reservation  to attract new com ers. In  his book he advertised the 
services of all of the big business ow ners from M issoula. He included ads for 
his real estate, loans and  insurance com pany that specialized in  sheep and 
cattle ranches as well as land  located on the fertile soil of the reservation’s 
rivers and  lakes.29 From the book one could have hard ly  had  the im pression 
tha t Indians and w hites w ould be living anyw here close to each other. The
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book is full of pictures of cities, libraries, schools, court houses, farms,
steam ers, mills and o ther industries. M any of the build ings p ictured w ere
located in nearby cities outside of the reservation, b u t Smead had  the dream
of m aking the reservation  into a sim ilar em pire. Even the pictures of Indians
w ere of only two types. They show ed either the peaceful, noble Indian
dressed  in  fuU cerem onial garb, or Indians w ho sim ulated whites, living in
nice houses w ith their ranches and gardens enclosed by fences. Smead w rote
in  his book that the reservation  w as still underdeveloped  because "The
Indian w orks fairly well for another, b u t no t so for himself. He needs the
guid ing  h an d  of one in a u t h o r i t y . "30  He further w rote that the;
F lathead Reservation will w hen opened to settlem ent furnish land 
for thousands of settlers, w here by labor, industry  and thrift, happy 
and  prosperous hom es will be builded. G reat m ines will open up, 
add ing  their quo ta  to the w orld 's w ealth. Smelters will be erected to 
reduce the ores, saw  mills will cut the virgin forests into lum ber. 
Flouring mills will be required  to grind  the w heat. Cities will spring 
up  to handle the business of this new  country, and  railroad wiU be 
bu ilded  to hau l its p roducts to m arket. Steamers will ply over the 
great Flathead Lake and on its shores sum m er hom es and health  
resorts will be built. The abundance of fish and gam e together w ith  
the perfect climatic conditions m ake this an ideal spot for cam ping, 
hun ting  and  fishing.28 M arvel not that the red  m an is loath to share 
his lands w ith  his w hite brother. This, to him  the fairest, the dearest, 
the brightest of earth, the last rem nant of his form er greatness will 
soon pass from  him. So m ust it be.31
Because of all of his open  business dealings, Smead had  quite a reputation  
around  the cities of w estern  M ontana. He began receiving letters from  people 
in 1904 tha t asked for his help in securing lots near Dayton, M ontana that 
w ere in  a boundary  d ispute w ith  the Salish-Kootenai. The tribes w ere sure 
tha t the areas they w ere living on w as located w ith in  the boundaries as stated  
in  the Treaty, and  they rem ained on  their allotted land. There were, 
how ever, m any non-Indians in terested in the particu lar strip  of land  near
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D ayton, and  they asked the A gent to relinquish the tribal allotm ents so they 
could be secured by outsiders. Smead had  been pressured  to sell those 
allotm ents to a m em ber of the Republican Central Com m ittee, and even to a 
C lerk a t the U nited States Land Office w ith in  the D epartm ent of the Interior. 
The federal em ployee w anted  the relinquishm ents because his son w anted  to 
secure a tim bered lot, and  so he sent Smead the nam es of the particular 
Indians tha t he w ould  like to have rem oved. H e then told the A gent that 
w hat ever the price, the m oney w ould be sent i m m e d i a t e l y S m e a d  
apparen tly  requested  the relinquishm ent of certain lots b u t although a few 
families m oved, he had  no real au thority  as far as the tribal m em bers w ere 
concerned and  m ost Indians refused to leave, rem aining on their lots. It is 
doubtful that any of the land  near D ayton w as really considered to be 
d ispu ted . D ayton and  its su rroundings are well w ith in  the reservation even 
as it is stated  in the treaty of 1855, and this is probably w hy Smead's dem ands 
for the Indians to re-locate w ere ignored. The agent continued receiving 
letters th roughout 1904 from  people inquiring w hy the Indians near D ayton 
had  still no t given u p  their lots.
A round this sam e time, m any m em bers of the tribe w rote governm ent 
officials in W ashington protesting their land being taken and protesting the 
actions of their agent. W hen they got little response, the tribes tried direct 
pressure by sending delegates to W ashington D C.. In W ashington they had  
hoped  to settle the problem s affecting the tribes by directly com m unicating 
w ith  those m aking and  im plem enting  law s on the reservation. The Salish- 
Kootenai had  become aw are that in o rder to m ake any lee-way in protecting 
their rights as a distinct culture and  nation, they w ould have to deal w ith  
A m erica and  its people on their ow n term s. The Salish-Kootenai had  to be
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savvy, and considering the incredible obstacles, they w ere quite efficient in 
the w ay they handled  political m atters. They knew  w hen  to speak up, w hen 
to let things ride, w hen to com prom ise, and w hen to ignore governm ent 
threats. They never stopped  corresponding w ith  the governm ent requesting 
tha t their w ishes be met. Indians constantly rebelled against those w ho tried 
to take their land  u n d er various pretenses. Their rebellion w as usually 
peaceful. If one looks in  the archives at aU of the instances w hen the Salish- 
Kootenai w ere asked to extinguish title to their allotm ents and relocate, one 
finds that the sam e m ethod of rebellion w as used by alm ost every Indian. 
They sim ply w ou ldn 't do  w hat the governm ent required  of them , nor w ould  
they im m ediately contest dem ands from  governm ent officials, therefore 
rem aining peaceful in  the eyes of non-Indians.
There w ere several p rom inent m em bers of the Salish tribe that had  a 
constant voice in opposing those w ho had  forced the Indians to split u p  their 
reservation. These prom inen t figures realized tha t the tribal voice w as being 
ignored in W ashington, and that they had  few resources to depend on for any 
kind of legal help. H iring lawyers w as difficult, as the Secretary of the Interior 
had  control of tribal as well as personal Indian m oneys. The Secretary could 
perm it the tribe to use its ow n m oney only if it w as to be spent on farm ing 
im plem ents or o ther "civilizing pursuits." Even then, the m oney w as 
usually given to the agent to spend for the Indians, or the Indians w ould  get 
som e kind of voucher to buy certain  im plem ents at stores w ith  inflated 
prices.
Com plaints about the extrem e control the governm ent had  over Indians 
and  about losing their land to non-Indians seem ed to go now here w hen  they 
discussed m atters w ith  local officials, so in 1908 the tribes decided to send
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three delegates to W ashington w ith  claims and  com plaints against the U nited 
States. A lthough the tribes w anted  to send Babtiste Kakashee, Charley 
MoUman and  Sam Resurrection, they couldn 't secure enough tribal m oney, 
and  therefore chose only one delegate, Babtiste, and  an  in terpreter by the 
nam e of Jackson Sundow n, to discuss m atters w ith  the President, the 
Secretary of the Interior, and  the Com m issioner of Indian  Affairs.
After a long trip  to the capital, Babtiste and  Jackson w ere im m ediately 
denied  access to the governm ent officials they had  come to talk w ith, because 
apparently  they d id  not have the consent of the Flathead agent to m ake this 
trip. The Acting Com m issioner w ho briefly spoke w ith  the tw o delegates also 
claim ed tha t they w ere not carrying p roper credentials from their tribe. In 
o ther w ords, the Com m issioner claim ed tha t he d id  not believe that Babtiste 
w as actually a chosen representative of the Salish-Kootenai tribes, because he 
had  no certifying docum ent from  the agent. A lthough the Com m issioner 
stated  that he d id  not believe Babtiste w as a political representative, he w as 
indeed aw are tha t Babtiste w as the sam e H eadm an w ho signed the Treaty 
w ith  the U.S. governm ent representing  various Fend d'O reille people in 
1855. The fact that Babtiste w as seventy-three years old and had traveled so 
far in great discom fort w as the only reason anyone in W ashington even 
bo thered  acknow ledging his presence. His time in W ashington w as brief, bu t 
Babtiste w as able to state a few  of the tribes com plaints, w hich ranged from 
the p ro test of the Dixon Bill to dem anding  tha t w hite people be stopped from  
enrolling in the tribal nation  and receiving tribal benefits of m oney and  land. 
The A cting Com m issioner listened briefly, b u t then  either justified the 
actions tha t caused the com plaints or told Babtiste that he found no m erit in 
his claim.
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N ot only w ere the tribal claims sim ply dism issed by the officials in Indian 
Affairs, b u t the official H eadm an w ho signed w hat is to this day the m ost 
im portan t docum ent of the tribal nation  w as denied  his authority  and  sent 
home. This was probably not a surprise to Babtiste. He knew  that to get 
perm ission to discuss m atters in W ashington, he w ould  have had  to have a 
docum ent signed and  notarized by the agent, a witness, and an  in terpreter.
All three w ere non-Indian, and  all three w ould approve only those w ho 
could best represent the "progressive" aspects of the tribes. Babtiste w as far 
from  progressive. It w as well know n that he hoped to re tu rn  his people to 
the trad itional econom y of hun ting  and fishing. It w as also well know n that 
those like Babtiste w ho w ere less assim ilated w ould not be allow ed by 
governm ent officials to officially represent the tribes, even if they w ere 
chosen as representatives by the tribe. It is for this same reason, that in later 
years tribal politics w ere ru n  predom inantly  by m ixed-bloods and any others 
show ing "progressive" attitudes.
This brings up  the topic of tribal factions, w hich w ere obviously in place by 
the tu rn  of the century. There w ere those w ho vow ed to rem ove the 
allotm ent policy and the w hites w ho came w ith  it, re tu rn ing  to their 
traditional economy. O thers had  already been forced to farm, and had been 
well exposed to non-Indian  education  and o ther social institutions and felt it 
w as best to try and  fit in w ith  the dom inant culture as best they could. Those 
tha t refused  to fit in w ith  w hite society, som etim es found them selves in 
unexpected  troubles w ith  their ow n families. A young Indian  couple w rote to 
President Taft in 1910 and explained tha t rum ors spread by whites had  gotten 
them  in  deep  trouble w ith  their family and their com m unity. The couple 
explained tha t they w ere at the fourth  of July Indian celebration, w hen
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governor Joe Dixon approached them  and asked if they w ould pose for a 
p icture w ith  him. They refused because of their strong opposition to Dixon 
opening u p  their reservation to non-Indians, bu t the picture was taken 
anyw ay. The photo  later becam e a national postcard  show ing Dixon standing 
next to the Salish-Kootenai couple. The in terp retation  under the picture read  
"we'll open  this reservation  together. "34 Incidents like this one w ere 
com m on, and quite capable of creating conflicts am ong tribal m embers. In 
addition, it is essential to keep in m ind that there w ere thousands of Indians 
of various backgrounds tha t had  been forced to unite on some political level 
to protect their land  base. As one can imagine, the differences in spirituality, 
economy, and poHtical goals, also m ade this union nearly impossible. These 
factors com plicated m atters and  m ade it easier for federal officials to dism iss 
any tribal authority  they opposed.
A lthough uniting on a political level w as hard  to do, there were always 
those leaders that continued their opposition to the allotm ent policy. Babtiste 
w as a leader w ho refused to give u p  easily. Only a few m onths after his 
disastrous trip  to W ashington, he decided to re tu rn  w ith  som ething that 
w ould perhaps urge officials to take him  m ore seriously. First, Babtiste 
gathered  all of the inform ation on the non-Indians w ho w ere securing their 
allotm ents on Indian lands. Babtiste claim ed that a law yer by the nam e of 
W ilham  Q. Ranft located in the tow n of M issoula had  been paid  by various 
ind iv iduals to secure their tribal enrollm ent and an allotm ent. Babtiste 
apparen tly  took this inform ation along w ith  the specific nam es of parties w ho 
had  paid Ranft. Before heading to D.C. again in 1909, Babtiste stopped in 
M issoula to see an attorney by the nam e of Chas Hall. Chas knew  Babtiste as 
well as the m any other Indians w ho w ere escorting Babtiste on  his w ay to
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M issoula. A m ong the escorts w ere Jackson Sundow n, A ntoine Moise,
M artin, Loam an V andred, Sam R esurrection, Paskel Anti vine, and  Joseph 
Pierre. Chas w rote Babtiste a letter to take to the capital that acknow ledged his 
credentials for representing a good portion  of the tribe. In addition, Babtiste 
w as already carrying a petition signed by m em bers of the Salish-Kootenai 
tribes acknow ledging their respect and confidence in the delegates that w ould 
speak for them  in  W ashington. In H all's letter to the Com m issioner of 
Indian  Affairs, he personally requested  that the delegates be heard  this time 
even though  their credentials w ould  not be in the form  required by the
federal governm ent.35
Chas H all had  obviously been inform ed that Babtiste had  again not 
received perm ission from  the agent to go on his visit to W ashington. In fact, 
F lathead Superin tendent Fred M organ w rote a letter to the CIA just tw o days 
before Hall, stating that he had asked Babtiste to delay his trip, but Babtiste 
refused and stated he w as going at once.^^ It w as h ard  enough for the Salish- 
Kootenai to access any legal help that had  real pow er to defend their interests, 
and this left the tribal people extrem ely vulnerable. Even w hen a tribal 
m em ber w ith  great political pow er w ith in  the nation dared  to confront the 
U.S. policy m akers, his p ro test w as im m ediately subdued  by tossing him  
u n d er federal or state jurisdictions. The D elegation of 1909 exemplifies the 
m ethods in w hich Salish-Kootenai m em bers protested , and  the w ays in 
w hich they w ere subjected to another culture 's dom inance by having new  
law s im posed  u p o n  them  at the governm ent's discretion.
W hat is not im m ediately revealed in the correspondence of 1909, is that 
Babtiste w as for m any years a tribal judge w ho seem ed to have gained respect 
no t only from  fellow tribal m em bers, b u t from  m any of the non-Indian
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people w ho knew  him. There is no doubt that he w as quite frustrated  in 
having to get perm ission and  a stam p of approval from  the agent before 
discussing the political issues of his nation w ith  governm ent officials. O n his 
trip  in 1909, there w ere additional com plications im posed upon  Babtiste by 
the F lathead Superintendent, M organ. Knowing that Babtiste w ould probably 
decide to ignore the Superin tendent's request tha t he stay on the reservation 
and w ait to go to W ashington, M organ apparently  told Babtiste that if he was 
going, he w ould  have to take w ith  him  a different interpreter...one assigned 
to him  by the superintendent. It w as said that Babtiste agreed to take an 
in terpreter by the nam e of Joe Pirerre.
If Babtiste d id  agree to the new  interpreter, he had  absolutely no intention 
of keeping his prom ise. Babtiste and  Joe rode to Missoula, visited Chas Hall, 
and  then  Babtiste quickly d um ped  Joe and  continued to W ashington w ith  his 
ow n chosen in terpreter, Jackson Sundow n. W hen the tw o arrived  in  the 
capital they stayed at the Beveridge's Hotel. There they received a letter on 
February 22 from  A cting Com m issioner R.G. V alentine explaining to them  
that once again, the tw o could not be recognized as representatives of their 
tribe, and w ere therefore dism issed. This tim e it had  nothing to do  w ith 
p roper credentials, b u t ra ther the fact that Babtiste b rough t Jackson instead of 
Joe as in terpreter. The office denied Babtiste any authority  because first he 
broke his prom ise to the Superintendent, and secondly, as stated by 
Valentine, the in te rp reter by the nam e of Jackson Sundow n w as no t "legally" 
m arried . W hen he w as requested  by p roper authorities to get m arried, it w as 
said tha t he "insolently and im pudently  refused to do so." In addition  to the 
concern about Sundow n's m arriage status, it w as said the governm ent
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believed tha t for a m an w ith  his intelligence, he w as not setting a good 
exam ple for his people.
As absurd  as this reasoning appeared, it is an im portan t exam ple to 
rem em ber today. Babtiste, although a pow erful m an in the eyes of his people, 
had  Uttle if any real political pow er w ithout totally conform ing to the dictates 
of w hite America. As w e will see in the next tw o chapters, the Salish- 
Kootenai have continually been  forced to conform  and  com prom ise in  o rder 
to rem ain peaceful and  reta in  their na tion ’s political pow er. Even today the 
tribes have to com prom ise in  one area so that they can retain  other pow ers, 
and  for non-Indians w ho have little understand ing  of this concept, the tribe’s 
au thority  m ay som etim es appear to be shaky.
For the early part of the tw entieth  century, it appears that the less the 
Salish-Kootenai w ere recognized in having valid claims, the harder they tried  
to be heard. Delegations to W ashington becam e a continuing strategy, and 
there are records of the Salish-Kootenai sending delegations to the capital on 
an average of every tw o years from 1908-1935. The year 1910 was a stressful 
one for the tribes, because this was the year the reservation w ould actually be 
opened to thousands of settlers. The reservation w as opened in the spring, 
and  by July the tribes had  m ore grievances than ever to present to 
W ashington. A letter from  the D epartm ent of the Interior on July 17, 1910 
reveals the m atters addressed  by a delegation of the Salish-Kootenai at that 
particu lar time. The letter is in answ er to 25 direct statem ents and questions 
p u t forth  by the Salish-Kootenai tha t perta in  m ostly to problem s directly 
related  to land. The tribes had  com plaints ranging from errors in the 
reservation  boundary  to settlers’ trespassing on private property . In addition, 
they requested perm ission to charge w hite settlers for the cattle that grazed
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illegally on  tribal property. The Com m issioner of Ind ian  Affairs w ho replied 
to the delegates either denied  w rongs done to the tribes or circum vented each 
one of the questions. One com plaint m ade by the tribal delegates w as that the 
allotm ent pohcy had  m ade provisions to sell tribal land to the state of 
M ontana to be used for schools and other necessary purposes. The sale per 
acre to the state w as only $1.25, and the delegates asserted that they w ere being 
cheated. After all, this w as 1910, and  they had  been selling acreage back in 
1882 for $11.20 per acre. In add ition  to no t m aking any m oney from the sale 
of surp lus land, the tribal people them selves w ere no t happy w ith  the 
allotm ents they had  received. M any com plained tha t they had  not received 
the actual p lot of land  that they had  picked out, and dem anded exchanges or 
the righ t to sell their land  and m ove elsewhere. They received neither. 
Allotees also com plained of being invaded by settlers because they couldn 't 
legally prove w here their p roperty  boundaries were. Survey com ers could 
no t be located, and  yet the Federal governm ent insisted that the tribe's m oney 
had  already been spent to survey each allotment.^S
O ther requests to the federal governm ent by the tribe had  to do w ith  
allowing the tribal elders and the infirm  to sell their property  because they 
had  no o ther m eans to care for them selves. The Salish-Kootenai w ere losing 
the social structure needed  to care for their elderly and o ther tribal m em bers 
in need. This request w as denied  as well. The Indians w ere sim ply told to 
m ake their needs know n to the superin tenden t if they felt it necessary One
of the tribes' biggest problem s that allotm ent had brough t w ith  it w as 
paternalism . The Salish-Kootenai w ere not allow ed to sell land, one of their 
only com m odities, nor could they lease it. In addition, any personal m oney 
or tribal income w as controlled by the Secretary of the Interior.
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Indians w ho w ere aw are of w rongs done by bo th  settlers and local and 
federal governm ents, caused som e anim osity am ong those w ho w ould have 
p referred  the Indians to rem ain ignorant. The F lathead Superin tendent Fred 
M organ, w ho w as in charge during  the opening of the reservation, appeared  
to be one of these people. He w rote to the Com m issioner of Indian Affairs 
several tim es com plaining of the m any "ignorant" Indians w ho opposed 
non-Indians settling on their land. In 1915 there w as a reference to the 
Com m issioner of Indian  Affairs about the letters and  correspondence that 
tribal m em ber Sam Resurrection w rote to the governm ent over the years. 
S uperin tendent M organ sta ted  tha t "Mr. R esurrection is a m edicine m an w ho 
exists off of old and ignorant Indians w ho for the time being seem to believe 
in  his pow ers to accom plish great achievements." The letter goes on to say 
that besides being a chronic letter-w riter w ho w astes his efforts on the hopes 
of restoring the reservation to the Indians, Sam isn 't to be trusted, as he 
hasn ’t paid  back any of the m oney borrow ed for his delegation five years ago. 
Along w ith  his personal judgm ents about Sam, M organ passed on a letter 
from  Sam Resurrection to the Com m issioner. The letter w as strong in 
rem inding  the governm ent that the Salish-Kootenai w ere not being treated 
in a fair, respectable m anner. It also rem inded  them  that the land had  been 
taken from  the Salish-Kootenai th rough  the allotm ent policy and it w as not 
the governm ent's righ t to do so.^O addition, Sam rem inded  them  that 
there w ere m any unfortunate aspects of having som eone else have so m uch 
control over his tribal people. H e knew  tha t several of the Indian agents and 
superin tenden ts had  their ow n agendas, and  d id n 't w ant the Indians 
m eddling  in their business affairs. The federal officials had  done m ore than  
the ir share in com plicating the situations for Indians.
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Relocation and receiving different allotm ents from  the ones chosen, 
continued to be major problem s for years to come. For instance, in 1904 
Indians Joseph Jean Jan C raw  and M alta Sachkolke pro tested  their rem oval 
from  their allotm ents, b u t w ere rem oved anyw ay because the governm ent 
w as not sure if their allotm ents w ere located inside the reservation 
boundaries. Any tim e a conflict arose over reservation boundaries, the 
federal governm ent's response w as that they w ere not sure if the boundaries 
had  actually ever been  surveyed. The survey had  indeed been done, b u t since 
the signing of the 1855 treaty nam es for geographic landm arks had changed, 
m aking it difficult for the governm ent to know  exactly w hat geographical 
boundaries m arked the reservation. The properties of Joseph and M alta, as 
well as the m any others tha t w ere rem oved, w ere prom ptly  requested by 
^vhite settlers as soon as they found out that the land  office w as in the process 
of rem oving the Indians. Time w as certainly never w asted  listening to the 
argum ents m ade by the Salish-Kootenai w hen  there w ere opportunities from  
outsiders to purchase the land. If the tribal people could not prove their 
boundaries, than  they could lay no claim to them  as far as w hite settlers and 
the Land Office w ere concerned. The General Land Office located in the 
nearby tow n of Kallispell had  the responsibility of allotting land to both  
Indians and non-Indians and  clearly had  little patience in determ ining right 
from w rong. They found it easier to rem ove the tribal people and sell the 
land in question to any settler that requested it.
For all of those prim e properties lost and sold to settlers, it w as later found 
by those w ho appraised the land for the Salish-Kootenai litigation against the 
federal governm ent in 1972, that the tribes had  only received 18 percent of the 
appraised  value on the land they sold u n d er the Act of 1904.41 D uring the
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litigation, the C ourt of Claims found that by 1951, the governm ent had  paid 
the tribes for only approxim ately one-seventh of the land  taken. In addition, 
they found that the 1904 Act created a taking of property  forbidden u n d er the 
fifth am endm ent, and  thereby aw arded  the tribes over tw enty-one million
d o l l a r s . 4 2
The policy of allotm ent destroyed m any individual tribal m em bers 
economically. In add ition  to not receiving the m oney for their individually  
appraised  allotm ents, m any Salish-Kootenai found them selves struggling to 
pay taxes on  a piece of property  they couldn’t afford. Before the Dixon Bill 
opened u p  the reservation to whites, the Dawes Act had  previously held that 
the land of each allottee w ould be held in trust for twenty-five years. At the 
end of the twenty-five year trust period, they w ould receive a fee paten t on 
the land  entitling them  to full benefits of ow nership. The end of the tw enty- 
five year trust m eant that the Indian  w ould pay taxes on the land, bu t w ould 
also be able to claim all rights to the land and sell it if necessary. U nder the 
Daw es Act, the President had  the pow er to allow Indian property  to rem ain in 
trust status, bu t under the allotm ent act, they autom atically becam e US. 
citizens. Because citizenship m eant paying property  taxes w hich pauperized  
m ost Indians, N ative A m erican citizenship w as am ended by an Act passed  in 
1906. The am endm ent stated that they w ould not becom e citizens until their 
allotm ents passed from  trust to fee status. This same act, how ever, 
em pow ered  the Secretary of the Interior to issue a paten t in fee before the end 
of the tw enty-five year trust period if the Indian applicant filed for a fee 
patent, or w as show n to be "competent" by the federal Com petency 
Com m ission. Each application for a fee paten t w as to be considered on  its 
ow n m erits and on the basis of a repo rt from  the Agency superintendent.
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Patents in fee w ere not to be issued w ithout Indian  consent; how ever, w hen 
the cities and  counties needed to generate m ore income, taxing the Indians 
becam e a great opportunity , the Com petency Com m ission gave com petency 
status to m any Indians on  the F lathead reservation  w ithout their consent.
For the federal governm ent to determ ine com petency w as in itself 
am biguous, and  violated the tw enty-five year trust period. "Competency" 
had  no bottom  hne definition o ther than  a person 's ability to "manage' his or 
her ow n financial affairs. In reality, the governm ent only w anted  to know  
w hether each Indian had  the "ability" to pay taxes on their property. As 
m any Salish-Kootenai knew , earning an  incom e from  forced farm ing was 
hard ly  a reahty. Their life w as not oriented tow ard  business enterprise and 
profit, nor d id  they necessarily desire such a way of life. The yearly taxes w ere 
im possible to earn, forcing m any to sell their land. Settlers, cattle ranchers, 
and  w hite business interests fu rther pauperized  the Indians, by refusing to 
pay a fair price for Indian land.
M any of those Salish-Kootenai w ho w ere forced to pay taxes on their land 
either refused, or took their cases to court in opposition of the com mission set 
u p  to determ ine com petency. The tribal people com plained that they had  
been determ ined  to be com petent w ithou t even being thoroughly 
investigated and w ithou t giving any consent. M ost of the com plaints 
referring to the issue of forced fee paten ts tu rn  u p  in the early 1900's. W ith 
surprising consistency, the tribal people opposed these forced fee patents and  
any o ther im posed fees that w ent w ith  the process. For instance, m any 
refused to pay the county clerk the $5 to $7 that w as required  for receiving the 
paten t. A letter from  Superin tendent Charles Coe to the Com m issioner of 
Ind ian  Affairs com plained tha t the Indians "refuse to pay the costs, holding
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tha t as the patents w ere arbitrarily issued them  w ithou t their consent that no 
expense should  attach in the m atter of having the patents canceled and that 
expense for such an abstract should  be borne by the Government."43
The A llotm ent policy created incredible am ounts of confusion and sorrow  
for the Salish-Kootenai people. W ithout consent, they w ere not only forced 
to pay a property  tax, b u t a tax on personal property  as well. Anything 
believed to be gained m aterially by the profit of ow ning land was taxed by the 
county. Eventually, so m any of the Salish-Kootenai as well as other N orth  
A m erican Indians pro tested  taxation, the act w as rendered  invalid by the 
Federal C ourt decisions of U.S. v. Kootenai County, Idaho, and U.S. v.
Benewah County, Idaho , and  the governm ent agreed to cancel the fee patents 
issued. A lthough this w as finally a victory for the tribes, m uch of the dam age 
had  already been done, as the federal court d id n ’t even hear the Benewah case 
until 1923. M any of the Salish-Kootenai had  already been forced to sell their 
land before the 1920’s, and for those w ho struggled to pay their taxes over the 
years, the governm ent refused to sim ply cancel the paten t and re tu rn  the 
m oney spent paying those taxes. It has been estim ated that there were 
approxim ately 450 forced fee patents, and only 32, or seven percent, of those 
paten ts w ere ever canceled on  the F lathead Reservation.44 Mrs. M ary Blood, 
Angelic Bartl, and  Mr. and  Mrs. Fadderou te are all exam ples of the further 
com plications endured  by the Salish-Kootenai after the court rendered  fee 
p aten ts  invalid.
M ary Blood was issued a fee paten t in 1917, and  had  struggled to pay the 
taxes on her land for over eleven years before her requests for reim bursem ent 
w ere com plied w ith  in 1929. M ary d id  receive a refund  on the taxes she paid  
on the land, bu t the governm ent denied  that the twelve years of taxes she
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paid  on personal p roperty  should  be reim bursed. Ironically enough, she was 
being taxed on the very p roperty  and  m aterial goods that the governm ent 
dem anded  she and  o ther Indians have. Personal property  taxes w ere to be 
paid  on everything from  cattle and  o ther livestock, to household goods and 
farm  im plem ents. M ary's com plaint w as tha t the county should rem ove the 
things originally purchased  or built by her husband so she could avoid paying 
taxes on the unnecessary property . W hile Mrs. Blood's husband had  m ade 
these purchases, he had  also abandoned  his wife and  children leaving them  
financially responsible to pay taxes on his personal property  .45
Angelic Bartl on the o ther hand, refused to accept her paten t in fee, and 
refused to pay any taxes on the land or lease it out to pay for the taxes. By 1929 
she had several years of taxes held against the land, b u t she was fortunate in 
that the county authorities d idn 't take action to sell the land to pay for the 
taxes. The county 's selhng the land w as a com m on occurrence if it was 
valuable enough for som eone else to p u t a claim on it. To avoid paying the 
taxes. Angelic Bartl had  to furnish  her title to the land and  show any entries 
against the land.46 For instance, d id  she have any judgm ents, leases, 
contracts to sell, or any m ortgages against the land? If she had, she w ould 
have perhaps lost it all. It was absurd to require proof of liens or m ortgages 
against the land before being relieved of the w rongs done by the governm ent, 
because som e tribal m em bers could not read  or w rite English and could not 
com plete the required  process of proving liens and m ortgages. From viewing 
the correspondence of the early 1900's, it is clear that to fight for one's land, 
w riting and  reading correspondence w as an absolute necessity. M ary Blood 
w as fortunate to have been well versed in the English language. There w ere 
w ell over 20 letters w ritten  betw een M ary, the superin tenden t or agent.
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D epartm ent of the Interior, and  the county over a period  of several m onths 
before anything w as settled. Angelic Bartel, w ho knew  less English, found 
herself in a case that took alm ost tw o years to settle. After the first year of 
getting now here, she w as forced to come up  w ith  the m oney to hire a lawyer 
to represen t her. Those w ho had to pay for help in opposing the w rongs done 
by governm ent policies w ere often at a g reat loss financially.
The last exam ple of a tribal family's com plications from  forced fee patents 
com es from  the L adderoute family. Like so m any, they too held out from 
paying taxes as long as they could. W hen the County authorities pressured 
them  by threatening to sell their land, they took out m ortgages on their 
property , b u t this m easure only continued to increase their massive debts. 
They held  out for several years, continuing to pro test their paten t in fee, bu t 
the D epartm ent of the Interior sim ply denied their requests. They refused to 
strike ou t the illegally im posed fee patent, because the couple had  taken out a 
m ortgage on the house to pay for taxes.47 According to the governm ent, 
taking ou t a m ortgage m eant tha t the property  had to rem ain under fee paten t 
status. This was a com m on disaster for m any Salish-Kootenai because 
m ortgages w ere alm ost always taken out just to pay the property  taxes that 
w ere forced upon  them  illegally.
The allotm ent policy was no doubt devastating to the Salish-Kootenai. For 
them , control over every aspect of their fu tu re  had  fallen into the hands of 
outside governm ents w ith  the force of law  behind  them . Federal and  state 
acts pertain ing  to allotm ent on the reservation  never contained specific plans 
for im plem enting the policies and therefore failed drastically. The goals of 
totally assim ilating the Indian  w hile protecting  their p roperty  w ere never 
reached, and  there w ere no policy specifics that laid out legal m atters and
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jurisd iction  on the reservation. Jurisdictional confusion w orked against 
everyone w ho lived there. N eedless to say, for the Salish-Kootenai the m ost 
reasonable solution to these problem s w as to have all non-Indians rem oved 
from  their land. O pposition to the allotm ent policy and  dem ands to have 
w hites rem oved becam e intense by 1904 and continued for m any years.
CHAPTER: IV 
POLHICS AND THE PAST 
W ith an  understand ing  of the history of allotm ent, we are able to see how  
the land  w ithin  the reservation boundary  w as spht up  and how  the tribes 
w ere overw helm ed by the control exerted over every aspect of their lives. 
W ith the division of land came the m essy division of jurisdiction over all 
people living on the reservation. D eciding w ho should  have authority  over 
persons, property, and  resources depended  on several factors, and the 
am biguity in  federal laws pertain ing  to N ative A m ericans allowed for plenty 
of debate. W hat the Salish-Kootenai found is that law  w as often 
im plem ented  by w hichever au thority  could argue or justify their case m ost 
m eaningfully. W ith the opening of the reservation to w hites in 1910, federal 
and  tribal laws had  to coincide w ith  state laws that w ere to be enforced upon 
the non-Indian neighbors of the Salish-Kootenai. In the beginning, how ever, 
the state appeared  m ore concerned w ith  trying to bring tribal m em bers under 
state laws, than  to enforce federal or tribal rules on the settlers. One of the 
m ost controversial topics of those days w as the control over fish and  gam e 
rights, and  it is here w here we begin to see how  the clash of jurisdictions 
directly effected the evolution of gam e laws on the reservation.
Turisdictional Confusion
There have obviously been several factors that existed to create the 
confusion for bo th  Indians and w hites on the Flathead reservation, and 
therefore neither Indians nor non-Indians have felt fully pro tected  by their 
represen tative governm ents. The lack of consistency in  determ ining and 
enforcing laws has th reatened m any residents for generations now.
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Reservation law has the potential of being so complex, tha t few people have
gained fam iliarity w ith  the how 's and w h y ’s of political decision making.
Tribal officials often feel that non-Indians have at tim es m ade reservation
law  m ore com plicated than  it should  be, because they have failed to
u n derstand  the tribal-federal relationship. N on-Indians therefore do not
understand  state relations w ith  the tribes, and  do not realize w hen the state
has overstepped their au thority  on the reservation. To understand  the
history of jurisdiction over fish and gam e m atters, it is necessary to
understand  the Indian-state conflict over laws. The conflict begins simply
because the state and  the Confederated Salish-Kootenai Tribes are both
sovereigns w hich m ust cooperate w ith  each other. W hen the state applies its
laws to Indian  people w ith in  the reservation, or w hen the tribes apply
regulations to non-Indians, legal d isputes arise. The d isputes question who
will have authority  over the m atter. A ttorneys Vine Deloria and Clifford
Lytle state in their book entitled American Indians, American Justice that:
A court's au thority  to hear and  determ ine a case is usually 
predicated  upon  its jurisdiction over (a) the subject m atter of the 
d ispute or (b) the parties involved in  the dispute 
(personal jurisdiction). If, for instance, an accident occurs w ithin 
a state, the state court m ay assum e jurisdiction since the subject 
m atter of the d ispute (the accident) occurred w ithin  the confines of 
the state's borders. Personal jurisdiction is invoked w hen the 
parties, as opposed to the subject m atter, fall under the authority  of 
the court. If tw o opposing litigants are dom iciled w ithin the state, 
tha t is, personally and geographically living w ith in  its borders, then  
the state court may assum e jurisdiction over their persons so as to 
en terta in  jurisdiction.^
As the authors poin t out, jurisdiction is never as easily determ ined. 
H istorically, deciding w hether or not jurisdiction on the reservation  fell into 
the hands of the state or the tribe depended  on the status of one's domicile, or 
w hether the violation occurred on tribal, federal, or state ow ned property. In
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other w ords, d id  the act occur on land held in  trust for Indians by the federal 
governm ent (trust patented) or w as it fee paten ted  land, falling under state 
taxation an d  control? The ethnicity of the ind iv idual involved in a violation 
also determ ined  w hether the case w ould  be heard  in  a state or tribal court. 
A lthough the previous rules given by Deloria and Lytle w ere the basis for 
determ ining  early gam e laws, w e will soon come to find out that those rules 
w ere inadequate for determ ining fairness, and  fish and gam e conflicts w ere 
m uch m ore com plicated to resolve.
T hroughout the history of tribal-state jurisdiction on the reservation the 
problem  has been tha t there are tw o questions that cannot seem to be 
answ ered  definitively. The first question is exactly how  m uch jurisdiction 
should  the tribes have over non-Ind ian  people living on the reservation?
The second question is how  m uch authority  should the state of M ontana 
have over the Salish-Kootenai people? Frank Pom m ersheim  and A nita 
Rem erow ski's book Reservation Street Law gives us a good sum m ary of the 
com m on legal argum ents tha t w ould  be used by bo th  sides concerning the 
previous questions. Using previously held Suprem e C ourt and  low er court 
decisions, the Salish-Kootenai w ould  generally argue in d isputes over 
jurisdiction on  the reservation that they had  been continually recognized as a 
sovereign nation, and  they had  the right to govern m uch of w hat goes on 
w ith in  the borders of their reservation. In regards to hunting , this m eans 
they w ould  m ake decisions concerning w hen  and  w here people h u n t and 
how  m uch they pay for perm its, and  arrest any violators of fish and  gam e 
regulations. In addition, w hen  Indians leave the reservation, they fall u n d er 
state jurisdiction for any violation, so it w ould  be logical tha t any non-Indian
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should  fall u n d er tribal au thority  w hen  they violate the laws of the tribal 
ju risd ic tion .
The state and those non-Indians Hving on the reservation w ould generally 
counter that argum ent by stating tha t because non-Indians are not allow ed to 
ru n  for tribal offices, they are not fairly represented in  issues that directly 
affect them . Their constitu tional rights as Americans, therefore, are violated 
if they are to fall u n d er any tribal jurisdiction. They argue that Indians 
should  have absolutely no control over decisions affecting non-Indians w ho 
live on  the reservation. As F rank Pom m ersheim  and  A nita Remerowski 
poin t out, w hen  the state w ants to extend its jurisdiction over Indians, it 
sim ply argues that Ind ian  people have the same rights as non-Indians, in that 
they vote and can ru n  for political office. Because Indians receive several 
state services just as non-Indians do, the state m ay argue in particular 
instances tha t they m ust follow state laws. A n additional argum ent from 
m any non-Indians living on the reservation is that tribal people don 't pay 
property  taxes, and  therefore the bu rden  of economic success faUs to non- 
Indians on the reservation. In regards to hunting, w hites argue that they pay 
to control and  re-stock state fish and wildlife, and they will not pay again by 
purchasing a tribal hun ting  perm it.
The gam e laws on the Flathead Reservation have evolved according to 
how  the various jurisdictions have m ade and enforced laws, and w hether or 
no t litigation betw een the jurisdictions w as involved. O ften gam e laws 
evolved sim ply by one authority  asserting its pow er over individuals in 
various situations, som etim es illegally. Soon w e w ill look at historical 
inform ation  reveahng a story tha t explains the confusion, the m ishaps, and 
the m anipu la tion  exerted over the Salish-Kootenai concerning their hun ting
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rights. As their rights w ere restricted, they not only experienced a great loss of 
their valuable resources b u t a failure to control the w elfare of their ow n 
people. A fter looking at this early history of conflict, w e will be able to 
understand  w hy the tribes have so needed and desired to regain control over 
land and resources w ith in  their reservation.
Because the lines of jurisdiction have always been blurred, fish and game 
laws have evolved based on em otional pleas and the changing needs of the 
people. In addition, jurisdiction on reservations are established based on 
previous outcom es of litigation th roughout the nation. If there is no 
previous exam ple of how  to rule on a case, jurisdiction m ay simply be exerted 
based on  som eone's perceived needs at the time, and perhaps w ithout any 
real legal justification. The early history of conflict over gam e and gam e 
rights will help us to understand  how  today 's decisions over hunting  and 
fishing are m ade on the F lathead reservation.
Some of earliest records of serious hunting  conflicts on the reservation 
began in  the early 1900's and occurred because of the intense m ovem ent of 
settlers onto the Flathead reservation. W hen the reservation was opened up  
to hom esteading, everything the Salish-Kootenai d id  becam e every w hite 
m an's business. H unting  had  becom e a big issue am ong non-Indians because 
for the m ost part, the Salish-Kootenai w ent on w ith  their business as usual, 
rarely draw ing boundaries to show  w here they could and could not h u n t on 
their tribal land. But settlers could not tolerate having Indians roam ing 
around  on or near w hat w as considered private p roperty . In addition, 
conservation becam e an issue for the state of M ontana, and  state gam e 
w ardens argued that gam e restrictions for Indians w ere absolutely necessary 
to insure enough gam e for everyone. U nderlying the public justification of
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how  to control Indian  hunting  w ere feelings ranging from fear to greed, and 
m ost im portantly , the belief that Indians w ould  have to assimilate into the 
Euro-A m erican culture th rough  the law s of civihzation. M any events 
docum ented  by non-Indians show  that if they could no t control Indian 
actions w ith in  the reservation, they began to feel vulnerable. This fear and 
vulnerability  w ere felt by the Salish-Kootenai tribes as well. W ith the clash of 
cultures had  come the need to gain control of the tribes' well being. In the 
face of g reat odds, the Salish-Kootenai continued m eeting the needs of their 
families based on their in terp retation  of their relationship w ith  the federal 
governm ent, and ignoring the state laws im posed upon  them.
Usually the stories of hunting  confUcts started  out w ith  the Salish-
Kootenai continuing to utilize their gam e rights based on their treaty w ith  the
U.S. governm ent and  their inherent righ t to do so as a sovereign nation. The
Salish-Kootenai decisions of w here to h u n t and  fish w as based on Article III
of the H ellgate Treaty w hich reads;
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the stream s running 
th rough  or Bordering said reservation is further secured to said 
Indians; as also the right of taking fish a t all usual and  accustom ed 
places, in com m on w ith  citizens of the Territory, and of erecting 
tem porary  buildings for curing; together w ith  the privilege of 
hunting, gathering roots and  berries, and  pasturing their horses and 
cattle upon  open and unclaim ed land.^
N otice this Article does not define any restrictions on w hat time of year 
they can h u n t or how  often they can hunt. In addition  to Article III, the tribes 
had  signed the treaty  assum ing that the tribal people w ould rem ain an 
independen t nation, w ith  the pow er to govern itself w ith in  the borders of the 
reservation. This of course w ould apply  to the rules of fishing and hunting  
gam e w ithou t any additional restrictions from  outside sources. The Treaty 
sta ted  that the Sahsh-Kootenai had  exclusive rights to fish and game. N ot
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only d id  it state tha t tribes retained the right to use those recourses that 
m aintained their economy, b u t tha t they had  the pow er to exclude others 
from  using those recourses. The treaty, and specifically Article III, becam e one 
of the only legal tools the Salish-Kootenai consistently used to defend their 
lifestyle of hunting  and fishing and  to support their economy after the 
reservation  opened up  to settlem ent.
M ost of the archival inform ation pertaining to the tribes shows that in the
evolution of gam e laws, there w ere several Suprem e C ourt decisions and
several local court decisions tha t w ere taken into consideration w henever
conflicts arose and  new  law s or regulations needed to be m ade. The thing to
keep in  m ind w hen view ing the archival m aterial, is tha t although it often
appeared  that a law  w as m ade w hich prevented  Indians from  hunting or
having jurisdiction over their ow n m atters, this w as in actuality, rarely the
case. The rules, regulations and so called "laws" enforced upon  the Salish-
Kootenai w ere often little m ore than  opinions and  in terpretations of officials
w ho w anted  to assert their pow er over the tribal people. Actual laws specific
in content and  pertaining directly to fish and  gam e w ere quite rare. A lthough
state and county officials asserted they could m ake laws pertaining to all
reservation  residents, the law s dealing w ith  N ative A m ericans w ere generally
m ade solely by Congress. States had  little real pow er to control N ative
Am erican issues, as Cohen states in his book Federal Indian Law :
W hen federal constitutional pow er over Indian  affairs is validly 
exercised it is the "Supreme Law of the Land" and supersedes 
conflicting state laws or state constitutional provisions pu rsuan t 
to the Suprem acy Clause.^
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In addition, Cohen tells us that state laws had  no validity w ith  N ative
A m ericans because of the legislation adop ted  under the Indian  Com merce
Clause, exem plified by a sum m ary by Chief Justice M arshall in 1832:
From  the com m encem ent of our governm ent. Congress has 
passed  acts to regulate trade and intercourse w ith  the Indians; 
w hich treat them  as nations, respect their rights, and  manifest 
a firm  purpose to afford that protection w hich treaties stipulate.
All these acts, and  especially that of 1802, w hich is still in force, 
m anifestly consider the several Ind ian  nations as distinct 
political com m unities, having territorial boundaries, w ith  
w hich their au thority  is ex-clusive, and  having a right to all the 
lands w ith in  those boundaries, w hich is not only acknow ledged, 
b u t guarantied  by the U nited States.^
As it turns out how ever. Congress often guaranteed  m any conflicts and 
sim ply avoided any overt pro tection  of N ative A m erican nations, letting the 
Indians and  indiv idual states battle out their differences. This failure on the 
p art of the federal governm ent came from  the fact that m ost laws pertaining 
to N ative A m ericans contained no specifics on how  to im plem ent and carry 
out a particular law. Because of any am biguity or lack of clarity on a specific 
issue tha t show s up  in federal law  pertain ing  to Indians, individual states 
could take these laws and  practically re-w ord and  re-w ork the in tention into 
som ething that w ould be advantageous to the state. There w as also the 
problem  that Congress and the federal governm ent in general felt they w ere 
too far rem oved from  the conflict to pass laws effectively protecting each of 
the tribal nations. This failure is w hy we typically see state and county 
jurisdictions easily being asserted over tribal people, property, and recourses 
on the reservation.
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Evolution of Game Laws on the Flathead Reservation
Perhaps the biggest event tha t started  sentim ents flaring over hunting on
the reservation  , w as an  incident that occurred in the fall of 1908. The
know ledge of the event m ade its w ay across the country, as show n by this
chpping from  the Kansas City Journal dated October 19,1908:
M issoula, M ont. Oct 19—A telephone m essage from Ovando,
Powell county, says that D eputy W arden C.B. Peyton and four 
F lathead Indians are dead  as a result of a pitched battle betw een 
D eputy  Peyton, his assistant, H erm an R udolph and a band of 
Flathead Indians near H olland 's Prairie on Swan river Yesterday 
afternoon .
Peyton and  R udolph w ere attem pting to arrest the Indians for 
hun ting  w ithout a license and killing deer in excess of law. Peyton 
w ent to the cam p of the Indians and told them  that they m ust 
accom pany him  to M issoula. W ithout a w ord  of w arning they fired 
on the deputy  w ith  rifles. Their fire w as returned  by Peyton and 
Rudolph. Yellowhead w as one of the Indians killed. The others 
are unknow n. The squaw s escaped.^
The headhner from  the Kansas City Journal was taken out of a letter 
addressed  to the Secretary of the Interior from  the acting commissioner, R.G. 
V alentine. V alentine addressed  the com m issioner about the hunting  
accident and  told the Secretary that the incident m ust have happened because 
the Indians w ere hunting  off of their reservation. He stated, how ever, tha t he 
w as only assum ing this to be the case from reading the new s article. W hen 
the article w as w ritten , no one knew  for sure w hether or not the incident 
happened  w ithin  the reservation boundaries, bu t as far as the tribes w ere 
concerned, the incident had  definitely occurred on the reservation. The 
problem  cam e in determ ining  w eather or not the Indians w ho shot and  killed 
the gam e w arden  w ere on tribal or state ow ned property  inside the 
reservation. Once this w as know n, officials could determ ine w hose court 
they w ould  be tried in. If they w ere on state land, the state court w ould try
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them , and  if they w ere on tribal land, they fell u n d er the jurisdiction of the 
federal governm ent. The fact rem ained, how ever, that w hether the tribal 
m em bers w ere on state or tribal land, their treaty did no t require them  to 
purchase a state hun ting  perm it.
R.G. V alentine poin ted  out to the Secretary of the Interior that if the 
Salish-Kootenai w ere found to be on any land  belonging to the state, then  
they w ould  have no rights because of the Suprem e Court decision of W ard  
vs. Race Horse. This case ru led  that Indians could not h u n t w ithin  the limits 
of the state in violation of its state laws. Valentine later came to the 
conclusion that the Salish-Kootenai Indians w ere off the reservation and 
therefore hun ting  w ith in  the confines of the state and in violation of state 
gam e laws. Taken very literally, the term  "outside" of the reservation 
boundary  w as in terp reted  to m ean on any land w ith in  the reservation that 
had  been relinquished to the state by the federal governm ent.^ The decision 
m ade by the federal governm ent concerning the incident of 1908 created 
trouble for m ore them just those w ho had  shot the gam e w arden. According 
to non-Ind ian  officials, the reservation  boundaries "theoretically" no longer 
existed, because it w as checkerboarded w ith state, federal and tribally ow ned 
property . The Salish-Kootenai w ould now  have to know  the status of every 
foot of land they w alked across w ithin  their reservation. As one can imagine, 
determ ining  the theoretical boundaries of state and tribal land and exactly 
w ho w ould  have jurisdiction over the checkerboarded parcels was an 
extrem ely com plicated issue, and  one the Indians could have avoided had  
they been left to m anage their ow n land base.
A long w ith court litigation like Ward v. Race Horse, there w ere other 
Suprem e C ourt decisions tha t w orked to denigrate the hunting  and various
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other rights of the N ative Americans. One case particularly  effective in doing
this w as the case of Lone Wolf  vs. Hitchcock in w hich the court ru led  that:
P lenary authority  over the tribal relations of Indians has been 
exercised by Congress from  the beginning and the pow er has 
always been deem ed a political one and not subject to be controlled 
by the judicial departm ent of the governm ent.^
This decision gave Congress the pow er to abrogate a treaty m ade w ith  the
N ative A m erican nations if they deem ed it necessary for governm ental
policy. The only stipulation was that Congress had  to show  "good faith"
tow ard  the Indians and  advise them  of their intentions. As you can imagine,
this court decision easily justified the non-Indians' need to change any treaty
rights tha t w ere inconvenient, and  the "good faith" could be avow ed simply
by stating tha t it w ould  be done for the "benefit" of the Indians. A lthough the
treaty rights of the Salish-Kootenai w ere never abrogated, non-Indian officials
found great pow er in stating that the possibility to do so existed. The
possibility of the Salish-Kootenai losing treaty rights becam e a com m on threat
to get them  to adhere to state laws, and  to assert state authority  over various
legal m atters on the reservation. For instance, if public opinion deem ed
Article III of the H ellgate Treaty ou tdated , they sim ply stated that it no longer
applied  to the Salish-Kootenai. They w ould  tell Indians and non-Indians
alike that the Treaty had  expired or had  been abrogated.
O ne exam ple of this comes from  a letter in 1908 addressed to the chiefs of 
the F lathead Tribes from  the acting Ind ian  com m issioner w ithin  the 
D epartm ent of the Interior. The letter is in response to the tribal opposition 
to opening the reservation up  to whites. A lthough the treaty w as not 
abrogated, and  the tribes w ere never properly notified of any intent to do so, 
the federal governm ent defended  their right to open up  the reservation
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illegally by stating that the case of Lo?ie Wolf v. Hitchcock m ade it possible.
In addition, the Acting Com m issioner w rote that contrary to belief, the treaty 
contained no provision to the effect tha t the lands on  the Flathead 
reservation  w ere to rem ain a reservation for the use of Indians. The 
governm ent w as using the Lone Wolf case to defend the fact that the Flathead 
reservation was to be opened, and the opening w as to be justified by stating 
tha t the treaty had no specific provision that stopped the governm ent from 
doing so. The letter to the tribal chiefs w as discouraging and sounded quite 
final, b u t in  reality the letter w as w ritten  as little m ore than  an "opinion" of 
one official.^ The reservation had been opened illegally, as the 1855 treaty 
w as still in full force.
The federal governm ent w as at fault for creating m any of the absurd legal 
justifications for illegal acts tow ard  the tribes. They in fact gave little 
incentive th rough  specific laws or congressional acts that m otivated the 
A m erican public to show  any kind of respect tow ard  N ative American groups 
or the laws pertaining to them. Because the governm ent d id  not consistently 
back u p  its policies tow ard  N ative Am ericans, m uch of the Am erican public 
saw  the idea of an Ind ian  nation  as nothing m ore than  a creation in the m ind 
of the Indian. The jurisdictional sta tus of individuals living on the F lathead 
reservation  rem ained incredibly am biguous, because everyone had  a different 
idea of how  best to in terp ret Indian  law. The Salish-Kootenai in terpreted  it 
one w ay, non-Indian people another, and  every judge and jury in terp reted  it 
differently as well. The irony of it all to the Indian  people w as that treaties 
w ith  o ther nation 's w ere supposedly considered the ultim ate law  of the land, 
yet could be abrogated w ithout the other nations consent, and  although
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N ative A m ericans w ould  rem ain sovereign nations, they w ere not allow ed to 
govern  them selves.
O ne good exam ple of a disagreem ent in in terpretation  over Indian m atters 
comes from  a case tha t happened  on the Flathead reservation in 1915. The 
defendan t w as A ntoine Larose, an  Indian and a w ard  of the federal 
governm ent. This m eant that his private p roperty  was held in trust by the 
federal governm ent and he therefore fell under tribal and, ultim ately, federal 
jurisdiction. Larose w as cited by the state for fishing on the reservation w ith  a 
gaff hook (spear), and was charged by the state gam e w arden  for violating state 
fish and gam e laws for tw o reasons. One, he was fishing w ith  a spear, and 
two, he w as fishing w ithout a license on a reservoir that was part of the 
F lathead irrigation project. W hen arrested and tried in M issoula county, 
Larose w as found guilty and fined $25.00 or 10 days in jail. Larose later 
discussed m atters w ith  the superin tenden t of the F lathead Reservation, Fred 
M organ, and  M organ im m ediately w rote the Com m issioner of Indian  Affairs 
and  pleaded w ith him  to back Larose in his case for several reasons. First, 
Larose w as a w ard  of the federal governm ent and therefore fell under federal 
jurisdiction. Second, if he fell u n d er federal jurisdiction, he should not have 
been able to be cited by a state official. In addition, Larose was fishing on a 
reservoir w ith in  the boundaries of the reservation w hich w as run  and 
operated  by the U.S. Reclam ation Service. The Reclam ation Service also fell 
u n d er the jurisdiction of the federal governm ent, not the state. Being a w ard  
of the governm ent, Larose should  no t have had  to buy a state perm it to fish 
on his ow n reservation. Falling u n d er federal jurisdiction gave Salish- 
K ootenai m em bers "exclusive" rights to fish in  all w aters on the reserve. 
M organ m ade it very clear that if the federal governm ent d id  not back Larose
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and  pro tect him, the state w ould  eventually assert total jurisdiction on the 
reservation  by banning  Indian hunting  and fishing altogether. It appears that 
the state had  been m aking threats for som e time, and was intending to 
control the fish and  gam e on the reservation at any cost to the welfare of the 
tribal people.^
It was obvious that the state w arden  was trying to make an example out of 
the Larose case, because he d ropped  the charges on the other two Indians 
fishing w ith  Larose. The state d id  not w ant to have three of the same kind of 
cases on their hands, and Larose w as the one w ho appeared  to be protesting 
the m ost, based on his treaty rights. ̂ 0 py  challenging Larose, the state w ould 
directly challenge all Sahsh-Kootenai treaty rights. F lathead A gent M organ 
had  gone to the trouble to get advice from  the U.S. A ttorney who 
acknow ledged the rights of Larose and advised him  to go through the m otion 
of appealing the district court decision in o rder to get another opinion from 
the state suprem e court. In addition, the U.S. A ttorney was willing to defend 
Larose at the trial. ̂  U ltim ately the case m ade it all the w ay to the federal 
courts, and  Judge George M. Bourquin ru led  tha t the state game laws of 
M ontana had  no force or effect on Indian  reservations. A lthough the case 
ru led  in favor of Larose, the ruling w as not as black and w hite as it appeared. 
The case ru led  in favor of any fu tu re  tribal m em bers facing state hunting 
authorities, bu t only as long as the federal governm ent w as holding title to 
the land  in  w hich a violation w as com m itted. Relinquishm ent of the title to 
various parcels of land on the Flathead reservation  w as a com m on m ove by 
the Federal governm ent. There w as relinquishm ent for the use of railroads, 
and  som e of the lands w ere gran ted  to the state of M ontana. The lands 
opened  to whites, how ever, w ere no t relinquished, as they were opened
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u n d er the provisions of the hom estead, m ineral, and tow n-site laws of the
U nited  S t a t e s . O t h e r  parcels of land reserved for reservoir, pow er sites, or
w ildlife refuges w ere no t relinquished either. They w ere sim ply reserved for
the federal governm ent, w ith  the Indians m aintaining title to the l a n d . ^3
Judge Bourquin 's decision to exclude the state from  having jurisdiction
over tribal people seriously angered m any state officials, especially state game
w ardens. State w arden  J.L. D eH art w rote several letters to federal officials
stating his d isagreem ent w ith  the judge’s decision. He further stated that he
w ould  continue to enforce state gam e laws anyw here off of the reservation, as
he felt Article III of the treaty no longer had  any force. As for jurisdiction
w ith in  the reservation boundary , the w arden  p leaded w ith  the
Com m issioner of Ind ian  Affairs to allow state jurisdiction over Ind ian  fish
and gam e m atters. He stated that Judge Bourquin's decision had m ade his job
even tougher, because:
U nder this decision there are m any of the Indians on the 
F lathead reserve w ho now  take the position that the old 
treaties that form erly existed as betw een the Federal G overn­
m ent and the Flathead Tribe are still o p e r a t i v e . ^4
In actuality, the treaty w as still operative, bu t the w arden had  apparently
taken his stand  over tribal hunting  rights due in part to the pressure from
non-Indian  settlers. Settlers in the B itterroot Valley had  even threatened to
fight it ou t w ith the Salish-Kootenai them selves if the w arden  d idn 't stop
them  from  hun ting  in their valley. C ontrary  to popu lar testim ony of gam e
w ardens, it is probable that w ardens pushed  for control over Indian  hunting
no t because Indians had becom e a th reat to the conservation of gam e or w ere
taking food out of the hands of settlers, bu t ra ther because they w ere the one
authority  w hom  non-Indians pressured  to keep Indians and w hites separate.
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There is sim ply no evidence in the w ritten  testim ony given by settlers that 
there w ere specific concerns threatening  to their livelihood that p rom pted  
their opposition to Indian  hunting. In correspondence by w hite settlers, it 
appears tha t unfam iliar Indians hun ting  in  large num bers w as uncom fortable 
and  even threatening to the settlers. Settlers living on Fish Creek around 
1915 com plained that Judge Parce, a m em ber of the tribe, came into the valley 
every fall w ith  over sixty head of horses and  large parties of Indians w ith 
children and  dogs. Farce came to Fish Creek to hun t large num bers of deer 
for w in ter provisions, and o ther than  the am ount of gam e taken, the people 
of Fish Creek had  no other specific com plaints against the tribe...only a very 
serious request tha t they be rem oved.
According to Judge Farce, also know n as Louie Pierre, he had  indeed 
frequented  the vicinity of Fish Creek. Three years before the com plaints 
about him  came before the w arden, how ever, he and his hunting parties had 
been ru n  ou t of Fish Creek at gun  poin t by the w hite com m unity. Since then, 
he said he had  hun ted  on a nearby place on Lo-Lo Creek. Agent M organ 
stated in a letter to the com m issioner tha t Louie had  come to his office every 
year asking for a letter from  the agent acknow ledging his right to hun t there, 
so he could show  it to the w hite people. Louie’s reason for w anting the letter 
had  to do w ith  his fear tha t if he couldn 't prove his right to hunt, there 
w ould  be another incident like the one in 1908 that left four Salish-Kootenai 
dead. In addition  to providing  the letter. A gent M organ had  been advising 
Indians on state gam e laws they had to follow, and he felt sure they had  been 
following them  accordingly. The Salish-Kootenai d id  not fall und er state 
hun ting  law s w hen outside of the reservation, b u t the agent felt it necessary
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for tribal m em bers to follow particular laws in o rder to avoid direct conflict 
w ith  settlers and governm ent officials.!^
In add ition  to assertion of state jurisdiction over tribal m embers, there was 
another topic of conversation becom ing apparen t by 1915. It appears that 
because authorities could no t agree on the particular hunting  rights of 
Indians, the protection and  conservation of gam e becam e a pow erful tool to 
use against Ind ian  rights. C onservation w as certainly an  issue on w hich all 
people could agree to. Indians w ould have to fall under state jurisdiction to 
insure tha t bo th  state and  reservation gam e w ould be conserved properly. In 
1915 A ssistant Com m issioner E.B. M eritt w rote two letters trying to convince 
others tha t the Salish-Kootenai had  no social rules that regulated the killing 
of fish and game. M eritt first w rote to F.C. M organ, superin tendent of the 
F lathead School. H e w rote tha t he believed that all Indians should com ply 
w ith  state game law s w hen hun ting  off of the reservation in order to protect 
the fish and  game. H e then w rote a letter to the M ontana gam e w arden, Mr. 
D eH art, and  stated tha t as far as he knew, the Salish-Kootenai had every right 
to h u n t and  fish "in accustom ed places" off of the reservation, b u t that 
perhaps they should  have to follow special rules pertaining to protection of 
wildlife. W hat the com m issioner d id  w as validate the legality of Article III of 
the Treaty, w hile trying to restrict it. This essentially left people believing that 
as long as it was for the "protection and  preservation" of game, the state could 
assert their jurisdiction over tribal people w hen  hun ting  and  fishing 
anyw here  in M o n t a n a . T h i s  argum ent was soon used against the tribes on 
their ow n reservation as well, claiming that the tribes w ere quickly depleting 
the entire reservation  of gam e.
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C ontrary  to popular belief at the time, the protection and conservation of 
fish and gam e was practiced and  had  been for years, by m any of the Salish- 
Kootenai. It is interesting to see how  very differently each ethnic group 
practiced protection and conservation of animals. It cannot be disputed  that 
there w ere Indians w ho ignored any conservation prom oted by Indians or 
non-Indians. For the m ost part, how ever, Indians w ere very aw are of anim al 
behavior, m ating seasons, and  especially of the spiritual w orld that connected 
them  w ith  the creator of all animals. Accordingly, they practiced their ow n 
m ethods of protection and conservation. D ocum entation of Flathead 
hun ting  stories show  that often, the success of a hun t had  less to do w ith  how  
m any anim als w ere hun ted  in a season, than  it d id  w ith  the skill of the 
hun te r and  his relationship to and respect for the anim al and  its creator.
M any Ind ian  hun ters believed tha t m aintaining a good relationship w ith  the 
C reator and  the anim al helped  insure success in a hunt. They believed that 
anim als couldn 't just be taken; they had  to be granted  to the people.
N on-Indians had  no understand ing  or tolerance for w hat w as believed to 
be a very unscientific approach to gam e m anagem ent and continued to 
suppress tribal hunting  rights. H arassed by all of the stipulations by 
governm ent officials over w hen  and  w here the tribes could hunt, the Salish- 
Kootenai decided that it w as tim e to exert their hunting  rights through 
m ethods tha t w hites w ould  notice. That concept w as som ew hat new  to the 
tribes, bu t very effective, and it is largely due to the cunning of these early 
Salish-Kootenai leaders and  the risks they took tha t their people reta in  their 
jurisd iction  today.
By the sum m er of 1919, it w as apparen t that the Salish-Kootenai w ould 
have to display opposition in a new  way, and so a law suit was filed by the
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Salish chief M artin Charlo. The suit w as filed in  Arlee, M ontana in o rder to 
define Ind ian  w ater rights on the reservation. W ater rights had at this time 
had  becom e an issue not only in  itself, b u t involved fish and gam e because 
Indians w ere losing their preferred  fishing spots on the reservation because of 
irrigation canals p u t in by the Reclam ation Service. According to Charlo, the 
canals had  blocked previously running  stream s, and  as a result the tribal 
people w ere unable to procure fish. In addition, m any of the Indians w ho 
w ere farm ing com plained that their land w as not being served by the 
irrigation services for w hich they had  been forced to pay .l^  The m ethod of 
settlem ent th rough  htigation  involved various federal and  state bureaus, 
creating an air of in tergovernm ental cooperation for a short time afterw ards. 
O n the o ther hand, the tribes w ere feeling confident and  pushed on w ith  their 
opposition to the state. Just a few m onths before Charlo s suit was filed, tribal 
m em ber Thom as A ntish w rote a letter to H.L. M yers, the Com m issioner of 
Indian  Affairs, stating that the federal governm ent needed to review  its ow n 
laws relating to the Sahsh-Kootenai in o rder to avoid arresting tribal 
m em bers for gam e violations. In addition, he told the Com m issioner that 
until the tribes w ere paid  in full for land that they had  ceded to the U.S., they 
w ould feel no need to follow state gam e laws.^^ These gestures of opposition 
did gain the tribe attention, b u t m ost state officials d id  not appreciate the 
tribes' attem pts to em pow er them selves, and  pushed  even harder to assert 
their jurisd iction  over Ind ian  m atters.
By the early 1920's, a m ore defined argum ent arose pertaining to the legal 
hun ting  and  fishing rights of the Salish-Kootenai. Fishing violations by 
Indians had  come u p  before, bu t now  had  p rov ided  a serious reason for 
prosecution  by the state. The violation w as again the spearing of fish. The
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state gam e w arden  filed charges against a Flathead Indian by the nam e of John 
G lover for spearing fish on a lake w ith in  the reservation  boundaries. C lover 
w as cited because he had  recently been  issued a paten t in  fee on his allotted 
land. Therefore the state assum ed that John w as no longer a w ard of the 
federal governm ent, and  had  now  fallen u n d er state jurisdiction because he 
paid state taxes on his property . After six m onths the final decision about the 
fishing rights of John Glover w ere still unsettled. The federal solicitor for the 
D epartm ent of the Interior w rote the Secretary of the Interior stating that the 
final decision on the Glover case m ust be "definitely and  certainly 
determ ined." The solicitor like m any federal officials, how ever, refused to 
express his opinion in that particu lar situation as he w as afraid his opinion 
w ould  be the final determ ination by the courts. In a sense, this w as one of 
m any opportunities federal officials had  to protect the fishing rights of the 
Sahsh-Kootenai, bu t instead, they left the decision to be settled betw een the 
state and  tribes, and  the ruling w ould be decided in a local M ontana district 
court.20 The significance of this case is that w ith  m any of the Indians ow ning 
fee land and paying property  taxes, the state argued that those individuals no 
longer had  Indian rights. As we have seen in the last chapter, ow nership of 
fee paten ted  land w as not a choice for m any Indians. The federal governm ent 
had  instead  forced "competency" upon  individuals, thus im posing taxes.
In 1925 a tribal m em ber Felix G endron com plained to the superin tendent 
tha t he seem ed to have no gam e rights left because he had to carry a federal 
perm it to trap  on his ow n private property. In addition  to having to carry a 
perm it to exert his tribal rights, there w ere additional rules Felix had  to 
follow. Superin tendent Charles Coe told Felix that:
This perm it does not give you any perm ission to trap  on other
people's lands. You could trap  on tru st allotm ents of other
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Indians p rovided  you get the perm ission of the ow ner to do so.
You can no t trap  on paten ted  lands as they are under the 
jurisdiction of the state and the state laws prohibit it w ithout a 
perm it from  the State Game W arden. You can not ship furs off 
the reservation w ithou t com plying w ith  the state l a w s . ^ l
W hat is m ade clear by this exam ple is that Indian hunting  and fishing rights
continued to be greatly reduced. According to the superintendents
in terpretation , Indians could no t h u n t on their ow n property  w ithout
purchasing  a perm it either from  the federal or state governm ent depending
on the Indians' land  status.
A very im portan t case arose for the Salish-Kootenai in 1926 that challenged 
one aspect of state control over Indian hunting  rights. Philip Moss was 
arrested  for shooting and killing an elk on tribal lands, and the District Court 
tried  and convicted Philip on the grounds that although he was a Flathead 
Indian, he had  received a pa ten t in fee to his allotm ent, therefore falling 
u n d er the jurisdiction of the State. The state had arrested him  for shooting 
this elk during  the state's closed hunting  season. Phillip argued that he shot 
the elk on tribal lands, and  bu tchered  the elk on an allotm ent held in trust (by 
a friend of his), and  therefore fell u n d er either tribal or federal jurisdiction. 
U nfortunately, because Moss ow ned fee paten ted  land, it w as assum ed he 
should fall under state jurisdiction and not federal or tribal authorities. He 
w as tried  in a local court, and was convicted to $25.00 or jail time.
Like m any before him . M oss's case questioned the relationship betw een 
private p roperty  and tribal m em bership. State officials argued that once you 
ow ned  land like any o ther Am erican citizen, you lost your tribal rights, and  
this w as the argum ent used to convict Moss. M oss d id  not see the connection 
betw een  his personal land  status and his treaty rights. A lthough convicted, 
Philip Moss was not a typical tribal m em ber in tha t he w as perhaps m ore
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fam iliar than  m ost w ith the contradictions of state and federal laws, as well as 
w ith  his Ind ian  rights. H e had  been a candidate for the office of sheriff during 
the first general election after Lake County was created, and  had a few 
connections and ideas to assist him  in fighting for his gam e rights. Philip 
struggled for m onths to get appeals to his case. He w as first tried in a justice 
court w here he w as found guilty. He then appealed, and  was tried in a district 
court. H ere he w as also found guilty and fined $200.00, or 100 days in jail.
The justification for the guilty verdict came from  the previous M ontana 
suprem e court case called Big Sheep, referring to the Crow tribe. As w e have 
already seen, this case ru led  tha t w hen  an Indian  received a fee patent to his 
allotm ent, he no longer retained his Indian rights. He had  severed his tribal 
relations and  therefore assum ed all of the responsibilities of being a state 
citizen. A fter the last ruling. Moss tried to appeal his case again, bu t the 
Flathead Superin tendent Charles Coe refused to report the case to the district 
attorney. Moss d id  eventually get the opportunity  to appeal, how ever, and 
was tried  in the federal Suprem e C ourt on habeas corpus. Judge Bourquin 
denied the w rit and rem anded him  back to the custody of the sheriff.
A t M osse s last trial, the judge followed the decision of the case Big Sheep, 
and  inform ed the jury tha t if the defendan t had  killed elk anyw here w ithin  
the lim its of Lake County (which is in the lim its of the F lathead reserve) 
during  closed hunting  season, they m ust find Moss g u i l t y T h e  story of 
Moss show s the im portance of case law  in setting precedence for the outcom e 
in new  cases. H ow ever, case law  m eant little to Moss, as there was no doubt 
in  his m ind that if he pushed  hard  enough, he w ould  win. He w as very 
aw are of his legal rights as an Indian. A lthough Moss w as trying to protect 
Indian  rights, his push  for justice slapped him  in the face. N ow  it w as his
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ow n case that w ould set precedence for all fu ture Indian hunting  violators.
The trial of Philip Moss w as the first major case w here the courts ru led  that
even w ith in  the boundaries of their ow n land base, Indians d id  not have
w hat w as perceived as "special rights."24
A lthough the state court ru led against Moss, the federal governm ent still
held  onto the idea that tribal m em bers retained their treaty rights even under
fee paten t status. In a le tter from  A ssistant Com m issioner J. H enry
Scattergood to Senator W heeler in 1930, Scattergood states:
W ith all due regard  to w hat was said by the court in the Big 
Sheep case, supra, w e are of the opinion that such right still 
rests w ith  the m em ber of an  Indian tribe to w hom  a patent in 
fee sim ple has been issued. In other w ords, the m ere issuance 
of a paten t in fee to an  indiv idual m em ber of an Indian tribe, 
covering the lands allotted in  severalty to him  does not, of itself, 
operate to deprive such Indian any other tribal or property  right. 
Obviously, such an  Ind ian  is stiU entitled to participate in further 
disbursem ents of tribal funds, per capita paym ents etc., and 
undoubted ly  has a like right also to enjoy hunting  and fishing 
privileges on lands belonging to the tribe of w hich he is still a
m em ber.25
D uring the m id to late 1920’s, and perhaps because of the victory of the 
state against Philip Moss, state gam e w ardens actually began patrolling Salish- 
Kootenai p roperty  to p revent any violation of state gam e laws. W hat is very 
in triguing about the w ardens trying to m aintain  strict jurisdiction over the 
Indians on their ow n reserve, is that the w ardens w ere choosing to patrol an 
incredibly large area w ith  theoretically few  benefits to them  or the non-Indian 
settlers. By the late 1920's, there w ere relatively few  Indian hunters, and 
although  non-Indians had  sw arm ed over the reservation, creating w hite 
tow nships, the governm ent had  a regulation tha t they w ere not allow ed to 
h u n t anyw here on the reservation  w ithou t obtaining a perm it from  the 
F lathead  Superin tendent.^^  Once they obtained a perm it, non-Indians fell
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u n d er state laws concerning bag limits and  closed seasons. In addition to 
obtaining the fed era l/trib a l perm it, non-Indians had  to purchase the state 
perm it to h u n t on the reservation.
Even after the Moss trial, there w as still no agreem ent on w ho had 
au thority  over Ind ian  hun ting  rights. W ardens patrolling the reservation 
around  the late 1920's w ere told by the Com m issioner of Indian Affairs that 
they w ere m ore than  welcom e to arrest any w hite person for violating state 
laws, b u t Indians could no t be arrested  by a state official. The commissioner 
instructed  the gam e w ardens to only advise the Indians on the provisions of 
state law s tha t have to do w ith  the prevention  or exterm ination of any 
particu lar game, b u t they w ere not allowed to directly interfere w ith  Indian 
h u n t i n g . T h i s  o rder becam e nerve-w racking for the tribal people. O n the 
one hand, Indians w ere afraid to hun t openly, because they could very well be 
arrested  and  fined by the state. O n the o ther hand, the federal governm ent 
took the view  that the state officials had  absolutely no jurisdiction to arrest 
Indians over hun ting  violations; they could only "advise" them. Therefore, 
it w as sim ply the luck of the d raw  w hom  they ran  into w hile hunting on 
the ir reservation.
The archives show  constant correspondence betw een federal and M ontana 
state officials asking each o ther to explain the various laws pertaining to fish 
and gam e on the Flathead Reservation. O ften it appeared  that w hatever 
h ighest ranking official could state his opinion m ost confidently and 
eloquently, w ould voice the legal view  m ost w idely accepted by officials. 
Jurisdiction sim ply depended  on the particu lar person, place, and time of a 
situation, because inconsistency in gam e law s w as standard  for the time.
I l l
A lthough state officials w ere concentrating on Indian violations, it 
appeared  to the Salish-Kootenai tha t the real problem  concerning fish and 
gam e regulation  w as w ith  m any non-Indians. N on-Indians hunting  on the 
reservation in the 1920’s had  found a w ay to get around state laws pertaining 
to game, and  this probably infuriated the gam e w ardens and m ade m atters 
even m ore intense. A ccording to a letter from W arden J.F. Goldsby to the 
D epartm ent of the Interior, by 1927 non-Indians on the reservation had 
started  an  actual m ovem ent to keep the state from  patrolling their private 
property. If they w ere successful, they could hun t freely on their ow n and 
possibly o ther property  ow ners land w ithout paying for a state perm it or 
adhering to bag lim its or s e a s o n s . 2 8  This is an interesting m ovem ent, in that 
it is the sam e approach  tha t non-Indians on the Salish-Kootenai reservation 
are using now, b u t today it is the tribal perm it and tribal authority rather than 
the state authority  tha t are m ost avoided.
Because of the seem ingly im possible job of controlling bo th  Indian and 
non-Indian  hunting, the federal bureaus eventually laid dow n some general 
regulations pertaining to fish and  gam e for both  groups. By the early 1930's 
officials began to state and act upon  these principles w ith  m ore consistency 
than the tribes had  previously seen. As can be expected, the Indians had 
absolutely no say in  the hun ting  m atters affecting them, leaving im portant 
tribal m atters to be battled  out betw een state and federal officials. The 
opinions tha t both  bureaus seem ed to agree upon  at the tim e were the 
follow ing:
For In d ian s.
1. State gam e laws do not apply to Indians while hunting on 
their ow n land held in trust, or on unallo tted  tribal lands w ithin 
the reservation. Federal officials such as reservation agents and
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superin tenden ts do no t have the jurisdiction to regulate hunting  
on the reservation unless occurs on  property  that is fee patented, 
thus falling u n d er state jurisdiction. Indians should, how ever, be 
advised of state statutes that are designed to protect fish and game.
This is advisable to Indians in that it w ould protect their best interests 
in  fish and  gam e conservation.
2. W hen Indians do h u n t off of the reservation, or on fee 
paten ted  lands in  or outside of reservation boundaries, they are 
subject to state laws and to the state courts for any violation of 
those laws. H unting  rights in the Treaty w ere to be in terpreted 
to m ean  that Indians could h u n t outside of the reserve in 
com m on w ith  the citizens of the state. They w ere not, however, 
allow ed special rights like excessive bag limits, hunting  outside 
of state gam e seasons, etc.
For N on-Indians.
1. N on-Indians have no rights to fish, h u n t or trap  anyw here 
w ith in  the reservation  w ithou t the perm ission of the 
superin tendent. The superin tenden t m ay grant a perm it 
depend ing  on the circumstances. The perm ission is granted  at 
the discretion of the superintendent, and a fee will be charged for 
a reservation perm it. Those allow ed any special privileges m ust 
com ply w ith  any special rules and regulations on the reservation, 
and  they m ust com ply w ith  aU state laws pertaining to fishing and 
hun ting  as well. Possession of a state perm it to fish, hunt or trap 
does not confer the righ t to do  so on the Reservation.
2. All non-Indian persons on reservations including business 
ow ners, traders, and  em ployees are expected to com ply w ith all 
state laws as well as the rules and regulations of the reservation.
State laws do  apply  on the reservations, and  state courts do have 
jurisdiction as to any action by w hites if it does not involve an 
Indian, Indian  property , or the operations of the federal
governm ent.29
A lthough the previous regulations appear to be easy to understand  and 
enforce, in reality, the regulations w ere so general that they still left huge gaps 
in the jurisdiction on  and  off of the reservation. For instance, if an  Indian 
was fishing on a lake and the land su rrounding  it was ow ned by the state, bu t 
the lake bed  and w ater rights belonged to the tribes, d id  the Indian have the
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potential of falling under state law? Since the reservation w as incredibly 
checkerboarded by this time, how  w ould  officials know  w hose property  was 
^vhose and  w hether they h ad  the jurisdiction to m ake an im m ediate arrest? 
A lthough these questions appear undu ly  technical, they were the questions 
being asked w hen deciding jurisdiction over gam e violations. The opinions 
of 1933 on fish and  game, although covering several possible scenarios, d id  
no t cover w hat ultim ately needed to be decided in order to simphfy all 
jurisdiction over fish and  game. W hat really needed to be clarified w as the 
question of ^vho should have ultim ate control over the fish and game. In 
o ther w ords, could the state or the tribe theoretically "own" fish and game? If 
the tribe had  m aintained w ater rights on the reservation, d id  they ow n the 
fish in those ^vaters? A lthough officials tried answ ering these questions, the 
issue of w ho should control gam e populations w as hard  to answ er 
specifically, because ultim ately fish and gam e m igrate back and forth across 
state and  tribal boundaries.
By the m id nineteen-thirties the issue w as focusing on the ow nership of 
Avaters, the fish in those w aters, and  the ow nership of game. It was an issue 
that needed  a definitive answ er for the tribal people. In 1934 D epartm ent of 
the Interior correspondence shows, tha t tribal m em bers were in great 
opposition to the control over reservation w aters by state gam e w ardens. At 
this tim e the Salish-Kootenai w ere in the process of organizing them selves 
pohticaUy under the Federal Ind ian  R eorganization Act (IRA), w hich w as to 
transfer to the tribes some of the federal responsibilities and  decision-m aking 
concerning Indians. The Salish-Kootenai h ad  rem ained a political un it over 
the years, always advising or pro testing  to other governm ent bureaus, bu t the 
IRA w as to allow them  to m ake decisions concerning their well-being
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politically and  economically, and re-assert their pow er as a sovereign nation. 
U nder the IRA, the tribes began playing a big part in cleaning up the mess of 
federal and  state gam e m atters, and it appeared  that the tables were turning.
O ne of the first issues the Salish-Kootenai attem pted  to solve was w hether 
or not the State Fish and Gam e Com m ission had  the right to issue fishing 
licenses on the Flathead Lake, and  this w as initiated by tribal m em ber Joseph 
C. A llard. The licenses that had  been issued to the area's ^vhite population 
allow ed them  to fish w ith  drag  nets to catch the sockeye salm on spaw ning on 
the reservation lake. This w as controversial for several reasons, one being 
tha t the no rthern  boundary  of the reservation is a theoretical line that runs 
th rough  the m iddle of the lake. One half of the lake (the southern  half) 
belongs to the tribe. The seining operations w ere placed in the hands of a 
m an by the nam e of Ben Cram er, and  the fish w ere apparently  d istributed to 
com m unity m em bers for food, and not for com mercial purposes. The 
agreem ent to operate seines and issue the licenses to do so, was a m utual 
agreem ent betw een Lake County officials and  the State Cam e Commission. 
O bviously this w as not sim ply a one-tim e operation on tribal waters, for as 
Superin tendent Charles Coe stated in a letter to the Com m issioner of Indian 
Affairs; "The State C am e and Fish Com m ission has issued seining licenses in 
the past on different portions of the lake."30
W hat w as w rong about this and  alm ost every previous decision 
concerning fish and  gam e on the reservation was that the tribal people had 
little if any say over the use of recourses on  their reservation. H aving no 
control over such issues p rom pted  the tribes to focus on the constant 
dep letion  of recourses by non-Indians and initiated the Indians' concern over 
p reservation  and conservation. Ironically, this w as the very same argum ent
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used by w hites to control the acts of Indians, just a few years earlier. As far as 
the tribes w ere concerned, the fact that w hites w ere not allowed to hun t on 
the reservation  w ithou t special perm its from  the federal governm ent, m eant 
tha t the fish and gam e on the reserve still belonged to the Sahsh-Kootenai. It 
w as for their benefit and use as stated  in the treaty, and it w ould have to be 
the Sahsh-Kootenai w ho decided  m atters concerning fish and  game. W ithout 
going into the issue of tribal w ater rights in any great depth, it should be said 
tha t the Sahsh-Kootenai d id  have w ater rights tha t dated  back to before w hite 
settlers w ere allowed to m ove onto the reserve. In the 1908 case of Winters v. 
United States, the Suprem e C ourt had  ru led  in favor of w ater rights for the 
Indians on  the Fort Belknap Reservation. The ruling affirm ed tha t w hen  the 
federal governm ent set aside lands for the Indians, they reserved the w ater 
rights for them  as weU.^l EssentiaUy, Indian w ater is held in trust for Indians 
by the governm ent, w ho protect w ater rights on their behalf. The U nited 
States does not ow n those w ater rights; they are sim ply a trustee for the 
Indians. In addition, federal w ater rights do not establish state law nor are 
they exercised in accordance w ith state law. There w as and is a federal 
sovereign right to m ake use of unappropria ted  w ater for its ow n purposes. 
This fact, how ever, has often been ignored, as states have historically 
constructed their ow n w ater laws and appropriated  w ater as needed.^2
By the early 1930's the federal governm ent appeared  dedicated to changing 
federal policy tow ard  Indians. Few of the previously im plem ented policies 
contained any specifics to m ake them  work, and  few w ere followed th rough  
to com pletion. Ind ian  nations like the Salish-Kootenai had  been robbed of 
their natu ra l resources and  their ability to do anything about it. Everything 
from  fish and game, to w ater and tim ber was taken by people w ho lived on or
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near the reservation. These outsiders had  often found loopholes in the laws, 
allow ing them  to take w hatever they believed w as desirable or necessary. The 
pohcy m akers realized tha t protection of these resources, along w ith  a new  
land policy tha t w ould  allow  recovery from  the disaster of allotm ent, w as 
greatly needed. They set out to solve these problem s w ith the 
im plem entation  of the Ind ian  Reorganization Act. The governm ent had  no t 
been able to avoid paternalism  over the tribes even while trying to 
im plem ent tribal self-governm ent. For this reason, the IRA beccune 
especially appealing to the Salish-Kootenai. Federal officials traveled to 
reservations and w rote up  surveys of the status of each Indian nation, and  
according to their assessm ents, they then began trying to im plem ent new  
ideas to help  strengthen  Ind ian  governm ents. Ideas like conservation w ere 
strongly pushed  on the reservations. Ironically, a t the sam e time they 
prom oted  conservation, they pushed  for the industrial evolution of the tribes 
as well.
By 1935 the Ind ian  Reorganization Act w as im plem ented and the Sahsh- 
Kootenai tried to tu rn  the tables and participate heavily in the decision­
m aking process concerning reservation m atters. They had  recently form ed a 
federally recognized tribal council and  began focusing their pow er on 
pro tecting  Indians and  their resources from unnecessary abuse. A lthough 
federal regulations stated tha t no w hite m an or non-Indian of any kind was 
allow ed to h u n t on the reserve w ithou t special perm ission and a special 
perm it given out by the superin tendent, the tribes had no way to enforce that 
law  until they took action in 1936 u n d er the pow er of the tribal council.
U nder the IRA, the Salish-Kootenai began asserting their authority  and 
jurisd iction  over non-Indians w hen  ever conflicts concerned tribal resources.
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A better understand ing  of the IRA helps us understand  how  the tribes w ere to 
be recognized legally, w hen  asserting their jurisdiction on their reservation.
The IRA is also know n as the W heeler-H ow ard Act of 1934, and was 
created as the beginning of a new  era in the adm inistration of N ative 
Am ericans. The act w as designed to allow Indians to take on the 
responsibility of m aking and acting on tribal decisions in relationship to other 
organizations. U ltim ately, it w as to elim inate control on the reservation by 
federal officials, and  allow  tribes to govern them selves and  w ork ou t local 
problem s according to their ow n needs. A lthough the policy was spoken of as 
som ething "granted" to the tribes, it w as really only verifying the tribal rights 
that they retained. The federal governm ent was not really "allowing" Indians 
to take on  the responsibility, they w ere sim ply trying to back out of a 
responsibility that shou ldn 't have been  theirs in the first place. U nder the 
Act, the tribes reorganized  them selves for self-governm ent, and w ould take 
on  concerns over various m atters on  their reservation. As to jurisdiction 
over fish and  game, the Salish-Kootenai held the right to conserve and 
develop their ow n land  and  resources. Section 16 of the IRA authorized the 
tribe to organize for its ow n com m on w elfare and adop t a constitution and by­
laws. This Act allow ed the tribes to protect and  preserve anything considered 
tribal property , w hich w ould include land  and natural resources. By having 
jurisdiction over their ow n lands and  by m aking law s pertaining to fish and 
gam e, they could then  regulate fishing and hun ting  w ithin  the reservation. 
Indirectly this allow ed the tribes to have a say over the actions of non- 
Indians. They began to regulate non-tribal m em bers' actions by requiring the 
purchase of a perm it to h u n t on the reservation, issued independently  of the 
state of M ontana, or the Fish and G am e Com m ission.
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The IRA allow ed for one of the m ost im portan t decisions concerning fish
and  gam e in  M ontana to be heard. According to A ttorney General W.
Bonner, the IRA stated  that:
AU Indian  lands, w hether allo tted  or unallotted, held separately 
or jointly and  all land held  for the use of the Indians, such as 
reservoir sites and  sim ilar lands, are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the U nited States governm ent; all gam e fish, w ild 
birds, gam e or fur-bearing animals, including beaver, kiUed, caught 
or captured  thereon are Indian  property; said beaver are not 
pro tected by the laws of M ontana; The Indian under tribal 
ordinances may kiU or capture said beaver on the lands aforesaid; 
the Indian 's possession w ould be legal and  the State of M ontana has 
no claim or ow nership  therein, nor has the State jurisdiction over 
the same; beaver caught, kUIed or captured  on any of the lands 
aforesaid is no t considered as beaver com ing from  w ithout the state 
b u t considered to be w ithin  the geographical limits of M ontana.33
The essential po in t the A ttorney G eneral m akes is that he believes that the
fish and  gam e are theoretically "owned " by the tribe, and  held in trust for
them  by the federal governm ent. The letter from  Bonner also agreed that the
tribes could require non-Indians to purchase a tribal game perm it w hen
hunting  anyw here on the reservation because the tribes had  the authority  to
protect and  preserve their natural resources and property. The fact that these
natu ra l recourses tend to m igrate onto fee land  ow ned by whites, w as not
believed to affect the tribes' jurisdiction over the animals.
As the Salish-Kootenai began patrolling the p roperty  w ithin the 
reservation  for gam e violations, there arose a m ore noticeable resentm ent 
tow ard  the Indians by whites. N on-Indians soon w ere confused as to w hether 
a perm it w as needed w hen they h un ted  on their ow n land, tribal land, or aU 
of the area inside the reservation. There w as confusion over w ho ultim ately 
had  jurisd iction  over non-Indians as well. N on-Indians resented  being 
controlled in any way by a pow er that w as not representative of the w hite
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settlers, and  therefore dem anded  tha t they fall u n d er state jurisdiction in all 
cases. In this w ay they had  justified their ignoring of all tribal fish and gam e 
regulations, and had  created a staunch opposition to tribal authority. W hites 
said they now  felt like m inorities on  the reservation, and  could no t believe 
that Indians could have gam e rights and  tribal land that whites could not use 
equally.34 A lthough by 1935 Indians could legally patrol their ow n tribal 
lands w ith  police or gam e w ardens, they d id  not have the money to do so, 
reinforcing the idea tha t tribal authority  need not be taken seriously by 
whites. They had  kno^vn for years that trespassing and hunting on Indian 
lands never entailed any consequences. W hite trespassing and  hunting  had  
becom e such a problem  that Superin tendent L.W. Shotwell w rote to the local 
new spaper in  1936 telling them  to p u t ou t the w ord  that trespassing to hun t 
on  Ind ian  lands w ould  have to stop, or there w ould  be no m ore hunting  
allow ed anyw here on the reservation.^^
In add ition  he sent the w ord  ou t to all sportsm en that the Salish-Kootenai 
w ould be enforcing the m andatory  purchase of a tribal hunting  perm it to 
h u n t on tribal lands. N on-Indians opposed the perm it, saying that they 
w ould  fall either u n d er state or tribal jurisdiction for gam e m atters, bu t not 
both.^^ Superin tendent Shotwell responded  to the opposition in a letter to 
the local Cham ber of Com m erce stating that although the required perm it 
raised considerable objection, it w as surely already know n that whites had 
never been  allow ed to h u n t on the reservation w ithout a special perm it. 
Therefore, he felt tha t the new ly required  purchase should have created little 
surprise. In addition, he let the people know  that the tribal perm it was 
m andatory , b u t that the tribes never requested  anyone to purchase a state 
perm it. That was done at the request of the state, and non-Indians were
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w elcom e to take m atters up  w ith  state officials. As far as Shotwell was 
concerned, i f  the tribes w anted  to d isregard the state perm it needed to hun t 
on the reservation, tha t w as just f i n e . 37 C ontrary to w hat non-Indians 
thought, the tribes w ere not out to control w hite-ow ned property. They 
sim ply w anted  jurisdiction over non-Indians w hen their acts were 
com m itted on Indian lands, or w hen their acts directly affected the protection 
of tribal resources.
The Self-governm ent Act legally reinforced the authority  of the Salish- 
Kootenai to ru n  their ow n affairs, bu t in the beginning, they had  few means 
to legally enforce their decisions. In addition, their resolutions could be 
restricted by the reservation superin tendent and by the Secretary of the 
In terior w ho bo th  had  to approve tribal resolutions. Concerning the 
preservation  of fish and  gam e on the reserve, the tribe w as still forced to w ork 
jointly w ith  the Office of Indian  Affairs, the Bureau of Fisheries, the Bureau 
of Biological Survey, and  even the state's Irrigation Service in protecting fish 
and  all o ther game. Of course, these bureaus w ith  varying goals ended up  
bu tting  heads. For exam ple, the federal governm ent had  reserved land  from  
the Salish-Kootenai for the use of a b ird  refuge. Every year as the b irds laid 
their eggs, the Irrigation Service began fiUing the reservoir, destroying m ost 
of the eggs. The governm ent w as paying thousands of dollars for the 
Biological Survey to protect wildlife, w hile another bureau  destroyed it. Keep 
in m ind that m ost of the land and resources under discussion belonged to the 
tribes, b u t w ere controlled by outside bureaus. A pproxim ately 23,000 acres 
w ere reserved for storage reservoirs for the Irrigation Service, bu t the tribes 
w ere the actual ow ners of the title to the land. The tribes received no lease 
m oney from  the Irrigation Service, how ever, and  had  little say in how  the
121
lands w ere used. Just to m ake m atters m ore frustrating, the Irrigation Service 
and  the Biological Survey together h ad  been preventing  the Salish-Kootenai 
from  hun ting  and fishing on the reserved lands except u n d er regulation. The 
Irrigation Service offered to buy these lands several times b u t the tribes 
refused to sell. In add ition  to know ing that their survival depended on 
keeping the land, the tribes claim ed tha t the Irrigation Service never offered 
them  anything near the am ount of m oney the land  w as worth.^8
In add ition  to straightening out the bureaucratic mess, and  asserting their 
ow n rights as hunters, it rem ained an  ultim ate goal for the tribes to "alleviate 
the considerable unau thorized  fishing by w hite t r e s p a s s e r s .  " 3 9  j n  1 9 3 6  
S uperin tendent L.W. Shotwell w rote to the Com m issioner of Indian Affairs 
that there w as an  enorm ous loss of fish because of w hite trespassing as well as 
the Irrigation Service. H e stated  that literally thousands of fish had been 
deposited  on the fields that w ere being irrigated. The Service had  not set up 
any nets or protective m easures to keep the fish from  ending up on  the alfalfa 
f i e l d s . 4 0  The state of M ontana b rushed  aside Shotwell's claims. Their 
argum ent w as that w hether w aste occurred by m istakes or by trespassing, 
those w aters w ere to be controlled by the state. Their justification w as that 
they had  often paid  to stock those reservoirs, and  therefore the fish belonged 
to them . Shotwell and  the tribes argued  that in reality it had  been m any years 
since the state had  m ade any kind of effort to restock fish on the 
r e s e r v a t i o n . 4 1  W hile the state patrolled  the land and destroyed the fish, they 
continued to be in  d irect conflict w ith  the tribes and  federal officials. 
In terestingly  enough, few  people, including Superin tendent Shotwell, 
po rtrayed  the conflict as a d irect loss to the Salish-Kootenai. Shotwell’s letter 
stated  that the people that w ere seriously affected by the great loss of fish were
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the fisherm en and  sportsm en of w estern  M ontana. He m ust have believed 
th a t argum ent w ould  have m ore w eight than  appealing to sym pathy or 
justice for the tribes. Even though  his intentions were good, portraying the 
Salish-Kootenai as a secondary force on their ow n reservation d id  little for 
the im age of tribal authority.
The tribes had  m uch  m ore to deal w ith  than  the problem s created by 
colliding governm ents. They w ere being directly attacked by non-Indians 
alm ost anytim e they tried to assert them selves in m atters pertaining to the 
reservation. In regards to the perm it that had  to be purchased by non-Indians 
to h u n t and  fish on the reservation, there w as great protest. The protest 
w asn 't over the cost of the one dollar perm it, b u t ra ther the fact that Indians 
had  begun  asserting jurisdiction over whites. These pro testers were the same 
sportsm en w ho had  stated earlier that they w ould  support alm ost any 
m easure of conservation of w ildlife on the reservation.^^ U nder the Indian 
Reorganization Act the tribes could have legally closed off all hunting on the 
reservation. A llowing sportsm en to fish and h u n t on tribal land was a 
com m endable concession, and  expensive for the tribes. In addition  to 
protesting tribal authority , w hites fished illegally on lands that were closed 
jointly by the Biological Survey and  the Bureau of Fisheries. The tribal gam e 
perm it was a very sim ple m easure to help pay the costs of carrying out 
protective m easures for wildlife, and  to provide a salary for a w arden  to patrol 
the areas.43 Superin tendent Shotwell agreed w ith  the tribes' need to patrol 
their land  and  agreed tha t w ithou t police and  gam e w ardens, non-Indians 
w ould  continue to d isregard  Indians and  to "make free w ith  the Indians' 
p roperty . "44 The tribes apparen tly  had  no desire to exclude non-Indians from
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hunting , only to have them  participate in the protection  and conservation of 
the tribal resources they u s e d . 45
Serious p ro test continued right into the m id to late 1930's, new spapers ran  
stories like the one entitled "Vigorous Protest Is M ade A gainst N ew  Indian 
O r d i n a n c e . "46 The C ham ber of Com m erce in Poison and especially its 
secretary, H.C. R edden personally protested over the tribes ability to issue 
perm its. H is reason for opposition w as his belief that the law  had been 
im plem ented  by the Indians practically overnight. He com plained that 
w hites had  always been  allow ed to h u n t after purchasing a state perm it, and 
now  they had  to purchase another one for hunting  inside the reservation. 
This, how ever, as the tribal people knew, w as a m isconception on the part of 
non-Indians. As we have seen, the Salish-Kootenai w ere never allow ed to 
im plem ent any th ing  w ithou t approval in  W ashington, so im plem enting 
laws on a "whim" was out of the question. In addition. If Redden w as correct, 
and  w hites had  been hun ting  on  the reservation for years w ith  a state perm it, 
than  the state of M ontana had  not been properly  inform ing or patrolling 
these hunters. They w ere never allow ed to h u n t on the reservation by the 
sole use of a state hunting  perm it, and  Superin tendent Shotwell even stated 
in  1936 that there had  never been a special hun ting  perm it issued to any non- 
Indian. Shotwell fu rther backed u p  the Salish-Kootenai accusations that 
notices prohibiting hun ting  w ere sim ply d i s r e g a r d e d . 47 N on-Indians had 
som e pretty  hard  feelings about the new  gam e perm it, as it appeared  to arouse 
m any m isconceived notions over hun ting  rights on  the p a rt of non-Indians. 
F urther feuding began. W hites b lam ed the confusion of the laws this time 
directly on  the Salish-Kootenai, by arguing tha t the tribes w ere overstepping 
their bounds. But the rights of the Salish-Kootenai to assert their au thority
124
over resources, and  the fact tha t w hites w ere not allow ed to hun t w ithout a 
special perm it on  the reservation h ad  been in effect since the beginning of the 
allo tm ent policy. There just had  been  no m eans to enforce them  on any kind 
of regular basis until the 1930's. The difference w as that not only w ere w hites 
kept from  trespassing on private tribal lands, bu t they now  had to answ er to 
the tribes even if they shot a deer in their ow n back yard.
For the Salish-Kootenai tribes, m aking m oney and reinvesting it for the 
use of patrolling and  enforcing tribal laws w as a g iant leap from the 
paternalism  of the federal governm ent. The m oney m ade from  the perm its 
and  court fines from  gam e law  violators was the first m oney that w as not 
confiscated and held in trust for the tribal people by the Secretary of the 
Interior. In addition  to w hat w e have already seen, the late 1930's b rought 
w ith  it new  conflicts over hun ting  on  the reservation, as some w hites began 
an  anti-governm ent m ovem ent. Because there had  been progress m ade in 
tribal conservation, there w ere new  tribal laws tha t som etim es prohibited all 
reservation  residents from  fishing on or around  reservoirs like those at 
M ission D am  w hen  w aters w ere low. N on-Indians ignored these 
conservation laws, how ever, forcing tribal police to arrest them. The anti­
governm ent m ovem ent by som e non-Indians sought to avoid all tribal, 
federal and  state gam e law s on the reservation, and proposed offering 
ind iv idual Indians m oney to h u n t on their p rivate  allotm ents. This 
m easure, they argued, could get them  around  all rules and regulations of 
closed seasons and bag limits.48
So, w hat came of all of this? It w as total frustration  for the Tribcd Council. 
W ithin the same year tha t they had  im plem ented a tribal perm it to fish and 
hun t, they w ere forced to d iscontinue the perm it until they could w ork  ou t
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som e of the confusion over authority , and  devise m eans to enforce fish and 
gam e law s in a strict m aim er. The tribes allow ed non-Indian hunters to once 
again take advantage of reservation resources free of cost until gam e issues 
could be resolved. Because of this m ove, m any of the heated issues soon 
b u rn ed  out. N on-Indians could h u n t w ithout a tribal perm it, and the tribes' 
au thority  had  been severely dam aged. The tribes had  no intention of taking a 
perm anent leave, how ever, and  by 1940 they w ere back in the saddle.
Im posing perm its w as once again reconsidered. The State Fish and Game 
Com m ission w ere the first to voice opposition, stating that they w ould refuse 
to restock any of the w aters w ith  birds or fish if perm its w ere reinstated.^9
In the early 1940's the State Fish and Game Com m ission was consistently 
den ied  any direct au thority  over gam e violations that occurred on the 
reservation by  Indians, b u t occasionally there w ould  be a w arden  w ho w ould 
arrest Indians anyway. For Instance, Sahkale Finley, a Indian, was arrested in 
the fall of 1941 for killing a deer ou t of season. He had  killed a deer on the 
reservation, bu t then  carried it off of the reservation w here he was caught 
du ring  a closed season in M ontana. C orrespondence im m ediately began 
betw een  the Flathead Superin tendent and  the state, how ever, and Finley was 
freed w ith  the apparen t understand ing  that the state had  no authority  over 
him. One thing to keep in m ind, how ever, is that w hen a tribal m em ber was 
arrested, lengthy discussion and  exchanges of opinion often took weeks or 
even m onths, and  created great hardsh ips for individuals. W hether guilty or 
not. Such delays seldom  applied  to non-Indians.
In 1942, the M ontana Fish and Cam e Com m ission sent a letter to the 
D epartm ent of the Interior. This letter w as im portan t because it w as the first 
le tter tha t sta ted  not so m uch w hat jurisdiction the state had  over w ildlife on
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M ontana reservations, b u t w hat jurisdiction they w ere sure they d id  not 
have. The decisions reached had  been handed  dow n  by the A ttorney General 
and  w ere generally agreed to by the Fish and Game Commission. They 
involved issues like the fact tha t state gam e laws on Ind ian  reservations 
could not be enforced upon  Indians. Interestingly enough, they agreed that 
the state had  no righ t to arrest Indians or w hites in  violation of gam e laws on 
the reserve. This inconsistency left a gap  in  jurisdiction over non-Indians 
w hich the tribes assum ed w as their responsibility to fill on some level.
Indians could also carry their kill outside of the reservation borders, or travel 
to necessary destinations w ith  their kill. Last b u t not least, the A ttorney 
G eneral denied  the state the right to hire Indians on a reservation to arrest 
o ther Indians for state gam e violations, a practice w hich created factions and 
div ided  tribal people.^! As it tu rns out, W illiam Zim m erm an, the A ssistant 
Com m issioner of Indian  Affairs, agreed w ith  the laws as stated  by the 
A ttorney General, w ith  the exception of the state no t being allowed 
jurisd iction  over w hites on the reservation. This in his opinion w ould 
prom ote the transgression of jurisdiction and  laws, as m any whites already 
believed tha t by living on the reservation they w ere "beyond jurisdiction of 
the state." Z im m erm an appeared  less concerned about the protection of 
w hites u n d er state jurisdiction, than  w ith  avoiding tu rn ing  reservations into 
"havens of refuge" for w h i t e s . ^ ^
1942 w as a big year for the Salish-Kootenai tribes in their struggle to settle 
fish and  gam e m atters for two reasons. O ne w as that for the last eight years, 
the tribes had  asserted their decision m aking pow er, and  had  used the pow er 
of tribal law  to finally persuade o ther governm ents to cooperate w ith  them, 
and  two, the governm ent bu reaus w ere beginning to agree on some general
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rules for assessing jurisdictional disputes. One thing that tribal, state, and 
federal officials could all agree on in the 1940’s, was that fish and gam e 
conservation w as a necessity. This gave the tribe some support in their 
attem pts to protect their recourses. In other ways the 1940's w ere a decade of 
concession for the tribes. They had  to com prom ise their sole jurisdiction 
over gam e issues, and  they had  decided to forego charging for fish and  gam e 
perm its, thereby losing revenue. In effect, they opened up  m any fish and 
gam e responsibilities to state jurisdiction, and allow ed the state to generate 
the incom e from  perm its. The 1940's w ere a time w hen it was decided that 
com prom ise w ould  be the best approach to reduce conflict, and in 1942 the 
tribes and  the state settled on a joint resolution over fish and game m atters. 
All in  all, it d id  appear to be a good com prom ise, for decisions that had  
created h ard  feelings betw een the tw o groups before, could now  be settled 
jointly. In addition, the personal concessions m ade by the tribes could be 
revoked if they deem ed it necessary.^^ To sum  u p  the proposed agreem ent 
betw een the state and  the tribes, there were ten issues that were generally 
resolved as follows:
1. The two organizations will appoin t som eone to act as both  
State Gam e W arden, and Indian  D eputy Game W arden on the 
reservation. The person will be appoin ted  by the tribe, and 
approved by the State Fish and Game Commission.
2. Those appoin ted  to the gam e w arden  position will be paid 
equally by both  the Flathead Indian Agency, and  the State Fish 
and  Game Commission.
3. The appointed  Fish and  Game W arden will carry out the 
provisions of the fish and gam e regulations w ithin  the 
boundaries of the reservation, and also act as a m anager of 
Fish and Game affairs of the tribe.
4. AU non-m em bers of the tribe are required  to have a State Fish
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and  Game License w hen fishing on the Flathead Reservation.
5. In reciprocation for the re-stocking of fish in the Flathead Lake 
and  the distribution of gam e birds on the reservation, non-m em bers 
of the tribe will be allowed to fish and hun t on  the reservation 
w ithout paying for a perm it from  the tribe.
6. N o seining will be perm itted  by Indians or non-Indians except for 
the purpose of supplying State Fish Hatcheries w ith sockeye salmon.
7. The opening and  closing of stream s and lakes, and  the setting of 
seasons for hunting up land  birds and m igratory waterfowl for non­
m em bers of the tribe will be determ ined m utually by the Tribal 
Council and the State Fish and Game Commission.
8. The Superintendent of the reservation will be authorized to tag 
beaver pelts caught by Indians of the tribe. The tags are furnished 
by the State Fish and  Game Com m ission free of charge. In addition, 
a record of all beaver skins tagged will be furnished to the State Fish 
and Game D epartm ent.
9. The Tribal Council and  the State Com mission agree that big game 
hun ting  is closed w ith in  the original confines of the Flathead 
reservation.
10. It is understood  that the Salish-Kootenai are not rehnquishing 
any treaty rights or any of their rights contained in the 1934 
Indian Reorganization Act.^4
A lthough quite advantageous to the non-Indian population, the 
concessions m ade by the tribes still d id  not please m any of the w hite people 
living on  the reservation because they had  little or no say in  the agreem ent. 
In effect, the agreem ent w ent now here, because there w as still so m uch 
d isagreem ent over the tribal council's au thority  concerning gam e issues. 
T hroughout the 1940's and into the next several decades, the Salish-Kootenai 
continued to w ork  w ith  state and federal officials to decide w hat regulations 
could and could not be legally enforced. By the 1950's fish and  gam e 
regulations w ithin  the reservation  requ ired  25 sections of rules tha t covered
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everything from  w here, w hen  , how, and  who. The one problem  that still 
w as no t solved by  this po in t in  tim e and  w hich continued to be incredibly 
problem atic, was how  the tribe could enforce these laws on non-m em bers 
living on  the reservation. Enforcing law s on  tribal m em bers was relatively 
easy. If they violated hunting  laws, they w ould be tried in a tribal court where 
they could be fined u p  to $250.00 and  sentenced to up  to six m onths in jaü. In 
addition , they could lose their hunting  rights on the reservation. N on-Indian 
violators, how ever, w ere to be tu rned  over to the state authorities to be tried 
in state courts. This created problem s for the Salish-Kootenai. First of all, it 
w as often difficult to actually arrest a non-Indian, as they rarely had  any 
respect for tribal au thority  and assum ed that the tribes had  no authority to 
arrest them . This belief stem m ed from  the fact tha t the tribes d id  not 
officially have the jurisdiction to prosecute these people over gam e laws.
They did, how ever, have the legal right to arrest non-Indian individuals and 
hold  them  or send them  to o ther authorities for prosecution. Secondly, if the 
violator w as tu rned  over to other authorities, it took time, m oney and effort 
to hold  the violator un til o ther officials arrived. Letting things "slide" or 
avoiding pressing charges w as often easier than  going th rough the 
bureaucracy of another organization to obtain justice. N eedless to say, this 
fact d id  nothing to positively reinforce the Salish-Kootenais' image of 
au tho rity .
In the next chapter we will take a look at contem porary hunting  issues on 
the reservation. N ot surprisingly, w e will find tha t the very same historical 
problem s w ith  tribal au thority  still exist today and are equally troublesom e. 
N on-Indians still show  disrespect for the authority  of the tribes. They 
continue to argue tha t the Salish-Kootenai have no jurisdiction over non-
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Indians, and  their reasons for denying tribal authority  range from  not being 
fairly represen ted  in  the tribal governm ent, to their perception tha t the 
reservation  no longer exists. W hat we will see in contem porary conflict is 
tha t the old m yths and  perceived rights about the private ow nership of land 
have been refined, b u t are still the m ain defense used by those who oppose 
tribal authority . This refusal to com prom ise and w ork w ith  the tribes has 
done little m ore than  continue conflicts over fish and game, and perpetuate  a 
general sense of anim osity betw een Ind ian  and non-Indian residents of the 
reserva tion .
CHAPTER V:
CONTEMPORARY H U N H N G  CONFLICTS 
It has been eighty-six years since the reservation was opened up  to w hite 
settlem ent, b u t the topics of conflict and the way Indians and non-Indians 
justify their stands rem ain very m uch the same. There is no doubt that 
injustices w ere done to the Salish-Kootenai concerning their rights to utilize 
and  control their resources, b u t today they are confident in their abilities, and 
have w orked  long and h ard  to place them selves back into a position of 
authority . They have spent a g reat deal of time and m oney in defining exactly 
^vhat legal rights the tribes have m aintained over the years. They now  have 
greater security in  asserting themselves, and  it is for this reason that non- 
Indians feel that they are now  the m inority. Tribal strength has at times 
given non-Indians little pow er on the reservation over tribal decisions or 
joint decisions that affect them . In regards to tribal authority over game 
m atters, non-Indians believe the tribes are exerting jurisdiction over m ore 
than  just wildlife. Indians are b lam ed for injustices involving non-Indian 
p roperty  and  constitutional rights. The vulnerability w hites feel tends to 
prom ote attitudes tha t d isregard  the political rights of the Salish-Kootenai 
and  in turn , non-Indians tend  to carry ou t the very sam e injustices on the 
reservation  tha t their forefathers did. M any non-Indians in w estern  M ontana 
still deny tribal sovereignty, tribal history, and the reality of tribal jurisdiction 
on the reservation.
The Salish-Kootenai are today, still running  u p  against walls of 
paternalism  and disrespect, w hich can at tim es leave them  pow erless to m ake 
their ow n ideas of self-governm ent w ork  efficiently. A lthough they are not 
seeking to m ake anyone feel guilty about the history of Indian-w hite
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relations, they do ask that tribal culture and sovereignty be respected. 
Differences in  culture and  law  foster various em otional issues that are today a 
concern for Indians and non-Indians alike. Fish and gam e issues on the 
F lathead R eservation are one exam ple of a pow erful em otional issue w hich 
has continued to create tension betw een the tw o ethnic groups. If conflict is 
to be resolved, connecting the past w ith  the issues of today wiU likely be the 
key to solving problem s.
As we begin  to look at contem porary hunting  issues on the Flathead 
reservation, we will find tha t there is still opposition to tribal jurisdiction, 
and  this conflict still faces off tribal and  state interests. To ease the tension 
and insure that gaps in jurisdiction are filled, the tribes have entered into a 
joint com pact w ith  the state. A lthough the agreem ent is for concurrent 
jurisdiction, it is not satisfactory to m any non-Indian residents of the 
reservation. The opposition stem s from  being forced to purchase a tribal 
hun ting  perm it. The fish and  gam e com pact is rooted in a legislative act from  
1947 authorizing the state and the tribes to d raw  up  agreem ents over fish and 
gam e m anagem ent. U nder the agreem ent, the state D epartm ent of Fish 
W ildlife and  Parks issues joint licenses for b ird  hunting  and  fishing on the 
reservation, and the revenue goes to the tribes. It should be understood  that 
although joint au thority  appears to be w orking to the advantage of both 
parties, it is still a com prom ise for the tribes. They have voluntarily p u t 
them selves in a position to w ork out agreem ents w ith  the state, and the cities 
and  counties tha t lie w ith in  their reservation. C oncurrent jurisdiction is a 
step in the right direction, as it avoids unnecessary conflict, and in a sense, 
has enhanced tribal sovereignty by defining exactly w hat au thority  the tribes 
have m aintained. N on-Indians w ho oppose tribal au thority  dem and
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protection, how ever, from  w hat they believe to be the injustices of Indian 
decisions and  tribal courts, just as Indians historically dem anded federal 
pro tection  from  w hites and their legal system. Historically, neither side has 
h ad  m uch  faith in or respect for the other's legal system. The ideologies 
behind  things, the w ay decisions are carried out, and the punishm ent for 
offenses can differ greatly betw een tribal and state courts. The differences are 
often based on cultural differences pertaining to law.
The situation on the F lathead Reservation is different from the o ther six 
reservations located in M ontana. The other tribes have less direct conflict 
betw een  ethnic groups over jurisdiction, because laws and the enforcem ent of 
those law s often elim inate the state's authority. All of the other six 
reservations fall u n d er the jurisdiction of the federal Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, w hich hires its ow n police force to w ork  in  conjunction w ith  tribal 
officers. These m easures reduce conflict betw een tribal and  state jurisdictions 
over land, people, and  recourses on the reservations. W hat also m akes the 
F lathead R eservation different is the w hite m ajority population  living on the 
reservation, and  the tribes' original adop tion  of Public Law  280 in  1963 w hich 
opened u p  agreem ents betw een the tribes and the state of M ontana for 
concurren t jurisd ic tion  over various m atters.
The opposition to concurrent jurisdiction on the Flathead Reservation is 
from  non-Indians w ho are not a p a rt of the decision m aking and  therefore 
feel tha t their constitutional rights are being violated. They do not vote on 
the tribal hun ting  perm it or its cost to those w ho are requ ired  to purchase it, 
and  yet the outcom e is im posed upon  them . O n the o ther hand, the tribes 
often  open  u p  com m unity discussions w here w hites are welcom e to come 
and  speak their m ind. There are opportunities to negotiate w ith  the tribes as
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well. Recreation program  m anager Tom M cDonald stated just last year
concerning the suggested alternatives by non-Indians to the im m ediate
closure of 64,719 acres of tribal land to non-members:
This is another exam ple of deferm ent of a decision based  on 
public involvem ent in  the tribal process,...It is bu ilt into our 
adm inistra tive ordinance to have public com m ent. The local 
com m unity has im pacts in the decision m aking process and 
they will have inpu t in  the study. 1
Because of public opposition to the closure of tribal lands last year, the tribes 
reconsidered and left the lands open to the public while they study the 
im pacts of heavy recreational use. It is true, how ever, that the ultim ate 
decision w ül be m ade by tribal m em bers, and  this infuriates some non­
m em bers w ho in tu rn  try to deny the tribes their authority. To gain an idea of 
the typical opposition the tribes face from  m any w hites today, we can take a 
look at one m an in particu lar w ho has opposed the tribes over fish and gam e 
regulations for years. Del Palm er protests tribal jurisdiction over fish and 
gam e every year by purposely violating tribal gam e laws.
Recent Hunting Issues
Del Palm er has been trying desperately to exert his perceived property  and 
constitu tional rights on the reservation, and  in his view  this can be done 
th rough  violating tribal law s on  his p rivate property . Del believes that he 
should  be allow ed to shoot wildlife on his p roperty  w ithout having to buy  a 
tribal perm it, bu t does not argue that he should be exem pt from buying a state 
perm it. H e does, how ever, argue tha t the state has illegally entered  into an 
agreem ent w ith  the tribes because the com pact "was m ade in the shade and 
kep t in the dark  by state officials."2 He fu rther argues tha t by no t giving him  
the righ t to participate in the decision m aking process, the state is in violation
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of M ontana's open-m eeting laws. Del hopes tha t by violating the tribal-state 
com pact he wiU be cited and can then have his day  in  court to argue against 
the tribes’ right to enforce the purchase of joint fish and gam e perm its. 
U ltim ately, Del feels that fee paten ted  land like his ow n is no longer part of 
the reservation, and  should therefore no t fall under any tribal authority. 
Palm er has been  cited several tim es for hun ting  violations. The charges w ere 
d ropped  in 1991, he was acquitted the following two years, and charges were 
d ro p p ed  again in  1994. H is efforts continue; although no authorities show ed 
up  to cite him  in the fall of 1996, he tu rned  him self in. Lake County attorney 
Kim C hristopher dism issed the charge because of lack of evidence.
A pparently , Del had  already eaten the bird he had  shot.3
N ot surprisingly, Del s case reflects aU of those same issues that have been 
b ro u g h t u p  th roughou t the history of Indian-w hite relations, and  his 
argum ents are popu lar am ong non-Indians on several reservations 
th roughou t the U nited  States. The first issue his case exemplifies is the 
question of w ho has jurisdiction over non-Indians w hen they are on their 
p rivate property . A ccording to Del and  several Suprem e Court cases, Indians 
have little or no jurisdiction over non-Indian  persons or their property , and 
this belief is not necessarily d ispu ted  by the tribes. The second issue rem ains 
inconclusive, and creates a m ajor problem  in exerting jurisdiction over gam e 
laws. The issue is, w hose gam e is it? Does the gam e on the reservation 
belong to the tribe, or does it belong to the state of M ontana since it can be 
argued  tha t gam e on the reservation  is ultim ately found w ith in  the confines 
of the state? Because fish and gam e m igrate back and forth  from  state to tribal 
land, this question is com plex, and  has no t been  answ ered  definitively.
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Tribal ow nership  of fish and gam e on the reservation has been argued 
using various justifications. The tribes believe the gam e on the reservation 
belongs to them  regardless of w hether it is found on tribal, trust or fee land. It 
is stated  in Article III of the Treaty with the Flatheads tha t the Salish- 
Kootenai have exclusive rights to fish and gam e on their reservation as well 
as in  all "usual and  accustom ed places" for hunting. Therefore, the treaty 
acknow ledges tribal control over gam e by giving them  the pow er to exclude.
In addition , the tribes have spent m any years caring for wildlife on the 
reservation  by relocation, re-stocking, m onitoring, and  patrolling. The Tribal 
C onstitu tion  approved  by the Secretary of the Interior also reinforces tribal 
au thority  in Article VI, Section la , giving the Tribal Council authority  to 
protect and  preserve wildlife and natural recourses belonging to the tribes.
The federal governm ent backs this decision further by acknow ledging that the 
fish and  wildlife of the reservation do indeed belong to the Indians. The 
assistant to the Com m issioner of Ind ian  Affairs w rote to the Tribal Council in 
1943 stating that aU fish and gam e belong to the tribes. By adopting the Tribal 
C onstitution, the council had  vested pow er to regulate fish and  gam e 
a c t i v i t y .4 Del Palm er and others opposing tribal authority  have argued from 
another view point. Because their fees and  taxes have been  taking care of the 
entire state's fish and gam e, they believe they should  have control of the 
gam e on the reservation as well. They too have helped finance the state for 
re-stocking the lakes and stream s w ith fish, and  have contributed 
considerably to wildlife conservation. Because they contribute to the state for 
these services, they argue they should  not have to pay the tribe for the same 
services.
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In his drive to elim inate law s and  agreem ents that affect non-Indians 
living on  the reservation, Del Palm er in  the process is m aking a direct attack 
on the culture and sovereignty of the tribes. Del's statem ent about his last 
hun ting  violation charge w as "1 had  every reason to believe w hat 1 d id  was 
legal...private land is not reservation land." H e asserts that the Salish- 
K ootenai Tribes have no jurisdiction over private property  that is in fee 
status. W hat Del ignores in his argum ent is that the tribes do not claim to 
have jurisdiction over his p roperty , they claim to have control only over 
tribal resources. Fish and gam e are believed to be tribal resources, and w hen 
any resident of the reservation violates the civil law  at hand, the tribes have 
the authority  to m ake the arrest of that person regardless of his or her land 
status. The tribe m ay not be able to try a non-Indian offender in a tribal court. 
They can, how ever, arrest and  hold  the violator in custody until the p roper 
au thorities arrive.
The tribal gam e perm it itself is the initial regulation tha t draw s so m uch 
opposition. N on-Indians often d isregard  the fact that the perm it is sim ply a 
tax on those people w ho h u n t anyw here on the reservation. It is not a tax on 
a person’s property , nor does it give the tribes authority  over a person's 
p roperty . But, for those w ho believe that their p rivate land is no longer part 
of the reservation, and therefore cannot be taxed by the tribe, it should be 
po in ted  ou t tha t the reservation  boundaries have never been extinguished, 
and  tha t it w ould take an  Act of Congress to do so. The tribes have the right 
to tax residents on the reservation based on the several Suprem e C ourt cases. 
The Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the Washington v. Confederated 
Colville Tribes are tw o cases in particular that reaffirm ed the fact tha t the 
pow er to tax is an aspect retained th rough  the sovereignty of Indians.^ For
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the Salish-Kootenai, the fish and  gam e perm it is an im posed tax covering the 
costs of their W ildlife M anagem ent, and  Fisheries and  Recreation Program . It 
also allows non-Indian recreationists and  sportsm en to use over one m illion 
acres of w hat has been  said to be "some of the best b ird  hunting  and  fishing in 
the nation."^ District court judge C.B. McNeil stated in 1995 that he believed 
the fish and  gam e agreem ent betw een the tribe and  state com plied w ith  the 
P ittm an-Robertson Act, a federal act reinforcing the tribes' right to collect 
jo int license fees from  non-Indians.^ In addition, the state of M ontana agrees 
w ith  the tribe that the 1990 state-tribal agreem ent has "superseded general 
M ontana licensing requ irem en ts. To this date there has been only one 
court that has review ed Del Palm er's legal case, and it strongly rejected it.
The judge disagreed w ith  Del s assertions tha t the law  w as unconstitutional 
or unenforceable, b u t ultim ately dism issed the case w hen the county attorney 
decided no to prosecute.^
Because w hites are not necessarily allow ed to participate in the decision 
m aking process of tribal m atters, it w ould seem  that a state-tribal com pact 
w ould  be pleasing to them. A lthough certainly not obligated to do so, the 
Salish-Kootenai have opened the door for state and tribal jurisdictions to 
have checks and  balances on  each other. This m eans there are doors open for 
checks on tribal m atters concerning non-Indians. Keep in m ind that this 
agreem ent w ith  the state can be enforced only w ith  the consent of the tribe, 
b u t has the potential to benefit all people living on the reservation. The 
conflicts betw een non-Indians and  tribal au thority  is unfortunate for the 
Salish-Kootenai. A lthough the non-Indian  culture has often been a challenge 
or d irect threat to tribal sovereignty, m any Indians recognize the contribution 
non-Indians have m ade to the reservation  econom ically, and  in o ther aspects
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like conservation. For non-Indians w ho recreate or fish and hunt, the tribal- 
state com pact is quite beneficial. John Strom nes of the Missoulian  
new spaper states tha t the agreem ent w ith  the Salish-Kootenai tribes was 
desired  by the State, Fish, Wildlife, and  Parks D epartm ent "in o rder to clear 
u p  nagging jurisdictional questions about w ho could regulate hunting and 
fishing on  the reservation land, and  to m ake sure non-tribal access 
co n tin u ed .
A lthough new  to the Indian  opposition scene, another m an holds views 
similar to Del Palmer's. Gene Erb Jr. is a friend of Del s and w as his co­
defendan t in  his 1994 hun ting  violation. D uring his hearing in A pril of 1995, 
Gene stated that in the past, he had  always purchased the state-tribal perm it 
b u t bough t only the state perm it the last year because he w as hunting on 
private p ro p e r ty .^  The interesting thing about his story is that although he 
w as hun ting  on private property , it w as not his own. This brings up  an 
in teresting point, in  that if aU non-Indians are allow ed to h u n t w ithou t a 
tribal perm it on any private p roperty  inside the reservation, it is certain that 
reservation wildlife w ould  quickly be depleted, and  the tribes also w ould  not 
have the incom e to m anage gam e populations. Del and  Gene's choice of 
m ethod  to ignore tribal regulations is interesting, b u t certainly not new  to the 
tribes. It is the same m ethod w hites used in the 1920's and  early 1930's w hen 
they w ere hun ting  only on tribal land  and  Indian  allotm ents in o rder to 
avoid aU state gam e regulations. D uring these years, w hites w ere not allowed 
to h u n t anyw here on the reservation w ithou t a special perm it obtained by the 
s u p e r i n t e n d e n t . 1927 was one year in particu lar w hen the state game 
w arden  asked the Office of Indian  Affairs for help  in  patrolling w hites on the
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reservation, because w hites w ere using the argum ent tha t tribal lands and 
Ind ian  allotm ents d id  not faU u n d er any state jurisdiction.
The political view  held by non-Indians like Palm er and Erb is difficult for 
the tribes to w ork  w ith, because although racism  is far from  being stated 
politically, m any non-Indians directly oppose the concept of a "Native 
American." Del and  several others w ho share sim ilar attitudes tow ard 
N ative A m ericans are p a rt of an anti-Indian  m ovem ent on the Flathead 
Reservation and belong to a g roup  called All Citizens Equal. They have m any 
topics on their agenda, bu t regarding fish and game, the group is distressed 
over the use of the natu ra l resources and  the fact that tribal officials have any 
authority  over m atters concerning non-Indians. They believe that until they 
have a p a rt in  the decision-m aking process on the reservation, Indians will 
continue to rem ain "super citizens" w ith  special rights. 14 Because there 
have been  several d irect attacks on the Salish-Kootenai by this group, they 
have often been charged w ith  racism. By 1989 the debate betw een Indians and 
m em bers of All Citizen Equal had  becom e quite public, resulting in the 
form ation of a m ulti-racial g roup  that m onitored  racist incidents on  the 
rese rv a tio n .!^
W hat som e residents of the reservation are unw illing to accept is the fact 
tha t the Salish-Kootenai have the inherent right to organize and govern 
them selves over m atters that concern their reservation. The right w as not 
given to them  by the U nited States, they possessed it naturally  as a sovereign 
entity. Their rights are reinforced by the Treaty of 1855 and several 
Congressional acts, public laws, and district and Suprem e C ourt decisions that 
have generally  continued to reinforce the rights of N ative Americans. 
A lthough tribal rights are generally protected, Del Palmer, his attitudes
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to w ard  law  and jurisdiction on the reservation, and  his continual violations 
of tribal fish and gam e regulations do have the potential of being a threat to 
the tribe. Del has one im portan t factor on his side. In a nutshell, he has a 
chance of being tried  for fish and  gam e violations u n d er a justice of the peace 
w ho identifies w ith  his plea on an em otional ra ther than  a strictly legal level. 
Em otions ru n  high in court rooms, and  can be devastating to the loser. The 
possible advantage is sim ply that there are inconsistencies in the rulings in 
tribal m atters by court judges. A lthough to this day, m ost governm ent 
officials back the tribal-state agreem ent and the tribal decision-making 
authority, there is always the chance that if a case w ere taken to court 
questioning tribal authority , a judge w ould  simply ignore previous opinions 
of the court.
O ne judge appeared  to do  this just a couple of years ago, and now  that 
Suprem e C ourt decision in particular has the potential of having a negative 
im pact on the Salish-Kootenai tribes, if litigation w ere ever to occur. The case 
sets a precedent for dealing w ith  non-Indians w ho com m it game violations 
w ithin  the boundaries of the reservation. The case is S o u th  Dakota  v.
B o u t  I a n d  w hich ru led  in the sum m er of 1993 tha t the Cheyenne River Sioux 
lost their righ t to regulate hun ting  and  fishing by non-Indians on the 
reservation. N ot only d id  Justice Clarence Thom as rule in his opinion that 
the tribe had  no authority , b u t he m ade his decision contrary to several 
p revious court rulings. Tribal A ttorney G eneral Steve Em ery stated  that the 
judge ignored "established law  and  the federal-Indian tru st r e l a t i o n s h i p . " ^ ^  
Em ery believed that the judge based his conclusion on the fact that if 
Congress had  in tended  the tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting, it w ould 
have done so by creating a specific statute. This conclusion is in direct conflict
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w ith  the long held  legal principle that as sovereign pow ers, tribes 
autom atically retain  their rights unless Congress specifically reduces or 
d im in ishes them .^^ A n im portan t observation in this case is the fact that it 
w as the state tha t b rought su it against the tribe, and the Sioux w ere in a 
position of au thority  sim ilar to that of the Salish-Kootenai today. The 
jurisdiction d ispu te w as over land that was until 1987 jointly regulated by the 
tribe and the state under a w ildlife agreem ent. W hen the tw o authorities 
came together to discuss the renew al of the com pact, negotiations broke 
dow n, and  the state sued. A lthough the outcom e w as not a total loss for the 
Sioux, the B our land  decision essentially lim ited tribal sovereignty. The 
B our land  case exemplifies tha t there is sim ply no law  that does no t have the 
potential to be changed by a serious em otional plea. Because case laws are 
"opinions of the court," they are not set in stone. Laws are dynam ic and 
always changing.
The fact that laws are not static forces the Salish-Kootenai to always think 
ahead and determ ine w hether they can risk the possible consequences of any 
legal action taken. A lthough they are currently  view ed by m ost 
bureaucracies as sovereign nations w ho govern them selves and m uch  of the 
activity in their boundaries, this does no t necessarily m ean that they will 
autom atically retain  the rights they have today. Gaining strength  and pow er 
over their ow n reservation has been  a slow process that is w atched and 
regulated  by surrounding  governm ents very closely. W hat actions the tribal 
council takes do indeed have an  effect on o ther M ontana citizens and  their 
economy. Because the tribes fall under the ultim ate jurisdiction of Congress, 
they are very aw are that they m ust w ork  beyond their m eans and beyond 
their ow n needs in o rder to protect the political progress that they have m ade.
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The tribes are also aw are that prom ises m ade to them  by Congress in the 
past have no t always been  upheld , nor have they necessarily m et the needs of 
N ative Am ericans. The federal governm ent on the one hand  has always 
stated  that Indians have the right to be independen t nations and in 1934 tried 
to back tha t statem ent u p  w ith the Indian Reorganization Act. Standing 
behind  those statem ents has been a different m atter, how ever, and often the 
tribes have gone w ithou t protection or the ability to really govern 
them selves. The pow ers given to Indians th rough  congressional acts have 
always been stated very generally. This happened  because non-Indians 
assum ed tha t N ative A m ericans had  little m otivation to em pow er 
them selves. This, as it has tu rned  out, w as not the case, and  non-Indians and 
state governm ents especially, have found them selves ill-prepared to deal 
w ith  today 's issues on reservations.
O ften to the w hite m ans' dism ay the Salish-Kootenai, although appearing 
to be assim ilated in  some ways, are p roud  to be a people of their own. They 
are culturally different, and w orking and  living w ith in  the confines of the 
U nited States and the state of M ontana will not change that. Forcing all 
N ative A m ericans to becom e A m erican citizens d id  no t change anything 
either. Fighting for their righ t to m aintain  jurisdiction over m atters w ith in  
their reservation in  a culturally different way, they have always faced direct 
hostility by non-Indians. A n editorial in a M ontana new spaper not only 
discusses the controversial tribal-state com pact, b u t exemplifies non-Indian 
a ttitudes tow ard  the entire concept of the N ative A m erican and the 
reservation. The letter reads:
G overnm ents, tribes infringe on rights
I think it's about tim e the non-Indian people, and  especially 
the sportsm en of our state, take note of our state and  federal
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governm ents infringing u p o n  our constitu tional rights.
I speak of ou r state m aintaining a cooperative agreem ent 
w ith  the C onfederated Sahsh and Kootenai Tribes. This 
agreem ent requires a special hun ting  perm it for anyone 
hun ting  on private  land  w ith in  the reservation  boundaries.
To this date, a jury has sta ted  four tim es tha t this provision is 
not valid, bu t our state continues to exert pressure upon  the 
sportsm en, including citations in  court. Just how  m any 
acquittals does a jury have to make in order for our state to 
adm it its mistake? W ho can forget a crow d of sportsm en being 
illegally o rdered  to leave the Lone Pine State Building so the 
tribe and state could negotiate this secret agreem ent?
The tribes have long claim ed they are a sovereign nation 
w hich can ignore federal and  state laws tha t the rest of us m ust 
abide by. Just how  m any sovereign nations w ithin our nation 
can we have? M any tribes have now  obtained status as 
"treatm ent as states" u n d er various federal environm ental 
program s.
As citizens, w hich is their right, they are elected to our state 
Legislature in w hich they help m ake laws and  taxes for all the 
o ther people in the state to obey and to pay w hile they, 
them selves and their people, are exempt. Nice, what?
The Flathead tribes are now  negotiating for control of one of 
our national treasures the N ational Bison Range at Moiese.
A long w ith it w ill go the federal N inepipe Reservoir and 
surrounding  property .
I ask that you understand  that I have no quarrel w ith  the 
Ind ian  people. It is their form  of governm ent I oppose along 
w ith  our federal Indian  policy from  W ashington, D.C..^^
A lthough the letter is polite, m any of the author's rem arks are historically 
inaccurate. For instance, a county jury has never stated that the tribal-state 
com pact is no t valid. H ow ever, there has in Del Palm ers’ case been a district 
court opinion saying the agreem ent is valid. The tw o acquittals to Del came 
only because charges w ere d ropped  by county officials. Charges w ere dropped  
either because there w ere no w itnesses or no evidence of the violation, and  
no t because the courts felt the com pact to be illegal. It is quite apparent that 
the au thor understands that there have been  m istakes m ade by state and 
federal governm ents; it is also apparen t that m ost of his blam e goes to the
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Ind ian  people. The au thor m ay not understand  tha t the tribe itself falls under 
federal laws, and they have never claim ed to be exem pt from  the ultim ate 
control of Congress. A lthough the au thor says he is opposed only to the tribal 
governm ent, and  no t to the Indians them selves, he should  know  that their 
governm ent is the representative voice of the Ind ian  people. The editorial 
appears harm less, b u t the m any attitudes expressed in the author's letter can 
m ake solutions very h ard  to find. There is no doubt tha t the author's feelings 
about the com pact as well as in ter governm ental relations are very real.
There is a sense of panic tha t N ative Am ericans are taking advantage of w hite 
A m ericans because they w ant "special " rights. Some believe that Indians 
receive m any rights and  benefits that o ther A m ericans don't. These feelings 
are at tim es based on fact, and  yet often these fears of inequality are based on 
ignorance.
It is true in  one sense that people today are not responsible for laws that 
w ere im plem ented years ago. That the land he ow ns w as opened to 
settlem ent by the U nited States governm ent is certainly not the fault of the 
w hite m an w ho ow ns a farm  or business on the reservation today. O n the 
o ther hand , it is no t the fault of today 's Salish-Kootenai tha t their forefathers 
and the federal governm ent en tered  in to  agreem ents w ith  the sovereign 
Ind ian  nations in o rder to allow  the non-Indian nation  to grow. The federal 
governm ent accepted the fact that the lands of N orth  America were legally 
"owned" by sovereign nations w ith  inheren t rights, and entered  into 
contracts w ith  them  accordingly. As part of the contract w ith  the Salish- 
Kootenai, the tribes reserved a land  base of their own. W hat the Salish- 
Kootenai fight to im plem ent on their reservation is not a direct attack on the 
non-Indians w ho live there. They w an t sim ply to m aintain  their land base
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and  their inherent right to do  so. As we view contem porary issues, we need 
to u n derstand  how  the tribes justify controlling fish and  gam e m atters on the 
reserva tion .
As m entioned before, just because laws are w ritten, they are not 
necessarily set in stone. The fact that N ative Am erican law  tends to be so 
am biguous is the reason w hy issues are still unsettled  betw een the tribes and 
state and county officials. The tribe cannot protect its values and enforce its 
law s w hen  every tim e they assert their jurisdiction their authority  is 
dism issed by those arguing that they have no right to conduct criminal 
investigations or cite individuals for crimes. O ne thing that should be set 
straight, and tha t m ost officials can agree on, is that the tribes have little 
au thority  over non-Indians w ho com m it any of the "major crim es” included 
in  the Major Cranes Act. In o ther w ords, they cannot try non-Indians in a 
tribal court for m ajor crimes. They do, how ever, have the right to conduct 
investigations and m ake arrests of those indiv iduals u n d er Public Law 280.
In addition, the case of Oliphant v. Siiqiiamish Tribe (1978) clearly allows the 
tribes the righ t to arrest and  /  or detain  non-Indians in o rder to deliver them  
to the p ro p er authorities for prosecution.
Civil au thority  is m uch less defined. Thus, jurisdiction over non-Indians 
is often left u p  to the courts to decide. It is generally agreed that offenses 
com m itted by one non-Indian to another will be handled  by state courts, as 
backed by the decision of finherf States v. McBratney (1882). Also agreed, is 
tha t in  a civil offense w here bo th  of the parties involved are Indian, the tribal 
court has full jurisdiction. If a non-Indian brings action against an Indian  in a 
situation  tha t occurred on the reservation, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe 
also occurs.20  The gap in the law  is w hen the Indian is the plaintiff, and  the
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non-Indian  is the defendant. This is often the case today w hen dealing w ith  
fish and  gam e violations on the Flathead reservation. This not only appears 
to be the one area that is not fully defined, bu t it is an  area that has become 
quite risky for the Salish-Kootenai. A negative ruling against the tribe in a 
court of law  could essentially affect tribal authority  in m any other aspects of 
se lf-governm ent.
Today the tribes appear confident in exerting their jurisdiction and are not 
totally opposed to taking risks to define their authority. W orking w ith  the 
state in  jurisdiction m atters, how ever, has always seem ed like a better answ er 
for all of those concerned. The various com pacts have allowed state and 
tribal authorities to share jurisdiction instead of risking the possibility of 
losing its authority  in  a court battle. The statute that has been the backbone of 
tribal-state compacts since the early 1960's is Public Law 280 (P.L. 280). P.L. 280 
is a federal statu te that now  allows for concurrent jurisdiction by the state and 
the tribes over m ost crimes and  several civil m atters on the reservation. It 
w as originally enacted as a federal pohcy to term inate tribal governm ents by 
once again forcing Indians into m ainstream  A m erican society. P.L. 280 came 
about due to the term ination era of the 1950's and  early 1960's during  w hich 
the federal governm ent w anted  to elim inate their trust responsibilities to 
N ative Am ericans. They thought they could do this by handing over m any 
of their responsibilities concerning N ative A m ericans to the ind iv idual 
states. N eedless to say, the term ination policy failed, and  caused great 
econom ic stress to m any N ative A m erican societies.^!
The Salish-Kootenai d id  have to consent to the im plem entation of Public 
Law 280 w hich allow ed for som e state jurisdiction on the reservation. The 
tribes gave their consent in 1963, because the law  d id  not w ithdraw  any tribal
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regulatory  authority , b u t m erely transferred  the responsibilities of jurisdiction 
by the federal governm ent to the state of M ontana. The state could then 
assum e jurisdiction over "all crim inal law s of the state of M ontana; and all 
crim inal ordinances of cities and  tow ns w ithin  the Flathead Indian 
R ese rv a tio n ."22 U nder P.L. 280 the tribes had  some authority  to try Indians 
in crim inal m atters, b u t they could not issue m ore than  a $5000 fine a n d / or 1 
year in jaü. They have been able to issue consecutive term s of the 366 day jail 
term , b u t because the sentence im posed for m ajor crimes has differed greatly 
betw een  state and tribal courts, and  because m any non-Indians have been 
extrem ely critical of the tribes judicial system, the state has usually exerted its 
au thority  over those m atters.
In the area of civil authority  und er P.L. 280, there have been eight
additional m atters that the state and tribes share authority  over, w hich are
labeled Tribal O rdinance 40-A. These areas of civil authority  have included:
"(a) Com pulsory school attendance; (b) public welfare; (c) dom estic 
relations (except adoptions); (d) m ental health, insanity, care of the 
infirm , aged and  afflicted; (e) juvenile delinquency and youth  
rehabilitation; (f) adoption  proceedings (with consent of the Tribal 
Court); (g) abandoned, dependent, neglected, orphaned or abused 
children; (h) operation of m otor vehicles upon  the public streets, 
alleys, roads, and  h i g h w a y s . " 2 3
A lthough there is concurrent jurisdiction over O rdinance 40-A, the federal
governm ent could no t transfer any m ore jurisdiction to the state than  it
already possessed. Thus, there are specific term s that exclude the state from
having jurisdiction over Ind ian  p roperty  , including the w ater rights of that
property , and  that excludes state jurisdiction over Ind ian  hunting  and  fishing
activities.
A lthough P.L. 280 enhances sovereignty in som e aspects, it has restricted it 
in  others, p rom pting  the Salish-Kootenai to w ant to w ithd raw  from  the
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agreem ent. Because P.L. 280 w as im plem ented only upon  the consent of the 
tribes, they w ere suppose to be able to w ithd raw  from  the agreem ent w ithin 
tw o years if dissatisfied. W hen the tribes becam e dissatisfied w ith the 
arrangem ents, they a ttem pted  to w ithd raw  their consent b u t to no avail. The 
M ontana Suprem e C ourt ru led  in 1972 that these attem pts w ere invalid. 
A pparently  M ontana G overnor Babcock had  issued an  extension of the 
w ithdraw al deadhne, b u t the court ru led  that Babcock d id  not have the 
authority  to extend tha t tim e p e r i o d . ^4
In 1991 the tribes again m ade it clear tha t they w ished to back out of their 
com pacts stem m ing from  P.L. 280 and Tribal O rdinance 40-A. They w anted 
the federal governm ent to take control over the jurisdiction that the state had  
assum ed. The m ain feeling in the tribes at this time w as that although the 
state h ad  concurrent jurisdiction over eight civil m atte rs/law s, the tribes had  
been the prim ary providers of services for a num ber of years. In addition, 
they had  retained their decision for au thority  over those m atters.
Retrocession w ould sim ply "officially" revest the tribes w ith  exclusive 
jurisdiction in  areas of a u th o r i ty .R e tro c e s s io n  w ould  not affect tribal 
jurisdiction over m ajor crimes. It w ould  only revest the federal governm ent 
w ith  jurisdiction over m ajor crimes, w hether by an  Ind ian  or non-Indian. 
Retrocession w ould  elim inate m ost state jurisdiction unless a state-tribal 
agreem ent of a particu lar sort was seen as desirable by the tribes. Financially, 
this w ould  be to the advantage of non-Indians living on the reservation, 
because they w ould no longer have to financially support the state b u rd en  of 
paying for jurisdiction. A lthough m any Indians do not pay local property  
taxes, they do  pay federal income tax, and  w ould therefore contribute equally 
to the financing of federal jurisdiction on the reservation. This could result
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in great savings in  state and county budgets. A lthough the tribes fought for 
quite som e time to back ou t of the com pact agreem ent, the bill they proposed 
to the Legislature w as essentially ignored. This tried the tribes’ patience, as 
tribal C hairm an Mickey Pablo w rote to M ontana Senate President Joe 
M azurek: "As a sovereign nation, it is dem eaning for us to p lead for that 
w hich w e believe our governm ent is rightfully entitled  to and  w hich w as 
denied us in  1963: the right to w ithd raw  our consent w hen we believe the 
tim e is right.
Since the 1960's, the tribes have shared jurisdiction w ith  the state of 
M ontana over m isdem eanor cases involving Indians, and  over eight areas of 
civil law, b u t the tw o authorities have had  a long tough road  figuring out 
exactly w ho has jurisdiction in certain areas of fish and game. A nything not 
specifically w orked ou t in laws and litigation is basically up  for grabs." The 
uncertainty  in the com pact over areas of civil m atters and particularly fish 
and  gam e has sparked long years of pro test by non-Indians of the Flathead 
reservation .
There are several historical questions of authority  that still need answ ers 
today. For instance, the controversy over ow nership of fish and gam e grew  by 
the late 1970’s. In addition  to figuring ou t the details of authority  over 
people, the question of w ho "owned" the wildlife had  several possible 
answers, depending  on w hom  you consulted. The state claim ed in 1978, that 
because they m anaged m ost areas of M ontana Fish and Game they ought to 
have control over all w ildlife in M ontana. They believed their au thority  
should  include the Flathead Reservation w ith in  the state of M ontana. The 
tribes asserted  tha t wildlife existing on the reservation w as ow ned by the tribe, 
and  should  therefore be m anaged by the tribe. The problem  in deciding
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jurisd iction  is com plicated by the m igrations of fish and gam e, so tha t their 
"ownership" is no t likely to be easily defined.
A rgum ents over control tu rned  into a serious d ispu te in Decem ber of 1978, 
after a conflict betw een  the tribes and  state over a hun ting  violation 
involving b ighorn  sheep. The privately  ow ned island on the reservation 's 
F lathead Lake w as hom e to m any b ighorn sheep. A pparently  one of the 
b ighorns left the island to cross the lake w hen it w as frozen, and w as then 
killed by a N ative A m erican hunter. The state w as in the process of buying 
the island from  the owners, and  in addition, the state Fish and Game 
D epartm ent had  been restocking and  relocating fish and gam e on the 
reservation. They believed it w as w ith in  their jurisdiction to prosecute the 
h un te r in  violation of illegally killing a b ighorn sheep. Essentially the state 
w as arguing that they "owned" the wildlife on the reservation, and  especially 
if the gam e was found to be on state or fee status property. D uring the 
jurisdiction d ispute over the hunter, the state also decided to proceed in 
m oving 75-100 b ighorn sheep off of the island because of overgrazing, and 
relocate them  in another area. The state had  already illegally confiscated the 
carcass of the bighorn from  the hunter, and  w hen the tribes dem anded it back, 
the state refused. The tribes w ere unable to prosecute the violator w ithout 
the evidence.
The tribes disagreed w ith  the State Fish and  Game D epartm ent over 
jurisdiction in  bo th  the prosecution and in the relocation of b ighorn on the 
reservation. First of aU, prosecuting  hun ting  violations is the responsibility 
of the tribe w hen it involves a tribal m em ber, and  secondly, the tribes 
believed tha t the wildlife w ith in  the confines of their reserve w ere ow ned by 
the tribe. As the conflict of 1978 increased, the issue becam e less about the
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actual hun ting  violation th an  about governm ent au thority  to relocate the 
sheep off of the reservation. Tribal C ouncilm an Tom  "Bearhead" Swaney 
refused to allow the Fish and  Game D epartm ent to relocate the wildlife. His 
refusal stem m ed from  the fear tha t such a concession w ould erode the tribes' 
treaty  rights to the anim als on the reservation. The conflict w ent on for 
m onths, and  the tribes broke off negotiations w ith  the state over the re tu rn  of 
the carcass from  the hun ting  violation. The tribal council then  threatened 
other action if the sheep carcass w as no t re tu rned  to the tribes. The state Fish 
and G am e D epartm ent only reaffirm ed their position of authority  over the 
bighorn, and  suggested that they w ould pursue the right to extend their 
jurisdiction over all big gam e on the reservation. Because of the way this 
m ajor conflict w as handled, Tom  Swaney w as stripped  of his seat as chairm an 
by the tribe. A lthough there w ere perhaps other reasons for letting Swaney 
go, the tribe beheved tha t he had  "created a crisis w ith  the state" concerning 
gam e on the reservation. The tribe could no t afford to be that bold at the 
time, because they realized a heated  confrontation m eant a possible loss of 
control over all tribal game.
Vice C hairm an Pablo, w ho becam e chairm an after Swaney departed, stated 
tha t he w as not sure w hether or not he w ould back dow n from  Swaney*s firm  
stance against the state, b u t in the end agreed to com prom ise. The final 
agreem ent over the b ighorn  controversy w as indeed a com prom ise on the 
p art of the tribe, b u t the tribes could no t afford any crisis over jurisdiction, 
and  negotiated accordingly. They agreed that the state and  the tribes w ould 
trap  tw enty-five b ighorn  and relocate them  on the reservation. The tribe 
w ould  have to reim burse the state for trapping  and  transporting  the sheep.
All in all the tribe w as to pay for one-quarter of all trapping  costs for the re-
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location of approxim ately 102 sheep, yet they w ould not m anage any of the 
relocated animals. The state got control of o ther b ighorn  transplants as well, 
b u t the contract h ad  no provisions for the fu tu re  m anagem ent of sheep on 
the island by either the state or the tribes. W hat the tribes got ou t of this deal 
w as an  avoidance of any m ajor litigation w ith  the state w hile keeping a hand 
in  the m anagem ent of big gam e on their reservation. The state also kept their 
au thority  over gam e on the reservation and received financial help to foot 
the bill for gam e m anagem ent goals.
The controversy served to show  just how  touchy and unstable tribal 
jurisdiction is. The tribes are aw are that a lthough C hairm an Swaney’s 
m ethods of negotiating w ith  the state w ere hardhned , such a stance is 
desirable at times. If a situation arises w here the tribes have a safe 
opportun ity  to negotiate in  this m anner they will do  so. They are also aw are 
of how  em otional the issues of jurisdiction on the reservation can be. To 
m aintain  their authority , the tribe needs to be able to negotiate in good faith 
w ith  o ther authorities, and  som etim es even negotiate at a loss to m aintain  
tribal sovereignty. In  o ther w ords, it is likely that the tribe agreed to pay for 
p a rt of the state's relocation of the b ighorn  and forego jurisdictional disputes 
over that process, so tha t they could m aintain authority  over other big gam e 
on the reservation. A negotiation tha t w as pleasing to the state, on the other 
hand , m otivated them  to back off of their threats to control ^  of the big gam e
on the reservation.27
1979 w as an intense year for the tribes. After dealing w ith  the conflict w ith  
the sta te ’s Fish and  Game D epartm ent over the bighorn, A1 Bishop, the 
com m issioner of the same departm ent, decided to sue the tribes over hun ting  
rights off of the reservation. Bishop believed tha t Indian  harvests of gam e off
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of the reserve w as taking aw ay from  the harvest available to non-Indian 
hunters. A lthough this thesis does no t a ttem pt to cover hun ting  conflicts off 
of the reservation, this story is w orth  m entioning, in tha t it gives us an  idea 
of the intensity w ith  w hich the tribes are h it from  all sides of any given issue. 
N ot only w ere the Salish-Kootenai accused of dim inishing the sta te’s wildlife, 
b u t to back up  the argum ent, they w ere all accused of being "anti­
conservationists." "They'll kill anything," Com m issioner Bishop w as quoted  
as s a y i n g . 2 8  in  add ition  to dealing w ith  an  adm inistration  on a political level, 
the tribes w ere still dealing w ith  people w ho had  negative stereotypes of 
Indians. U nfortunately, stereotypes m ake solutions to any given problem  
alm ost im possible to find.
N on-Indians should realize that because the Salish-Kootenai are culturally 
different, they m ay choose to do  things a little differently than  state program s 
dictate, b u t this certainly does not m ake them  any less know ledgeable in  a 
given area. The Salish-Kootenai have and  will continue to have different 
ideas about how  things should operate for the benefit of the tribe. Ironically 
enough, criticism of the tribe is often highest w hen  the tribal system  im itates 
tha t of non-Indians. A n exam ple is the anti-conservationist accusations from  
Com m issioner Bishop. At this tim e the tribes already h ad  an  intense gam e 
protection program , wildlife p lanning by gam e biologists, and enforcem ent of 
gam e violations by tribal gam e w ardens.^^ Even back in the 1940's, several 
im portan t ordinances for the pro tection  and  conservation of wildlife had  
been enacted by the tribes. They enforced p roper practices in trapping and 
selling beaver furs, and  had  regulations for the killing of deer and elk, and for 
netting  fish.^0 addition, in 1979 the C onfederated Salish-Kootenai Tribes 
becam e the first and  only Indian  g roup  in  the U nited States to create a
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w ilderness area on their reserve. The Tribal Recreation D epartm ent w as self- 
supporting  from  the revenue of non-tribal m em ber perm its for recreational 
use of tribal land .^ l
M uch of the m edia coverage of fish and  gam e issues u p  until the m id to 
late 1970's featured  non-Indian concerns about the m anner in w hich Indians 
w ere using the recourses on the reservation. W hen looking over the events 
reported  from  the reservation  during  this time, the reader finds m ost of the 
conflict still had  to do  w ith  fishing and  hun ting  violations by tribal m em bers, 
just as it had  in the past. By the late 1970's, how ever, views som ew hat flip- 
flopped again. Tribal m em bers had  estabhshed a w ilderness, and had  m ade 
the w ildhfe and environm ent m uch m ore than  just a personal concern.
These issues w ere consistently a part of the political agenda, and the tribal 
governm ent once again began concentrating on legal protection of tribal land  
and recourses. They drafted  additional fishing and hun ting  rules and 
regulations of their own, and  continued to seek au thority  over those w ho 
com m itted crimes against these regulations. Just as we have seen in  the past, 
there w as great opposition to the tribes w hen they asserted their control over 
tribal land  and wildlife, affecting non-Ind ian  hun ters on the reservation. 
N on-Indians com plained of discrim ination, especially w hen tribal lands w ere 
closed to hunting  and recreation. Of course the tribal council often restricted 
its ow n m em bers w hen it came to fishing and hunting, b u t only w hen  they 
felt it w as absolutely necessary. The tribes had  the right to close tribal lands 
sim ply because they are privately ow ned by the tribes. From  the tribal 
standpoint, it w as a perfectly acceptable thing to do. After all, whites do not 
allow  Indians to fish, hunt, or recreate on their p rivate  land. The resources 
on tribal land are there for fu ture use of the Salish-Kootenai, and  they should
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be allow ed to control the use of them  as they see fit. But the fact that non- 
Indians are being lim ited to hun ting  areas, charged for a tribal perm it to hunt, 
and  having to answ er to the tribes over gam e regulations, have angered 
m any non-Indians.
The early 1980's b rough t m any of the same disputes over jurisdiction, bu t
the conflict w as fairly subdued. The tribes asserted them selves w ith
confidence, and m any issues seem ed to fall into place. D uring the early
1980's, m any p roperty  ow ners on Flathead Lake and in the state of M ontana
w ere upset about the 1977 tribal-im posed Shoreline Protection O rdinance. In
short, this ordinance m aintained w ater quality standards. By 1982 some w ho
believed tha t tribes should  have no authority  in regulating their riparian
rights had  ended u p  losing their rights in  a court of law. Originally, the
Federal District C ourt ru led against the tribes, bu t they appealed. In the
appeal, the court "recognized tha t Tribal pow er can extend to activities of non
m em bers on fee lands in such circum stances b u t only if there is a tribal
in terest sufficient to justify Tribal regulation ."32 The decision of the court
had  been partially influenced by a case the preceding year that involved the
Crow  Tribe in M ontana. The ruling in the Bighorn River case, stated  that if
Indians can prove tha t an  issue is adversely affecting the tribes, there is a
possible reason to allow for tribal authority  over non-Indians. In the case of
the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Montana the ruling stated that:
The conduct tha t the Tribes seek to regulate in the instant 
case—generally speaking, the use of the bed and  banks of the 
sou th  half of Flathead Lake—has the potential for significantly 
affecting the economy, welfare, and  health  of the Tribes. Such 
conduct, if unregulated , could increase w ater pollution, dam age 
the ecology of the lake, interfere w ith  treaty fishing rights, or 
o therw ise harm  the lake, w hich is one of the m ost im portan t
t r i b a l  r e s o u r c e s . 3 3
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The U nited States Suprem e C ourt denied  a petition  for review  in the 
F lathead Lake case, and  w ith  some general rules of jurisdiction being 
reaffirm ed in that case, the Salish-Kootenai proceeded to develop plans to 
w ork  o u t a new  agreem ent w ith  the state over gam e m anagem ent. The 
outcom e of the case certainly helped p u t the tribes in a better bargaining 
position for au thority  over gam e m atters, and  especially those issues 
pertaining to fish. The term s of the com pact began to be discussed in  1986, 
and  took several years of planning. In 1987, the tribes further asserted their 
right to control fish and gam e by passing Tribal H unting  and Fishing 
O rdinance 44-D, allowing the tribes to assert their jurisdiction over gam e 
th roughout the entire reservation. The tribes’ decision to pass 44-D w as then 
approved  by the Secretary of the Interior. Tribal jurisdiction over fishing and  
hun ting  by non-Indians evoked great protest, and  in  Septem ber of that year, 
220 people w ere organized by the group All Citizens Equal (ACE) to discuss 
their opposition to the ordinance w ith  M ontana governor Ted Schwinden.
In addition  to protesting the ordinance, they pro tested  the tribal-state 
negotiating sessions that began in  1986. In  their view  the sessions violated 
M ontana's open m eeting law, because the tribes often m et in  private w ith  
state officials to discuss m atters. They also voiced concern tha t their 
constitutional rights w ere violated because they w ere not a part of the 
decision m aking process th rough  voting. The state responded  by inform ing 
them  that both  state and tribal officials had  agreed that any com pacts reached 
w ould  have scheduled hearings and  a com plete review  by the public. M uch 
to the dissatisfaction of non-tribal and  All Citizens Equal m em bers. G overnor 
Schw inden stated  in his Septem ber m eeting tha t the Salish-Kootenai have 
rights based on treaties and Congressional and executive acts. He also cited
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the B ighorn River Case in w hich bo th  state and tribal rights w ere addressed. 
The case, he said, exem plified the tribes' re ten tion  of inheren t authority  over 
non-Indians in  m atters adversely affecting the welfare of the tribes.
Schw inden also backed the tribes' righ t to closed door sessions in particular 
cases, stating that everyone he m eets w ith  has that r i g h t . ^4
The tribes. G overnor Schw inden, and  the D epartm ent of Fish, Wildlife 
and Parks soon came to an agreem ent concerning the tribes' jurisdiction over 
wildlife. T hroughout 1987 the tribes pushed  to gain control over m ost 
reservation  wildlife issues . They in tended  to contract w ith  the federal 
governm ent for m any of the w ildlife functions of the Flathead Agency 
They also m ade agreem ents w ith  counties lying w ithin  the reservation 
boundaries. Some of these counties agreed to acknow ledge that ultim ate 
au thority  over land-use p lanning belonged to the t r i b e s . T h e  fish and gam e 
agreem ent betw een the tribal and  the state governm ents was m ade in hopes 
tha t it w ould  ease jurisdictional disputes. The com pact called for joint 
m anagem ent, cross deputization  of w ardens, and a joint license for non-tribal 
residents of the reservation. The joint license w as to satisfy the com plaints of 
non-Indians over having to purchase tw o perm its, and  also requests tha t it be 
reasonably priced. In addition, the tribal-state com pact envisioned tha t non- 
Indians w ho com m itted fishing and b ird  hun ting  violations on tribal land 
w ould be tried  in tribal court, and  if violations w ere com m itted on state 
lands, the violators w ould be tried in state court. The pact w ould also create a 
local reservation  fish and gam e board  of Indians and non-Indian residents. 
A lthough  the tribe w as still having to com prom ise regard ing  sole jurisdiction 
over their resources, the com pact w as an im provem ent over expensive 
litigation. The tribes signed the agreem ent in the later p a rt of 1988. A t this
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tim e. G overnor Schw inden was just leaving office, and the final signing of 
the pact by the state was then  left up  to the new  governor, Stan Stephens.37
The new  adm inistration  u n d er governor S tephens d id  not believe tha t the 
tribes had  m ade enough concessions. They opposed non-Indians ever being 
tried  in  Ind ian  courts for fish and gam e violations, as well as other aspects of 
Ind ian  jurisdiction over w hites. G overnor S tephens's opposition to tribal 
authority  forced the tribes and the state to start over in  bargaining for a final 
agreem ent. The state d rafted  a new  proposal for the tribes to sign, b u t m uch 
to their surprise, the tribes strongly rejected it. Various aspects of the 
agreem ent itself w ere rejected because it requ ired  too m uch com prom ise on 
behalf of the tribes, b u t Stephens’s accusations tha t tribal w ardens w ere not 
adequately trained w ere quite offensive as well. Stephens apparently  believed 
tha t cross-deputization could not be adequately attained  until tribal w ardens 
w ere trained in the same m anner as state w ardens. To him, graduation  from  
M ontana Law Enforcem ent A cadem y was a m ust.^^ In this sense he ignored 
the tribes' right to im plem ent authority  in a culturally different way and 
appeared  to have little respect for tribal sovereignty.
The tribes' fear that the state w as seizing their authority  brought on a 
stalem ate in w hich each side refused com prom ise. In February of 1990, the 
tribal council threatened to close over 600,000 acres of tribal land to non- 
Ind ian  hun ters and  recreationists if S tephens d id n 't sign the com pact tha t had  
previously been agreed u p o n . 3 9  That year also found a law suit filed on behalf 
of the Salish-Kootenai against the state, claim ing the inheren t righ t to 
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-m em bers concerning fish and game. The 
follow ing year the tribes began w ithdraw ing  from  the 1965 agreem ent to share 
jurisdiction betw een the state and the tribes, hoping to share those
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responsibilities w ith  the federal governm ent instead. The bill to w ithdraw  
from  Public Law 280 w as called H ouse Bill 797, and  w ould essentially give 
total au thority  over m inor crimes to the tribal governm ent.40 Shared 
jurisdiction was no t w orking for the tribes in its curren t form  because they 
could no t hold  their ow n court, conduct their ow n policing, or set their own 
penalties for crim es com m itted .^l Retrocession continued to be negotiated 
betw een the state and tribes over the next few years. The m ain opposition 
stem m ed from  the tribes' desire to have sole jurisdiction over all F lathead 
resident m isdem eanor crimes. N on-Indians w ere afraid this jurisdiction 
w ould  in the fu tu re  lead to total tribal au thority  over non-Indian violations 
like fish and  gam e m atters.42
Because of state opposition to sole tribal jurisdiction. H ouse Bill 797 lay 
dead  in  the legislature and  w as rein troduced at a later date as Senate Bill 368. 
That bill w ould allow the tribes only partia l w ithdraw al from  their earlier 
com pact w ith  the state. W hen Senate Bill 368 passed, the tribe regained 
partia l legal jurisdiction on their reservation. The bill agreed that the tribes 
w ould  have jurisd iction  in all m isdem eanor crim es involving tribal 
m em bers, and  in felonies and civil cases after consultation w ith the state.43 
By M ay of 1993, the state and  the tribes started  dividing up  their new  duties 
u n d er Senate Bill 368, and  eventually created a cross-deputization proposal 
tha t law  enforcem ent agencies on the reservation could sign onto. A ccording 
to the state, M issoula, Sanders, and Flathead counties as well as the cities of 
Ronan, H o t Springs and  St.Ignatius, the pact tha t re tu rned  some of the law  
enforcem ent pow er to the tribes w as w orking well, and had  been signed by 
m ost of the authorities.44
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A lthough Senate Bill 368 concentrated on the transfer of authority  over 
tribal m em bers from  the state, it d id  reinforce tribal jurisdiction over w hites 
in som e instances. The tribes are not allow ed to try non-Indians in a tribal 
court, b u t they can investigate a crim e and  cite a non-Indian under tribal 
jurisdiction if they need to m ake an  arrest.^5 Protests continue because the 
tribes have gained g round  in  asserting their au thority  over non-Indians. 
Those in opposition assert tha t it is illegal for the tribes to have any 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and  illegal for the state to enter into such an  
agreem ent w ith  the tribes. It should  be understood , how ever, that higher 
courts have upheld  the decision tha t anytim e a non-Indian  or a non-Indian 
organization such as the state enters into a relationship w ith  the tribes by 
consent, the tribes have the potential to m aintain  civil au thority  over non- 
Indians. In effect, the courts have affirm ed the state's righ t to enter into 
agreem ents w ith  tribes, as weU as tribal au thority  in  concurrent jurisdiction 
over persons in civil actions.
Tribal sentiments and legal justification of issues
H ow  do the tribes justify their sentim ents and  actions over the issues 
perta in ing  to gam e on their reservation? We can understand  tribal 
sentim ents by looking at how  the Indians justify their attem pts to control the 
outcom e of events. U nder Senate Bill 368 that becam e law  in  1993, the tribes 
partially  w ithdrew  from  their joint jurisdiction w ith  the state. This act gave 
them  m ore control over various legal m atters on the reservation, and  gave 
them  sole jurisdiction over their ow n tribal m em bers. N on-Indians are 
afraid of having to fall u n d er the jurisdiction of the Tribal C ourt if they 
becom e plaintiffs u n d er the bill, and  have becom e extrem ely critical of the
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entire tribal legal system. There has been an  expectation on the part of m any 
people and  their representative governm ents for the Salish-Kootenai to act as 
a subm issive, secondary force on their ow n reservation. This im age is 
partially  reinforced every tim e the tribes com prom ise in decisions concerning 
authority. A lthough the im age is certainly not desired by the tribal 
governm ent, they do  beheve tha t com prom ise is the best w ay for them  to 
succeed, benefit and  profit. Tribal decisions in the field of politics and law 
have for quite some time been a crafty balance of their ow n cultural needs 
w ith  the needs of their non-Indian  neighbors in  o rder to avoid m ajor 
criticism, factions, and  conflict.
The tribes are convinced that generally, non-Indians are over-critical of the 
tribal legal system, forgetting not only that there are cultural differences, bu t 
tha t there is sim ply no legal system  that is perfect. The tribes m ust surely 
w onder w hy non-Indians are so critical of another cu lture’s system  w hen it 
has failed to perfect its own. N o governm ent can be perfect or fair in  every 
case and all politics and  laws are culturally relevant to one's ow n people. Yet 
in the eyes of m any non-Indians, the tribal governm ent m ust ru n  at a level 
close to perfection and should totally em ulate su rrounding  cultures, if it is to 
rem ain in a position of authority . A rgum ents perta in ing  to Senate Bill 368 
are good exam ples of non-Indian fears in the realm  of tribal jurisdiction. The 
bill gives the tribe total au thority  only in cases w hen their ow n tribal 
m em bers are defendants, b u t w hites and county officials on the reservation 
persisten tly  w orry  tha t non-Indians falling u n d er tribal jurisdiction will 
receive different treatm ent in the tribal courts than  they w ould in  the state 
system. Even m ore of a concern to some county officials is tha t Indian  
defendants will receive different treatm ent in tribal courts than  in the state
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system. Even M ontana A ttorney G eneral Joe M azurek w as quoted in 1993 as 
saying that equal guidelines for penalties need to be agreed upon  by both  state 
an  tribal o f f i c i a l s . 4 7  f o r  the m ost part, the criticism comes not from  actual 
com plaints of w hites being treated  unfairly. It stem s from  the fact that the 
tribal court does not have a definite separation of pow ers, and therefore is 
perceived to be biased and  runn ing  w ithout checks and  balances. Non- 
Indians w orry  about the severity of the penalty  that Indian judges will p u t on 
o ther Indians. It is true that the sentences m ay vary depending on the 
situation, bu t there is no doubt in the m inds of the tribal court that all people 
will be treated  fairly. The Sahsh-Kootenai legal system  m ay ru n  differently, 
b u t the judges and  their courts are operating for the very same purpose that 
the state system  is...justice.
Because the tw o justice system s operate differently, the Salish-Kootenai are 
expected to set new  guidelines and w ork th rough  the m any concerns of state 
officials concerning their legal system. This being the case, w hat exactly is left 
for the tribes to say in their ow n self-governm ent? The concerns tha t come 
w ith  Senate Bill 368 are a small b u t perfect exam ple of one of the m any ways 
in w hich the tribes are expected to com prom ise w hen  dealing w ith outside 
forces. They dem onstrate the contradictions implicitly in the com plaints of 
m any non-Indians. O n the one hand  they argue tha t the Salish-Kootenai 
carmot an d  do  no t have the "know how" to take care of political m atters on  
their reservation. O n the other hand, w henever the tribes have decided to 
em erge from  beneath  o ther governm ental control, they are stopped 
im m ediately. N on-Indians show  disrespect for Ind ian  ideas that could w ork  
to benefit the tribe and  relieve the state financial b u rd en  that so m any non- 
Indians w orry  about. Even w hen  initiatives or laws pass to benefit the Salish-
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Kootenai, it does not necessarily m ean that the tribe has actually been given 
the freedom  and  the tools to attain  the goals a t hand. There are alm ost always 
non-Indian  officials w ho seem to have better answ ers for everything. This is 
the problem  that in the past has forced Indians into dependency, and  the 
Salish-Kootenai feel this sam e im pact of paternalism  today. They can hardly 
m ove w ithout criticism, and  a p lan  is alm ost always conjured up  by outside 
officials to m ake sure tha t the tribes operate on a level that can be understood 
by non-Indians.
Because the tribes are p u t on the spot by the state and its people to justify 
their au thority  in  another culture 's legal term s, they have general guidelines 
they can use w hen  justifying their actions in reservation m atters. It is helpful 
to examine a general outline of tribal regulations that w as prepared  for the 
Indian  Law Support Center in Colorado. The outline will no t give us the 
specifics for Sahsh-Kootenai control over fish and game, b u t it wiU reveal the 
reasoning behind  the argum ents used by the Salish-Kootenai. These 
argum ents are their legal strength  in their efforts to control fish, gam e and 
o ther tribal recourses.
The Tribal Regulation Manual  states that there are basically three major 
sources of tribal regulatory  pow er, and  three m ajor sources of hm itations on 
tha t pow er. The sources for pow er (especially in  decisions dealing w ith  non- 
Indians) are:
1. The inherent sovereignty source.
2. The pow er to exclude source.
3. The federal delegation source.
Inherent sovereignty is not recognized as a reahty by non-Indians w ho 
oppose Ind ian  control or the concept of an Ind ian  reservation. W hen 
discussing tribal sovereignty, m any do not fully u n derstand  how  the term  is
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applied  to N ative Am ericans. The term  "sovereign" needs to be understood  
as a principle of vested pow ers in an Indian  tribe. Sovereignty is not 
"granted" to Indians by the U nited States Congress, and neither are those 
pow ers inherent in the term  itself. The pow ers to choose a form  of 
governm ent, to adop t self-governm ent, to define m em bership, to levy taxes, 
to regulate p roperty  w ith in  the jurisdiction of the tribes, and  to adm inister 
justice are all inherent in  the term  sovereign. This sovereignty was 
recognized w hen the tribes first en tered into relations w ith  the federal 
governm ent. Tribal sovereignty is lim ited because the Salish-Kootenai tribes 
are a "dependent sovereign," b u t their sovereignty has never been 
extinguished. For instance, they have lost some pow ers that the state of 
M ontana still retains as a sovereign, b u t in reality the state is a dependent 
sovereign as weU. In  particular, the tribes have lost the pow er to transfer 
tribal land  w ithout federal approval, to carry on relations w ith  nations other 
than  the U nited States, to regulate non-Indians w hen  there is no direct threat 
to tribal interests, and  to im pose pun ishm en t on non-Indian o f  f e n d e r s . 4 8  
The federal governm ent and  the state of M ontana build  relations w ith  the 
Salish-Kootenai w ith in  the confines of the term  sovereignty. A few out of 
m any Suprem e C ourt and  state decisions tha t upho ld  sovereignty of N ative 
A m ericans provide good examples. United States v. Wheeler (1978) decreed 
that tribal laws could be enforced in  tribal forum s, Williams v. Lee (1959) 
upheld  the decision tha t N ative A m ericans could im pose (levy) taxes for 
regulatory  and revenue raising purposes, and  Montana v. United States 
(1981) fount that tribes have the pow er to regulate the conduct of non-tribal 
m em bers w ho enter into a consensual relationship  w ith  the tribe, or w hose
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conduct directly affects or threatens a significant tribal interest.49 Yvonne T. 
K night sum s it u p  in  the tribal regulation m anual by stating that:
Tribes are considered to be sovereigns com pletely separate from 
the state and  federal governm ents in the sense tha t tribal 
sovereign pow ers derive from  the consent of separate peoples 
w hose governm ents w ere in  existence at the time Europeans 
entered  this country. Since tribal governm ent p redate the 
form ation of the state and  federal governm ents, and  are not 
derived  from  or dependen t upon  the federal constitution, tribal 
governm ents are not bound  by the provisions of the federal
c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^ ^
Sovereignty encom passes and  justifies the Salish-Kootenai right to regulate 
the conduct of others if it threatens a tribal interest. It also gives them  the 
right to tax. The fish and  gam e perm it im posed upon  non-Indian F lathead 
residents is just such a tax. In addition, because sovereign tribal governm ents 
p redate  the constitution, and  the reservation itself p redates the form ation of 
the state of M ontana, tribal rights are no t always restricted to the provisions of 
the U nited States constitution or the provisions of the state.
The second source of pow er for the tribe to regulate is called the pow er to 
exclude. This essentially m eans tha t tribal m em bers can exclude non­
m em bers or non-residents from  any tribaUy ow ned property. In regard  to fish 
and game, this source of pow er has been reduced greatly for the Sahsh- 
Kootenai. In the Treaty of 1855, the "pow er to exclude" m eant exclusive 
rights to game, especially inside of their reservation boundaries. The Salish- 
Kootenai have used the pow er to exclude as a bargaining tool several times 
over the years w hen  deahng w ith  state-tribal compacts. Their tool w as the 
th rea t of closing tribal lands to hun ting  and  recreation for non-tribal 
m em bers, if they could not reach agreem ents w ith  outside authorities. C ourt 
decisions like Mern'on v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1980) reinforce this pow er for
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the tribes by ruling that the pow er to exclude blends w ith  the tribes' pohce 
pow er. "Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landow ner as well as 
the rights of a local governm ent, dom inion as well as sovereignty."^!
The th ird  source of pow er tribes can use to regulate m atters on the 
reservation, is the federal delegation source. In other w ords. Congress can 
delegate authority  to the tribes, and this allows the tribes to preem pt state law. 
In this case, they w ould not necessarily be forced to adm inister justice w ith 
s t a t e  i n t e r e s t s  i n  m i n d . In the case of Mesca/ero Apache Tribe v. State of  
New Mexico (1980) applicable treaties and federal statutes preem pted state 
gam e laws, therefore allowing the tribe to enforce its game laws against non- 
tribal m em bers on tribal lands. The state of N ew  Mexico had  previously been 
illegally exerting their jurisdiction over w hites and  enforcing state gam e laws 
on the reservation.
In spite of their pow ers to regulate, tribes face several lim its on their 
authority. The lim itations are often m ore defined than  the pow ers to 
regulate, b u t are still quite complex. A lthough they do  lim it power, the 
am biguity in their definitions can som etim es w ork to benefit the tribes. The 
follow ing are several lim itations of pow er im posed upon  the tribes.
1. Limitations based on treaties and statutes.
2. Limits im plied from  the dependen t nation status of tribes.
3. Limitations based on tribal constitutions.
Lim itations based on  treaties and  statutes begin by defining "Indian 
country," or w ho can regulate w hat areas, and  go on  to include the federal 
governm ent's delegation to the states of its jurisdiction over Indian country. 
For the Salish-Kootenai, lim itations on jurisd ic tion  over non-m em bers come 
from  defining w hat areas inside the reservation  the tribes have authority  
over, a question raised by the fact that the reservation w as opened up  to non-
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Ind ian  hom esteading. It is argued that those sections of land  sold to non- 
Indians are no longer part of Indian  country  nor do  they fall und er tribal 
jurisdiction. It has always been  assum ed that fee paten ted  land w as outside of 
reservation  au thority  because of Congressional in ten t to elim inate the 
reservation  th rough  allotm ent pohcies. But the Suprem e C ourt has held that 
the act of opening u p  the reservation to non-Indians does not alone 
term inate the reservation  or re-define "Indian c o u n t r y . "^3 As a result, this 
lim itation has never been  strictly defined in the eyes of N ative Americans.
Public Law 280 can also serve as a Umitation based on a federal statute.
That law  delegated jurisdiction over m ost crimes and a few civil m atters on 
reservations to the state. The Salish-Kootenai en tered  into this agreem ent in 
1963 w hen the tribes d id  not have the financial resources to assum e major 
areas of jurisdiction. The tribes are beginning to rise above the lim itations of 
PubUc Law 280, how ever, because it does allow for retrocession of jurisdiction 
back to the federal governm ent from  the states at the request of the tribes. As 
we have seen, the C onfederated Tribes form ally began partial w ithdraw al in 
1993. The tribes state that there are tw o basic reasons for w ithdraw ing from  
the provisions of the law:
1. To assum e m ore responsibihty over their people and  affairs 
in  an effort to realize greater self-determ ination , and
2. To foster a com prehensive system  of justice responsive to the 
unique cultural, social, and  rehabilitative needs of their p e o p l e . ^4
The tribes' ability to gain m ore authority  over Indians and  m atters affecting 
the w ell-being of their people, will determ ine just how  hm iting the current 
com pact w ith  the state will be u n d er Public Law  280.
O ther hm itations on the tribes have been im plied from  the dependent 
nation  status, and this is certainly an im portan t one to discuss from  the
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Salish-Kootenai po in t of view. The general rule for determ ining lim its in 
this case is that tribal sovereign pow ers are implicitly lim ited (due to their 
dependen t nation status) in those areas w here tribal pow ers are in conflict 
w ith  overrid ing  national interests. The Suprem e C ourt has identified four 
instances involving relations betw een  tribes and  non-m em bers in w hich 
inheren t tribal sovereign pow ers have been  divested because the dependen t 
nation  status implicitly requires that tribal pow ers not conflict w ith 
overrid ing  national interests.^^ The four instances are as foUows: (1) The 
tribes can no longer alienate the land they occupy to non-Indians. In other 
w ords, Indian title to land could be extinguished by  the U nited States if they 
show a valid need and  clearly inform  the tribe of their in tent to do so.^6 (2) 
They carm ot enter in to  com m ercial or governm ental relations w ith  foreign 
nations, (3) they carmot try non-m em bers in  an  Ind ian  court, and (4) they 
cannot assert civil au thority  over non-m em bers. The last two definitions, 
how ever, have several exceptions that have specifically affected the 
C onfederated Sahsh-Kootenai Tribes. These exceptions are im portan t w hen 
view ing today's jurisdictional confhct over fish an d  game. The courts have 
identified tw o exceptions w hen  the tribes w ould  m aintain  civil authority  
over non-Indians:
1. W hen the non-m em ber enters in to  consensual relationships 
w ith  the tribe or its m embers, and
2. W hen the conduct of the non-m em ber threatens to have or has 
a direct effect upon  tribal interests.
The first exception applies to authority  over fish and  game, in that non- 
Indians have entered  into a consensual agreem ent w ith  the tribes th rough  
their representative state governm ent. The state and  the tribes have a 
consensual agreem ent to regulate authority  over gam e m atters. The second
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exception is especially im portan t to the Salish-Kootenai, because the 
definition of threatening  or affecting tribal interests is set forth  in Montana v. 
United States (1981). The decision holds that tribes have an inherent pow er 
to exercise civil au thority  if the conduct of non-Indians threatens or directly 
affects the political integrity, economic security, or health  and welfare of the 
tribe. The Salish-Kootenai used this argum ent in  the case of Confederated  
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Namen to gain 
control and  regulatory  pow ers over non-Indian p roperty  ow ners use of the 
riparian  zone of a lakebed. The tribes argued tha t they ow ned the lakebed, 
and  the lake itself w as an im portan t tribal resource; therefore, the tribe 
claim ed they should be able to regulate w ater pollution, fishing and any other 
action threatening that resource. The ruling in favor of the tribe was re­
affirm ed by the U.S. Suprem e C ourt in 1982.
Two im portan t court decisions have reinforced the tribes' right to have 
regulatory  pow er over non-Indians: the Colville case and the M ontana  case. 
A lthough these cases set lim itations for tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
they clearly reinforce o ther rights hke the right to tax non-Indians {Colville). 
A lthough the Colville case is inconsistent w ith  the M ontana  in that it allows 
Indians to tax only on  trust land  (tribal land), M ontana  clearly allows the 
tribes to have regulatory pow er over non-Indians w hen they directly threaten  
tribal w elfare or resources. The inconsistencies in the court rulings are 
im portant, because they som etim es m ake it h ard  for the Salish-Kootenai to 
assert jurisdiction, or m aintain  respect for tribal law. These inconsistencies 
and  the fuzziness in the in terpretation  of laws are the very reasons w hy Del 
Palm er and  others w ho persistently  break  tribal law s have some potential of 
being a th reat to the tribe.
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The last lim itation on the tribes' pow er to regulate non-Indians is based on 
tribal constitutions. The tribal constitu tion for the C onfederated Salish- 
Kootenai w as adopted  by the tribe in 1936 u n d er the Indian  Reorganization 
Act. The major purpose of the constitution w as to delegate governm ental 
pow ers to tribal representatives, protecting those people w ho are subject to 
the pow ers of the tribal governm ent from  any abuse of tha t pow er. The 
m ethod used  to accom plish the purpose of the constitution is generally called 
the enum erated pow ers approach. It delegates pow ers to elected 
representatives of the tribe, reserving the rem ainder of pow ers to be exercised 
by the vote of tribal m embers. It w as hoped  that this approach w ould 
im plem ent p roper checks and balances am ong the branches of tribal 
governm ent. M any of the tribal governm ents adop ted  the enum erated  
pow ers approach at the request and  advice of the federal Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. The same approach does not always m eet the changing needs of the 
tribes today. The federal governm ent d id  no t foresee today's problem s 
because they had  little faith in  the tribes' ability to em pow er themselves. 
Today tribal needs have changed, and  tribes have becom e m ore pow erful 
than  the federal governm ent could have foreseen. Their constitution 
therefore needs to be re vam ped so tha t they can em pow er them selves to 
enforce tribal ordinances over the entire reservation.
The Salish-Kootenai have been aw are of the need to update  their 
constitution. They have attem pted  to am end it, bu t their w ishes have been 
denied  by the Secretary of the I n t e r i o r . ^ ^  The original constitution lack bo th  
governing pow ers, and the delegation of specific pow ers to govern both  
them selves and non-Indians. Thus it failed to delegate or vest any regulatory  
au thority  in  the tribal g o v e r n m e n t . ^ 9  As we have seen, this has caused
172
incredible conflict and  is constantly nagging the tribe, instead of allowing
them  to m ove on w ith  m eeting the needs of their people. O ne of the m any
problem s in  am ending the constitu tion is tha t any am endm ent has to be
approved  by the Secretary of the Interior, and  that process can be risky for the
tribes. It is very expensive and takes time. The actual risk comes from  the
Secretary’s pow er to decide w hich tribal ordinances he will "allow" the tribes
to enforce. A t times the Secretary of the Interior or the Suprem e C ourt may
decide w hether or not the tribe has the inherent pow er (based on their
constitution) to enforce a specific tribal ordinance. Concerning fish and game,
they w ould  need to decide w hether the Sahsh-Kootenai have an inherent
au thority  over non-m em bers w ho hun t and  fish in v iolation of tribal
o r d i n a n c e s . ^ 0  A ssum ing that the tribe has inheren t sovereign pow er to
regulate in a particular m atter, their pow er is subject to the provisions of the
Indian Civil Rights Act. U nder this act, the tribes' pow er for civil regulatory
authority  (over whites) is th reatened due to Section 1302 (8), requiring "due
process of law." It should  be kept in  m ind, how ever, tha t several federal
decisions have upheld  that:
Congress d id  no t in tend, th rough  the ICRA (Indian Civil Rights 
Act), to im pose on tribal governm ents the sam e standards 
im posed on federal and  state governm ents by the federal due 
process and equal protection clause. Rather, Congress in tended 
to allow tribes to develop their ow n standards of due process 
and equal pro tection  by balancing tribal views of individual 
rights against tribal view s of tribal interests in m aintaining the 
un ique traditions, custom s, and political values of the tribe.
The guidelines laid ou t in  the Tribal Regulation Manual  give us a good 
idea of the possible options and legal justifications as well as lim itations felt 
by  the Sahsh-Kootenai w hen legal d isputes arise. In add ition  to the m any 
Suprem e C ourt decisions and federal law s or acts that w e have seen support
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or deny tribal decisions, there is one bo ttom  line decision that ultim ately 
affects tribal m atters today. This is the decision of the U nited States 
governm ent to give their d irect support to tribal sovereignty and self- 
governm ent. The 1994 Tribal Self G overnance Act states in  Section 2, that: 
Congress finds tha t—
(1) the tribal righ t of self-governm ent flows from  the 
inheren t sovereignty of Ind ian  tribes and nations;
(2) the U nited States recognizes a special govem m ent-to- 
governm ent relationship  w ith  Ind ian  tribes, including 
the right of the tribes to self-govem ance, as reflected in 
the Constitution, treaties. Federal statutes, and the course 
of dealings of the U nited States w ith  Indian  tribes;
(3) although progress has been  m ade, the Federal bureaucracy, 
w ith  its centralized rules and  regulations, has eroded  tribal 
self-govem ance and dom inates tribal affairs;
(4) the Tribal Self-Governance D em onstration Project w as 
designed to im prove and  perpetuate  the governm ent-to- 
governm ent relationship  betw een Ind ian  tribes and the 
U nited States and to strengthen tribal control over Federal 
funding  and  p rogram  m anagem ent; and
(5) Congress has review ed the results of the Tribal Self- 
G overnance D em onstration Project and  finds tha t—
(A) transferring control to tribal governm ents, upon  tribal 
request, over funding and  decision m aking for Federal 
program s, services, functions and activities in tended  to 
benefit Indians is an effective w ay to im plem ent the Federal 
policy of governm ent-to-governm ent relations w ith  Indian 
tribes; and
(B) transferring control to tribal governm ents, upon  tribal 
request, over funding  and decision m aking for Federal 
program s, services, functions, and  activities strengthens the 
Federal policy of Ind ian  self-determ ination.^^
A lthough there often appears to be great support for N ative A m erican 
rights, the fact rem ains that Indian  authority  will always be d ispu ted  w hen 
federal law s do no t lay ou t specific authority  betw een the state and the tribes. 
The m ain pow er behind those w ho d ispute authority  is the fact that often 
there is no specific Litigation that has definitively settled a particular conflict.
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For instance, the tribal-state com pact giving the Salish-Kootenai authority  
over fish and  gam e m atters concerning non-Indians has never been  settled in 
a court of law, therefore m aking the agreem ent appear as little m ore than  a 
legal "obligation." Even though  a legislative act in 1947 au thorized  the 
M ontana D epartm ent of Fish, W ildlife and Parks to enter into agreem ents 
w ith  the tribes to enforce joint m anagem ent plans, today’s com pact is an  
obligation that carries little w eight in the eyes of some non-Indians.
In the last few m onths the tribes have again been faced w ith  direct 
challenges to their au thority  over fish and game. The issues at hand  are the 
very sam e issues tha t we have seen since the opening of the reservation to 
whites. A t stake, in the view  of non-Indian hunters and some state officials, 
are perceived private p roperty  rights, constitutional rights, and  other "m atters 
of principle." In October 1996 Del Palm er once again staged his b ird  h u n t to 
challenge the tribes' jurisdiction over private property. His goal has been  the 
same every y ear... tha t his case will go to court and  tribal jurisdiction will be 
o v e r r u l e d . A lthough the tribes have never claim ed to have jurisdiction 
over his private property , they do have the right to protect gam e as a tribal 
resource. The tribal-state com pact grants tribal jurisdiction to enforce fish and 
gam e law s on all lands w ith in  the reservation  boundaries.
As far as the tribes are concerned, if Del and others w ant to attack tribal 
jurisdiction over their ow n resources, then  the tribes will sim ply cut off non- 
Indians from  using them . In the sam e m onth  in w hich Del announced he 
w ould  challenge tribal authority , the Salish-Kootenai th reatened  the closure 
of over 64,000 acres of tribal lands to non-m em bers. The proposed closure 
came about because the tribes felt the lands w ere being over used. The 
recreational dem and is very high, and  the tribal council believed that the
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tribal m em bers needed m ore room . They had  p lanned  to close the lands 
u n d er tribal O rdinance 44D, w hich governs fish, gam e, and recreational use 
by non m em bers on reservation lands.64 A lthough the areas to be closed are 
sensitive due  to overuse, it is certainly no coincidence tha t the land closure 
w as proposed in October.
The proposed closure came at a time w hen it could perhaps w eight 
decisions being m ade outside of tribal jurisdiction. Del had  never been any 
significant threat to the tribes in the past, b u t the tribes never know  w hen 
som ething m ight change. They reasoned that this m ight be the year that his 
case w ould  be heard. In addition, the tribes heard  a proposal by Lake County 
Representative Rick Jore in  the 1997 state legislation, fore's bill w ould rescind 
the state's agreem ent w ith  the tribes over fish and  gam e jurisdiction. Back in 
Decem ber of 1996, the tribes' Vice C hairm an Mickey Pablo stated that he 
w ould certainly vote to close all tribal lands if the Rick Jore bill p a s s e d . ^ 5
As it tu rned  out, Del s annual h u n t failed to grab anyone's attention. He 
called on several people to cite him, b u t no one show ed up, leaving Del to 
tu rn  him self in. H e handed  a w ritten  statem ent to the depu ty  sheriff tha t said 
he had  not purchased  the required  tribal perm it to hun t, and  although 
reluctant to do  so, the depu ty  issued Del a ticket. The charge of hunting  
w ithout a tribal perm it w as then  dism issed in the Justice C ourt of Lake 
County.^^ As for Rick Jore's bill to end tribal-state cooperation, it appears that 
it will lie dead  in the legislature as it d id  in 1995. Strong opposition came 
sta tew ide from  w ildlife and sportsm en’s groups, the M ontana W ildlife 
Federation, and virtually every state governm ent agency w ith  any clout in 
the issue, including the D epartm ent of Fish, W ildlife and  Parks, the A ttorney 
G eneral's Office and G overnor M arc Racicot.67 Surprisingly, even w ith  this
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opposition from  m ajor sources, the bill was tabled on only a 10-9 vote, and 
will be p resen ted  again in  the next m ajor legislative session.^^
As we consider the long history of tribal-state relations since the 
reservation w as first opened to settlers, it can certainly be said that tribal 
pohcies have had  a greater tendency to foster cooperation than  conflict.
Today, the tribes have a willingness to enter com pacts w ith  the state and to 
foster positive cooperative m anagem ent over reservation m atters. The tribal- 
state agreem ent is a partial sacrifice by the tribes, bu t is an  alternative to 
battling ou t issues th rough  expensive litigation. If the consistent pressure felt 
by  their authorities w ears dow n the tribes' patience, how ever, non-Indians 
face the possibility of having to w orry about m ore than  m erely paying a small 
fee to fish, hunt, and  recreate w ith in  the reservation. If the tribes ever 
decided  fish and  gam e jurisdiction th rough  litigation, M ontanans w ould 
have plenty  to lose regardless of w hether the tribes w ere victors in their 
lawsuit. First, the tribes w ould be able to close off several thousand acres to 
all fishing, hunting, and  recreation by non-m em bers. This decision alone 
w ould  affect well over 20,000 people a year. N on-Indians have said tha t it 
w ould be equivalent to shutting  dow n a national p ark  to I n d i a n s . A s  it 
currently  stands, the tribes have every in tention of keeping these lands open 
for non-Indian  use. C urrently  over 20,000 people purchase tribal perm its 
every year, b u t it should be kept in m ind  that this num ber is far from  the 
actual num ber of non-Indian people w ho use tribal lands to recreate. In 
addition, Chris Tw eeten of the state A ttorney G eneral’s Office recently stated 
tha t rescinding the agreem ent could cost M ontana taxpayers upw ards of a half 
a m illion dollars, and  w arned  tha t "it is far from  certain  tha t the state w ould
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prevail if it w ent back to federal court to d ispute the Treaty of Hellgate, passed 
by the U.S. Congress in 1855, long before M ontana w as a state.
The tribes do indeed have sources of pow er that could obtain a definitive 
outcom e for gam e m anagem ent on  the reservation. But the tribes are 
som ew hat dependent on the state at this poin t to back tribal decisions and 
enforce tribal regulations. If the state w ere to tu rn  on the tribes and sue them  
over the specific extent of tribal jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty w ould be pu t 
on  the hne. As the B our land  case exem phfied, the state can be very pow erful 
in persuading  the courts to lim it tribal sovereignty. The state advantage 
w ould  depend, how ever, on w hether the judge chose to ignore previous case 
laws or the history of federal-Indian relations. Litigation is certainly 
som ething neither the state nor the tribes w ants to face, because either side 
has an  equal chance of losing their authority. The current balance in  fish and  
gam e m atters has evolved over ninety years, and  attem pts to be any m ore 
definitive in m atters of jurisdiction could be risky for bo th  governm ents. 
A lthough the people and the governm ent of M ontana have had  the upper 
hand  in the past, it is now  tim e to reevaluate the stereotype that the Salish- 
K ootenai are helpless in  controlling m atters concerning them selves or those 
around  them . They are no longer a quiet, secondary force on  their 
reservation .
CHAPTER VI:
CONCLUSION
Summary
There is no doub t that the allotm ent policy has created m any 
intergovernm ental problem s tha t have caused conflict betw een Ind ian  and 
non-Ind ian  residents on the reservation. O pening u p  the reservation to non- 
Indians and  their jurisdictions created a fight for pow er that has often 
h indered  tribal political goals. W ith the signing of the 1855 Treaty, the Salish- 
K ootenai agreed to peace and separation from  w hites and w ere shocked to see 
the land  and  recourses on  their reservation taken ou t of their control in just a 
few  years. Regardless of the encroachm ent by early settlers, the Indians were 
still able to live for the m ost p a rt as they had  before. The Dawes Act, 
how ever, p rom pted  changes in Ind ian  economy, kinship, forms of m arriage 
and  education by forcing Indians to adhere to federal regulations. Later came 
the 1904 act that had  the hardest im pact on the tribes, as they w ere forced to 
d iv ide up  their land  and  live w ith  people w ho had  little understand ing  or 
tolerance for their culture. U nder tha t act, the Salish-Kootneai were forced to 
follow various state laws, and  state au thority  was justified as a direct result of 
allo tm ents on the Ind ian  reservation.
Before the allotm ent policy, Indians had  som e concept of private 
ow nership, bu t no t regarding  land. They lived com m unally, so the concept of 
indiv idually  ow ned land d id  not fit in to  their social, political, economical, or 
sp iritual life. Their com m unities w ere generally m ade u p  of tribal entities 
tha t controlled tracts of land held in  com m on. Free m ovem ent and  the use 
of recourses th roughout large areas w as the very econom y of their people,
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and  each location they called hom e held som ething im portan t to the tribe.
The politics of the early tribal people w ere very different from  w hat they 
experience today. There w ere those w ho asserted pow er and m ade decisions 
for the tribe, b u t rarely w as their pow er absolute. There w ere chiefs in charge 
of m atters such as w om en and children, war, or hunting  parties, and these 
chiefs served as the tribal conscience. They w ere there to guide the 
com m unity, and  although m any leaders held their positions hereditarily, 
they w ere still m ost often respected for their know ledge and  skill in 
providing for their people. Because of his im age as protector and provider, 
the chief w as treated  w ith  respect am ong his people.
Enforcing laws or restitution was not decided by a separate organization of 
the tribe, b u t by the tribe itself. Perhaps one of the m ain differences betw een 
Indians and w hites in the function of laws w as tha t Indians d id  not make or 
enforce laws in a bureaucrat m anner, bu t rather by consensus. Thus, politics 
w ere no t separated  from  family, economy, or religion. Violations of tribal 
laws w ere handled  openly. They w ere often publicly armounced, and the 
violator p u t on display th rough  som e form  of public hum iliation. The chief 
d id  not try to cover up  for another as bureaucratic governm ents often do. He 
w as the one w ho scolded the violator publicly. 1 Because everyone had  an 
in tricate role in the com m unity 's survival, hum iliation  w orked efficiently as 
part of the justice system. It w as this system  of hving and  interacting w ith  
large families on every social level tha t reinforced the tribal governm ent’s 
resistance to private land  ow nership.
W hen governor Stevens approached the three m ajor tribes in 1855 and 
w orked ou t a deal for them  to cede a large part of w estern  M ontana and Idaho 
to the U.S., the tribes w ere reluctant, bu t they too had needs to be m et out of
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treatying. They agreed to cede land b u t to reserve for them selves a hom eland 
called the Flathead Reservation. They believed tha t a reservation w ould  not 
change their lives drastically and in addition, they w ould receive protection 
from  w arring  tribes w ho had been trying to take aw ay their land and 
resources. It is doubtful w hether the ultim ate goals of the U nited States were 
properly  represented  to the tribes, and  there are docum ents proving that 
m uch of the conversation at the event w as m isinterpreted. It is quite 
unlikely tha t the tribes w ould m ake treaties to keep o ther Indians from  taking 
their land, and  yet let w hites split it up  and move onto their reserve. It is 
clear from  the archives that m any of the elders w ho attended  the conference 
and the signing of the treaty, w ere in total disbelief w hen they heard  that the 
reservation was to be opened to whites. It had  been  their clear understanding 
that w hites w ere not to be allow ed to settle on the reservation, except those in 
service to the Indians.
W hen the reservation w as created for the Salish-Kootenai in 1855, their 
lives d id  not im m ediately change. They continued using the land held in 
com m on, and traveled to the accustom ed spots to hun t and  gather . By the 
1880's it appeared, how ever, that the chief w as becom ing submissive to 
federal officials w ho began m anipulating  and  controlling every m ove of the 
Indian people. Decisions w ere still gu ided  by the chiefs, bu t they slowly lost 
the respect of their people w hen their decisions could no t be carried out 
efficiently over non-Indian form s of control. The chiefs could no longer 
p rov ide for their people economically or politically w hen  the federal 
governm ent began confining them  to the reserve. Politically, they w ere 
unable to deal or bargain  w ith  federal officials, as the U.S. either ignored 
discussions w ith  chiefs, or m anipulated  them  w ith  non-Indian  laws and
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regulations. There w as often no choice for m any of the Salish-Kootenai bu t 
to fall u n d er the agent's strong arm  of the law.
The real force of law  on the Flathead Reservation came w ith  the allotm ent 
policy. The D aw es Act initiated w hite social norm s and  values by prom oting 
the concept of private land. This concept slowly began breaking dow n the 
tribal social system. Indiv idual land  ow nership d id  no t appear to break the 
tribes' spirit, as m any w ere still able to live com m unally and carry out their 
econom y bo th  on and  off of the reservation. W hat d id  drastically interfere 
w ith  their economy and social structure Avas the 1904 Flathead A llotm ent Act. 
The act opened u p  the reservation to whites, forcing Indians to stay on their 
indiv idual parcels of land, and  non-Indian law  enforcem ent was used to 
ensure that Indians d id  so.
Because the F lathead Reservation w as opened to whites, non-Indian 
residents w ere reinforced in their belief of their superiority and strength  over 
Ind ian  governm ents. The M ontana publications of the tim e em phasize this 
fact by portraying the Indians as a culture that could no longer survive, and 
w hich ou t of sheer w eakness and defeat, had  given u p  their land. The 
national political goal of transform ing the Indian  and assim ilating him  into 
w hite society w as also a pow erful tool against the Salish-Kootenai. As w hites 
came onto the reservation, they w ere filled w ith  grand  illusions tha t the 
reservation  w ould be com pletely dissolved. The Salish-Kootenai w itnessed 
greed and disconcern for Indian treaty rights, not concern for carrying out 
goals to help  the Ind ian  in civilized pursuits. The U.S. had  broken its 
prom ise and w ithout any consent from  the sovereign they had  treatied with, 
proceeded  as if the reservation boundaries and  the com pletely different 
cu lture residing there, d id  not exist. M any Salish-Kootenai m em bers living
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th rough  the im plem entation of the 1904 Act, had  absolutely no in tention  of
giving in to non-Indian control over land, and  for m any years m ade it their
life goal to rescind the illegal policies tha t split up  their reservation. They d id
no t believe that because the reservation had  been opened up  to w hite
settlem ent, its boundaries had  been dissolved. They knew  exactly w here the
boundaries were, and  w hat federal docum ent reserved the land  w ithin  those
boundaries for the tribal people. A lthough m ost tribal opposition to the act
w as no t overly assertive, some of those m em bers w ho had  portrayed a calm
opposition to U.S. Indian  policy had  lost their patience by the time the
reservation was actually opened. One letter in particu lar w ritten  by Salish
m em ber Sam Resurrection reads:
We only now  thought of the right thing. Is it good for you 
w hite people to be thieving us. We w an t to know  how  are the 
robbers and thieves laws. We now  find out that we are getting 
poor and will tell you all our riches that you have stolen. We 
know  that this place belongs to us.2
Sam w as quite assertive in accusing the U.S. of theft, and  w ent on to accuse
the governm ent of robbing the Indians of their reservation resources. One of
his m ain concerns over resources was the constant taking of reservation fish
and game, and he stated  his anger and  disgust at the U.S. for killing Indians
because they w ere hun ting  their ow n game. Sam rem inded  the U.S. tha t "we
will never forget w hat they d id  to us. Because we are very sorry, we will
always m ake you think of w hat you d id  to us for our animals."^
In addition  to the allotm ent policy's control of fish and gam e m atters, the
opening of the reservation often forced Indians to m ove off of the m ost fertile
and  best-w atered lands. Some w ere relocated onto hillsides or even sheer
slopes and  then forced to attem pt farm ing there. W hite business m en w ith
political pow er reserved huge tracts of grazing land for their cattle and their
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families, and  this also forced m any Salish-Kootenai to relocate. In add ition  to 
thousands of acres tha t w ere ow ned by indiv idual whites, the allotm ent Act 
of 1904 reserved thousands of acres for tow n sites, schools, religious 
organizations, hospitals, mills and  agency sites. The 1904 act im posed a forced 
sedentary  hfe w ithout the tools to m ake that kind of life work, and this only 
reinforced the Ind ians’ need to use existing tribal resources.
For m any Indians, forced entrance into a cash econom y w ithout the m eans 
to do  so w as virtually  impossible, and  certainly no t a desired struggle. Living 
next to non-Indian people that com peted w ith the Indians for land and 
recourses created a g reat need on the p art of the tribes to have laws over 
^vhites on the reservation. The Salish-Kootenai w ere losing grazing spots for 
their ow n horses and cattle, they had  lost their w ater sources, and the tow ns 
and com m unities h ad  pushed  the w ildlife farther aw ay from  home. The 
tribes began sending correspondence and delegations to W ashington in 
p ro test of the opening of the reservation. They received little em pathy and 
w ere often subdued  by authorities that illegally asserted their pow er over 
Indians.
Early on there w as little com petition betw een Indians and  non-Indians 
over w ho w ould follow w hat laws. Indians sim ply w ould be forced to follow 
any federal or state laws tha t non-Indians had  the physical strength  to apply. 
W hen a violation occurred betw een a tribal m em ber and a settler, state 
authorities arrested the Indian and  tried him  in a state court. If found guilty, 
he w ould be fined or jailed. It w as not hard  for the state system to w ork its 
w ay in  and  assert its jurisdiction over various reservation m atters. The state 
could argue that au thority  over m atters pertaining to fish and gam e was their 
jurisd iction  because no o ther au thority  had  taken on the responsibility. In
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other w ords, if there w ere gaps in jurisdiction the state felt that they could 
assum e responsibility for filling those gaps. The federal governm ent could 
no t offer p roper protection to the Salish-Kootenai because their policies and 
law s on  reservations w ere so poorly p lanned out. There w ere always gaps 
allow ing states to assum e control over Indians and  their property. The 
federal governm ent d id  not really take on  the responsibility of fully 
assim ilating Indians into m ainstream  America, b u t neither d id  they allow the 
Indians to m ake their ow n laws, p ro tect them selves, or assert jurisdiction 
over their ow n reservation.
N ot surprisingly, m uch of w hat the state perceived as civil violations by 
Indians, w ere those pertaining to fish and game. H unting created conflict 
because Indians often h un ted  on  p roperty  w ithin  the reservation that had  
passed  ou t of federal or tribal ow nership. Later the issue of game 
conservation m ade the Indian  a sure target for hunting  violations as well. 
Perhaps underly ing  the entire conflict w as the idea tha t Indian  fondness for 
hun ting  indicated they w ere not integrating properly  into m ainstream  
A m erican society. They w ere still "roam ing around" instead of living a 
sedentary  farm ing life. Interestingly enough, non-Indian  com plaints about 
Ind ian  hun ting  violations appeared  insignificant. Ind ian  hun ting  d id  no t 
appear to change any non-Indian 's quality of life. On the other hand, non­
w hites w ho w ere getting atten tion  for being troublem akers felt they were 
really the ones w ith  serious com plaints. The Salish-Kootenai spent years in 
opposition to w hites w ho bo th  took and w asted recourses while cutting off 
Indians from  using them. They tried repeatedly  to get their various agents to 
enforce tribal and  federal gam e laws on  non-Indians living on  the 
reservation. Political strength  over non-Indians w as h ard  to attain. The
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Salish-Kootenai came from  diverse social and political backgrounds m aking it 
tough  for them  to unite, and  if the federal governm ent d id  not honor their 
political prom ises to the tribes, the Salish-Kootenai had  very little legal force 
against the state.
To ensure the dow nfall of tribal control over reservation m atters and  to 
continue the use of reservation  resources w ithout Ind ian  interference, the 
state tried  to apply all "civilized" law s to Indians. Their justification came 
from  one underly ing  them e...land. Land becam e the justification for alm ost 
every violation against the tribal people. To w hites it becam e bo th  a w eapon 
and a tool of justice. W hen arguing in favor of Indians falling under state 
law, there w ere several justifications frequently used. The first one w as that 
since the reservation had  been opened, and it contained huge parcels of land 
that w ere either ow ned by the state or fell under state jurisdiction, the 
reservation  boundaries obviously no longer existed. A llotm ents b lu rred  the 
reservation boundaries, as fee paten ted  land becam e situated next to trust 
land. Secondly, because all N ative Am ericans had  been granted U.S. 
citizenship, it was assum ed tha t they should  have the same rights and fall 
und er the sam e law s as any other citizen. Even later on w hen the citizenship 
act w as deem ed invalid, another argum ent w ould  be used. Forced fee-patents 
w ere given to m any of the Salish-Kootenai, forcing them  to pay state and 
county taxes on their land; Therefore jurisdiction over some tribal property  
fell into the hands of the state. It w as a sim ple transition to assum e that 
because the state had  control over Indian property , they w ould therefore have 
control over the actions of the owners.
Land w as the very m eans to gaining control over Indians and  their 
hun ting  rights. W hen the Indians began organizing on a political level
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recognized by the federal governm ent, they too began fighting for control and 
jurisd iction  on  the reservation, using the very sam e m eans that had  been 
used  by non-Indians. They developed and im plem ented tribal gam e and 
conservation regulations, they filed law suits, and  m ost im portantly , they 
began using every possible m eans to hold onto or buy back the lands w ithin 
the reservation. They regained control over their ow n tribal m em bers, and 
elim inated the state's control over trying Indians for state violations. The 
tribes continued protesting the abuse of their people and  resources on the 
reservation, and never stopped  opposing the illegal act that opened up  their 
reservation  to whites.
The tribes becam e quite savvy in their m ethods of opposition and  control, 
b u t they alm ost always rem ained peaceful so as not to draw  too m uch 
negative atten tion  or opposition to their goals. The Ind ian  Reorganization 
Act, and  the adoption  of the Tribal Constitution and Bylaws, as well as 
various court litigations and  federal acts, helped to reinforce tribal authority  
over the years. Tribal authority  has always been seen as a problem  to some 
non-Indians and state representatives. The pow er the tribes retained as a 
sovereignty was never expected to be extensively used by the tribes, and 
therefore state governm ents never realized the tribes' potential to organize 
on any m ajor political level. In spite of the pow er they began asserting over 
the years, there w as one area in  particu lar w here the tribes knew  they could 
not com pete for control. In the area of non-Indian or state ow ned property  
w ith in  the reservation, Indians h ad  little control over acts tha t affected the 
well-being of the tribe. C onsequently they had  no jurisdiction over tribal 
resources like fish and game, w ater or tim ber. In particular the tribes had  no 
au thority  over non-Indians' excessive killing of gam e on non-Indian  lands.
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Because at one tim e the am ount of land ow ned by non-Indians on the 
reservation  w as well over 50%, Indians feared that fish and gam e could easily 
be depleted  if the tribes w ere left out of decisions concerning reservation 
gam e.
To gain control over acts concerning fish and  gam e, the tribes used 
argum ents in their favor that avoided issues of non-Indian land rights. They 
d id  not argue that they h ad  jurisdiction over land, b u t rather authority  over 
all reservation resources that w ere reserved for them  in the treaty. As the 
argum ent over fish and  gam e authority  grew , the tribes seem ed to be getting 
m ore and  m ore support over the years from  the federal governm ent. Federal 
acts w ere im plem ented to help  N ative A m ericans keep their authority  over 
m atters that seriously concerned their people. Suprem e C ourt litigation 
began ruhng  w ith  som e consistency tha t states could have jurisdiction only 
over non-Indian  people on a reservation, and then only if their jurisdiction 
d id  no t infringe upon  tribal g o v e r n m e n t . ^  The tribal governm ent began to 
assert that non-Indian fish and gam e rights, state jurisdiction over game, and 
the loss of revenue to states d id  indeed infringe upon  the tribes’ right to 
protect tribal resources. Instead of battling it out w ith  the state over the right 
to govern resources, they began w orking on  agreem ents betw een the two 
governm ents that w ould be reasonable for all reservation residents. In reality 
the agreem ents began as early as the 1940's, bu t the m ajor agreem ents noted 
in history are those that began in the 1960's and  m ore recently in 1991. Today 
the com pact betw een  the state and the tribes allows for jurisdiction to be m ore 
consistent and  for gam e laws and  conservation to be enforced, all w ithout the 
violation of non-Indian p roperty  rights. Tribal au thority  over fish and  gam e
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is sim ply to protect tribal resources for the use and benefit of all reservation 
residents.
Tribal Explanations and Resolutions
The Salish-Kootenai never doub ted  their au thority  over fish and gam e on 
their reservation, b u t non-Indian law  has always required  that the question of 
tribal au thority  be answ ered  in  a definitive m anner, or not expressed a t all. 
W ithout the current tribal-state com pact, the question of authority  over gam e 
w ould  have to be answ ered conclusively in  o rder for the tribe to have their 
laws respected and enforce regulations w ith  any consistency. The tribes have 
had  the confidence and  legal backing to pursue litigation in o rder to solve 
questions concerning gam e, b u t not w ithout certain risks. For this reason, 
they have chosen cooperation w ith  state bureaus and  their non-Indian 
neighbors instead of lawsuits. The state bureaus agree that cooperation is the 
best answ er. They too have plenty to risk if the tribes or state were to sue each 
o ther over fish and gam e regulation.
It should be understood  tha t state and tribal bureaus have continued to 
support the com pact not only because of w hat they both  have to loose, bu t 
because of w hat they bo th  have to gain. For years now, the state and the 
Salish-Kootenai tribes have been w orking together because m any of their 
com m on goals can be attained  by doing so. Preserving wildlife, saving 
taxpayers money, and helping to insure the continued recreational use of 
tribal w ilderness by non-Indians are three prim ary  goals tha t have been 
beneficial to the state th rough  the fish and  gam e com pact. The tribes benefit 
in m anaging, regulating, and  protecting their tribal recourses and in the 
process, are continuing to define their rights as a sovereign.
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U nfortunately, m any non-Indians m isunderstand  the fish and gam e issues
a t hand , and  do no t look at the intergovernm ental agreem ent as a fair deal.
Several oppose the com pact because they do not understand  that the tribes are
sim ply exerting their right to control their resources, not the right to control
private property. A lthough m ost state bureaus offer support for the
agreem ent, there are ind iv idual representatives w ho support non-Indians in
opposing it. The persistent fear that the tribes w ant to m anage all non-Indian
property  and  the unw illingness to w ork tow ard  com m on goals has been
evident in State R epresentative Rick Jore's defense of his proposed bill to
elim inate the tribal-state com pact. Jore told the com m ittee that the very
sanctity of private property  and the C onstitution w as at stake because of the
com pact.^ There are other argum ents used by those opposed to the fish and
gam e agreem ent. M any declare tha t because they are citizens of M ontana they
pay taxes to the state and receive state benefits, and therefore should not fall
u n d er tribal jurisdiction. In addition, they m ay argue tha t the m andatory
purchase of a tribal fish and gam e perm it is taxation w ithout representation
because it is im posed partially by the tribes. To that argum ent, the tribes have
an answ er that few like to hear, b u t all can com prehend. Tribal m em ber
M ichael Pablo has a very sim ple analogy w ith  w hich all of us can em pathize
in one w ay or another. In a letter addressed  to all those critics w ho distort
tribal history, M ichael wrote:
The tribes frequently  hear the com plaint that non-Indians 
cannot vote in tribal elections b u t m ay be subject to some tribal 
laws. I pay taxes on land in Sanders County, b u t 1 cannot vote 
in  Sanders County because 1 live in F lathead County. So w ould 
this be taxation w ithout representation? I can be arrested for 
speeding in another state, and  do not have a vote in that state's 
governm ent. 1 don 't com plain. I understand  w hy things are 
the w ay they are.^
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M ichael rem inds us that although governm ents m ay not ahvays please 
everyone, they tend to do  their best for the general public. N on-Indians m ust 
understand  that the tribal-state com pact is a concession for the Salish- 
K ootenai people, and  is no t necessarily pleasing to all tribal m em bers either. 
The tribes have been lim ited in  their pow er to fully control and protect their 
resources d u e  to the failures on the p art of the U.S. governm ent. The Salish- 
Kootenai do not see them selves as trying to take advantage of non-Indians on 
the reservation. They regard  their agreem ent w ith  the state as a tribal 
concession that w orks to benefit the general public. A lthough the goals of the 
C onfederated Tribes are not really com plicated to understand , they still have a 
hard  tim e convincing the non-Indian  population  of their im portance. As 
C hairw om en R honda Swaney acknow ledged in  1993 w hen  running  for 
election, the tribes "suffer from  a poor public image," w hich she believed was 
caused largely from  reactive, rather than  proactive public relations w ith  non- 
Indians.^
There is a fear in som e non-Indians tha t the tribes' authority  over gam e 
will eventually  lead to total control over non-m em bers. To have control over 
w hites and  their land  w ould cost the tribes a lot of m oney and  time, and  it is 
not a goal tha t has been expressed by the tribe. Furtherm ore, it is not an 
inherent pow er of the tribe or supported  by federal laws. It is apparen t to the 
tribes th a t in tergovernm ental cooperation does indeed work. They look at 
m any of the non-Indian fears as an  overreaction that h inders positive law  
enforcem ent that w ould  benefit all reservation residents. The tribes believe 
tha t the fear concerning tribal au thority  on the reservation comes from not 
tru ly  understand ing  the tribal-federal relationship over the years. It is hoped 
that a better understanding  of this history will clear up  som e of the
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m isconceived notions. The 1855 Treaty w ith  the F latheads is the tribes’ m ost 
im portan t legal docum ent. For in tergovernm ental or residential conflicts to 
be w orked out on any level, the treaty m ust be understood  as a valid, 
enforceable legal principle. The treaty  reveals how  the federal governm ent 
has historically v iew ed the Salish-Kootenai, and to some extent show s the 
U nited States' need to keep the peace and  protect Ind ian  nations. The treaty 
as an agreem ent of alliance w ith  the U nited States. M ost im portantly, it is 
the one docum ent tha t is legal proof of Indian  sovereignty. The fact that the 
treaty is still recognized by today's Suprem e Court, is its recognition of tribal 
sovereignty. Even th rough  the federal governm ent created tribal 
dependency, that dependency does not elim inate tribal sovereignty.
N ative A m erican sovereigns have been defined as those tribes tha t are 
"domestic dependen t nations, " and w ere ru led  as such in  the Suprem e C ourt 
case of Cherokee Notion v. Georgia (1831). In this case, the issue w as w hether 
o r no t the Cherokee nation w as considered a foreign nation. Chief Justice 
John M arshall ru led  tha t Ind ian  nations w ere independen t political entities 
tha t w ere able to m anage their ow n affairs, b u t described them  as dependen t 
sovereigns. This term  m eant that a lthough they m aintained self- 
governm ent, there w ere several restrictions upon  them  as a nation.^ For 
instance, they could not treaty w ith  other nations, b u t they could negotiate 
w ith  federal, state o r county governm ents. They could not regulate non­
m em bers unless tribal interests justified their doing so, and they could not 
im pose crim inal pun ish m en t on non  m e m b e r s .^  Any authority  not 
specifically taken away w as retained by the tribes as an intricate part of their 
governm ent's jurisdiction. In 1832 the Worcester v. Georgia case also 
decreed that because tribes w ere considered foreign nations, state laws could
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not be im posed u p o n  them.^O Concerning this issue Sherw in Broadhead, 
legal consultant to the Colville Tribes rem arked in  1978:
Chief Justice M arshall used  the phrase, "domestic, dependen t 
nations," and  I don 't th ink M arshall recognized that w as a 
tw o-edged sw ord. The U nited States could use dependency to 
keep Ind ian  tribes from  raising very im portan t issues. If you 
look at the history of the way the U nited States dealt w ith Indian 
tribes in M ontana and  in  the Dakotas, you see the governm ent 
destroyed their source of sustenance, took their lands, and took 
and  purchased  their resources. The governm ent gave the Indians 
m oney instead of giving them  any long-term  consideration of 
gam e.
The use of dependen t nation term inology w as indeed a double edged 
sw ord. The Salish-Kootenai rem ained a political entity, b u t one that 
tem porarily  lost m uch of its pow er due to the dependency status of Indian 
nations. The rem ark  by Sherw in B roadhead points out that by turning 
nations into dependents, the federal governm ent could get around  its 
responsibilities to the Indians. It w as this very attitude that allowed for state 
bureaus and  settlers to get their foot in the door of tribal politics. The term  
"domestic dependen t nation" allow ed the federal governm ent to take a 
special in terest in Ind ian  nations and  control various aspects of their personal 
lives if it appeared  to be in the Indians' best interest. So entered the allotm ent 
policy. It w as this very policy that reinforced the term  dependent nation.
Forced dependency caused financial hardships and com plete poverty for 
m any of the Salish-Kootenai, and  this is w hat m ade the Indian 
R eorganization Act attractive in the 1930's. The act reinforced the fact that 
the pow ers held by the tribes w ere not gran ted  by  the U.S. governm ent. Their 
pow ers of self-governm ent w ere inherent, a lthough perhaps not always 
exercised. The IRA specifically gave the tribes m ore opportunities for self- 
governm ent and in itiated  a retrea t from  the federal governm ent's
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paternalism . The tribal C onstitution and Bylaws w ritten  up  and adopted  
u n d e r the IRA are the m eans by w hich the Sahsh-K ootenai justify their legal 
stand  regarding  the protection and control of gam e or o ther tribal property.
In addition, a m ajor source of strength  for the tribes under the Indian 
Reorganization Act was its term ination of the allotm ent policy, allowing the 
tribes to p revent the lease or sale of tribal lands. N ot long after the IRA was 
im plem ented , how ever, the era of term ination  began. The term ination 
policy of the federal governm ent in tended  to hand  over m any of their Indian 
trust responsibilities to the states. Specifically, it was Public Law 280 that was 
im plem ented  under the term ination policy, w hich w as to help fül the gaps in 
pohce pow ers and help resolve civil disputes. For the m ost part. Public Law 
280 allow ed the state to assum e m any of the jurisdiction responsibilities on 
the F lathead Reservation, b u t it could no t be im plem ented w ithou t the 
consent of the Salish-Kootenai. In the court case Kennerly v. District Court of 
M ontana  the court ru led  that Public Law 280 pre-em pted all other m eans by 
w hich the state could assert their jurisdiction on the reservation. In other 
w ords, the court ru led  that if the tribes d id  not enact PubHc Law 280, the state 
w ould  not have any jurisdiction over Indians or Ind ian  m atters on their 
rese rv a tio n .!^  The tribes consented to certain term s of Public Law 280 because 
it d id  not strike out any self-governing pow ers reinforced by the IRA. 
C oncurrent authority  betw een the state and  the tribes soon w as in place, b u t 
jurisdictional disputes rem ained. It appeared, therefore, that the one w ay to 
solve problem s of au thority  w as to have the Salish-Kootenai and  the state of 
M ontana sue each o ther to resolve the conflicts.
Both the state and  the Salish-Kootenai w ere seriously opposed to litigation. 
The state w as opposed because the tribes had  m aintained several im portan t
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pow ers. The tribes have their C onstitu tion u n d er the IRA as one im portan t
pow er, and  it is reinforced by the federal governm ent. That constitution is a
legal concept that allows the tribes to be the delegates of certain authorities,
b u t lim its their pow ers only to those stated  in their constitution. Those
pow ers that the tribes hold  pertain ing  to fish and gam e give them  the
authority  over the following, u n d er Article VI of the Tribal Constitution:
(a) To regulate the uses and disposition of tribal property, to 
protect and preserve the tribal p roperty , wildlife and natural 
resources of the C onfederated Tribes, to cultivate Indian arts, 
crafts, and  culture, to adm inister charity; to protect the health, 
security, and general welfare of the C onfederated Tribes.
(c) To negotiate w ith  the Federal, State, and  local governm ents on 
behalf of the C onfederated Tribes, and  to advise and consult 
w ith  the representatives of the D epartm ents of the G overnm ent 
of the U nited States on all m atters affecting the affairs of the 
C onfederated Tribes.
(i) To prom ulgate and  enforce ordinances, subject to review  by the 
Secretary of the Interior, w hich w ould  provide for assessm ents 
or license fees upon  non  m em bers doing business w ith in  the 
reservation, or obtaining special rights or privileges, and the 
sam e may also be applied to m em bers of the Confederated Tribes, 
p rov ided  such ordinances have been  approved  by a referendum  
of the C onfederated Tribes.
(n) To prom ulgate and  enforce ordinances w hich are in tended to 
safeguard and prom ote the peace, safety, morals, and general 
welfare of the Confederated Tribes by regulating the conduct of 
trade and the use and disposition of property  upon  the 
reservation, provid ing  that any ordinance directly affecting non 
m em bers shall be subject to review  by the Secretary of the 
In terio r.
O ne should  also keep in m ind that there are tribal ordinances like 44-D, 
approved  by the Secretary of the Interior, that g ran t tribal authority  over all 
fish and  gam e on the reservation. In addition, non-Indians are not allow ed
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to h u n t big gam e or trap  anyw here on the reservation. The taking of big 
gam e is the exclusive righ t of the Salish-Kootenai and  is guaran teed  to them  
by their treaty and  various court d e c i s i o n s .  14 For the m any w ho believe that 
they should  not cooperate w ith  the federal laws em pow ering the tribes 
because they are state and not tribal citizens, it should be noted  that there are 
tw o advantages that the tribe has over this argum ent in a court of law. First, 
their relationship w ith  the federal governm ent w as established long before 
M ontana becam e a state. This is w hy legal docum ents like the 1855 treaty are 
still valid and enforceable. W hen M ontana d id  becom e a state, the federal 
governm ent w as already quite aw are of the state's ability and desire to 
interfere in  the tribal-federal relationship. As a result, M ontana had  to p u t a 
disclaim er in  its constitu tion in o rder to be accepted into the Union. This 
disclaim er w as in the first ordinance of the Enabling Act of the State of 
M ontana, stating that M ontana w ould  disclaim  all rights to the lands ow ned 
or held  by Indians, and  that those lands w ould rem ain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the U nited S t a t e s . I n  1972, w hen the state of 
M ontana rew rote its constitution, it carried over that ordinance because the 
Enabling Act still rem ained in f o r c e . 16 The state of M ontana has claim ed that 
a lthough  they are denied  jurisdiction u n d er the Enabling Act, they can still 
exert au thority  over acts com m itted betw een non-Indians on the reservation. 
This being the case, there is still a gap in the sta te’s jurisdiction over non- 
Ind ian  residents w ho com m it a violation against tribal property: namely, fish 
and  gam e.
Consequently, M ontana currently  agrees w ith  the tribes tha t a joint 
com pact is the best solution for all citizens on the Flathead Reservation.
There can be no doubt that the legal stability of the tribes is secure. O n the
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other hand , they are aw are that w hen  tribes and states battle out court cases, 
the state often has the advantage. If the federal governm ent does not back the 
tribes legally, than the tribes m ay be at a d isadvantage due to the sheer pow er 
of the state 's legal system. E lim ination of the joint fish and  gam e agreem ent 
has the potential of bringing great financial hardsh ips to bo th  governm ents. 
For this reason alone, there is little doub t that the com pact is ideal. It avoids 
bad  feelings betw een the tw o governm ents and for the m ost part, betw een 
Ind ian  and  non-Indians residents as well. It is a w ay for all to cooperate 
w ithou t overstepping jurisdictional boundaries.
D iscussing issues at the local level is the m ost sensible approach to solving 
conflicts, and htigation should be strongly opposed. People like Del Palm er 
w ho believe tha t h tigation is the only w ay to define legal jurisdiction over 
gam e and  those people w ho com m it violations, are m issing a large p a rt of the 
picture. Fighting it out in the court room  has tw o possible scenarios for each 
side. The outcom e could possibly answ er only the question in front of the 
court. For instance, does the tribe have the authority  to cite Del in a hunting  
violation? The answ er w ould  m ost likely be affirm ative, b u t it w ould  solve 
noth ing that is truly of concern to Del. In this scenario, it w ould take case 
after case to provide the answ ers that Del is looking for. Because the costs of 
litigation are so high, this m ethod  could financially ru in  a governm ent 
bureau . N o one w ould  be the w inner in tha t atm osphere of conflict.
The other possible scenario in the courtroom  is that instead of merely 
answ ering  the original question of w ho has au thority  over gam e or gam e 
violations, the court m ay find that the question should not be an issue of 
authority , b u t rather an  issue of double jeopardy based on the constitution. If 
the court ru led  on two sentences for one offense, the outcom e w ould affect
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the losing party  in m ore than one area. For instance, if the Salish-Kootenai 
w ere the losing party , they could end up  losing authority  in  other m atters 
concerning their welfare. This w ould  also hold true for the authority  the 
state asserts on the Flathead Reservation; the state and  non-Indian residents 
could lose their current au thority  and  find them selves under even stronger 
tribal control.
Because the federal governm ent is aw are of problem s at the local level on 
reservations, they created the Policy Review Com m ission to study the 
problem s w ith  federal Ind ian  law  and  create solutions. The chairm an of the 
com m ission stated in a conference in 1978, that there w ere several things the 
governm ent should  no t do, and  tha t only one solution w ould w ork for 
everyone. Litigation w as out, and so w as national legislation. For instance, 
they recom m ended tha t the federal governm ent no t enact a policy like Public 
Law 280 in the future, because it w as not a "fair and  equitable resolution.
The staff of the Policy Review Com m ission concluded tha t the best w ay to 
resolve conflicts at a local level w as the in tergovernm ental com pact allowing 
concurrent jurisdiction betw een states and tribes.
There is really no reasonable excuse for non-Indians and their 
representatives no t to cooperate w ith  the Salish-Kootenai fish and  gam e 
com pact. The com pact is a political tool that w orks for both  Indian  and non- 
Ind ian  people. It is true that the tribal-state com pact does not recognize all 
citizens equally. It does require non-Indian people w ho use tribal resources to 
help  pay for the fish and  gam e m anagem ent on the reservation. In a sense, 
non-Ind ian  residents are treated  as out-of-state visitors w ould  be treated 
w hen  fishing or hun ting  w ithin  the state of M ontana. They pay to use those 
resources tha t do not belong to them  and  are no t m anaged by them. But this
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is a small price to pay considering the m any positive aspects to the agreem ent. 
The fact tha t a tribal perm it is required  for fishing and  hun ting  anyw here on 
the reservation, regardless of the status of the land, m eans better jurisdiction 
and  less confusion for all reservation residents. The com pact is 
straightforw ard  and enforceable, and  eases jurisdictional tension. W hy not 
buy  a tribal perm it to fish and  h u n t anyw here on the reservation? The tribes 
certainly do not see the required  purchase as a violation of personal property  
or constitutional rights. N on-Indian  residents have always been required  to 
buy a state fish and gam e license to hun t on their ow n private property. Does 
it really m atter w hether non-m em bers have to get the state’s or the tribes' 
perm ission to hun t on their land? The perm it and its restrictions exerts no 
m ore authority  over private land, than  does the gam e perm it from the state, 
and  its purchase achieves com m on goals for bo th  Indians and  non-Indians. 
C onservation becom es a priority  tha t now  has the funding to be done 
exceedingly well. The m oney goes to im prove and  preserve wildlife habitat, 
benefiting all residents for generations to come. The m oney is allocated for 
the sam e goals the state w ould im plem ent. Those concerned about state 
budgets on Indian reservations are relieved to know  that the current system  
saves taxpayers’ money. The state no longer has to totally fund program s for 
w ildlife habitat because the tribes have taken on m uch of those 
responsibilities.
A lthough the tribes are aw are that some are antagonistic to their goals and  
aspirations as a people, they are also aw are that in general, non-Indians have 
good intentions. If aU people will take the time and  effort to understand  the 
tw o governm ents’ historical relationship, they will gain a better 
understand ing  of w hat transpires today in Ind ian  country. Tribal cooperation
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has m ost often stem m ed from  their understand ing  of the situation and their 
efforts to w ork w ith in  the confines of that situation. There is no reason w hy 
in tergovernm ental organizations cannot continue this cooperation for the 
benefit of all people. Those w ho have said that the conflicts caused by the 
fragm entation  of reservation land  can never be solved m ay w ant to 
reconsider that judgm ent. The tribes certainly feel that problem s and conflicts 
can be resolved. They have invested a lot of time and m oney to insure that 
gaps in  authority  have been  filled. They have adopted  m easures to make 
their political decisions positively affect as m any people as possible.
A lthough they have not totally abandoned the possibility of legal battles w ith 
governm ent agencies, the tribes recognize that cooperation is the better way.
It is certainly to the advantage of all M ontana state citizens to become 
educated  about federal-Indian relations, and  to continue to cooperate in 
settling the historical conflicts bequeathed  to them  after years of struggle and 
com prom ise.
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